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

AFTER COMMUNISM WHAT?

Elemér Hankiss • Tony Judt • George Kolankiewicz
Andrei Marga • Mark Medish • István Rév
Richard Rose • Jacques Rupnik • George Schöpflin
Roman Szporluk • Eric Weil

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After Communism: What?

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Preface to the Issue "After Communism: What?"

THE TITLE OF THIS ISSUE, "After Communism: What?," may be thought an exercise in prophecy, an attempt to outline what the world is likely to be in the year 2000 or even beyond. No such vain ambition explains this issue; its intentions are substantially more modest. Almost five years after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, and more than two years after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, it may be useful to reflect on how events since 1989 are now viewed, what analyses and interpretations are commonly offered for this half decade, possibly as significant for Europe and the world as any other in modern times, whose meaning and import are becoming increasingly obscure.

To recapture the spirit of the autumn of 1989 in the summer of 1994 requires something more than memory; it is to accept the proposition that euphoria is almost always short-lived. This was the case in the period after World War II and, even more emphatically, after the unprecedented bloodletting and slaughter of World War I. Still, in both those instances, the hope that ran high for a moment helped create institutions that embodied the ideals of the day, this being particularly true in the international arena. The post-1989 era, by comparison, has been remarkably barren. Neither the West

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nor the East has known what to make of the new conditions generated by the official ending of the Soviet-American "cold war" standoff.

The "revolutions" since 1989, graphically communicated at the time by the all-seeing eye of putatively powerful television cameras, seem strangely remote today. Communism, in its old forms, at least in Europe, is officially dead, but the obsequies have not created a new belief in the inevitability of progress. Events in the twentieth century move rapidly, making suddenly obsolete what only yesterday appeared to be cosmic, pregnant with possibility. If there have been no great poets to celebrate these twentieth-century events in the way that a youthful Wordsworth and a host of others did so memorably in describing the joy they felt in being alive at the time of an earlier great revolution—that of France in 1789—the testimonies to the relief and pleasure felt by many at the sudden and unanticipated end of the Soviet domination of Eastern and Central Europe, at the collapse of the authoritarian regimes spawned by communist power, have been numerous.

The pages of *Dædalus* in the last half-decade are filled with such encomia. Indeed, several of these issues may be read today as a record of hopes both realized and betrayed. Joachim Gauck, writing recently in a *Dædalus* issue devoted to the new united Germany, spoke in terse and concise terms when he summed up what the East German rebellion had been about: "In the autumn of 1989, following a period of crippling depression, after years of remaining silent, a great number of men and women began to protest against a fossilized dictatorship no longer able to persuade its citizens that it was doing its job — taking care of the people's welfare."[1] Knowing that he and his contemporaries had lived through something too memorable to be rendered only in such dry prose, Gauck went on to describe what had happened to the German Democratic Republic, once thought to be among the more stable and efficient of all the communist regimes:

> The courageous protesters of Leipzig were symbolic of the rebirth of citizenship. It was a heady period for all who for decades had been forced to keep their heads down. The weekly demonstrations, in towns large and small, and the catalog of demands for human and personal rights and for radical political change became more and more determined. These protests culminated eventually in growing

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> demands for German reunification; not because the Easterners had suddenly become nationalists, but because in this manner they were most clearly able to express their desire to turn away from socialism.[2]

Was it, then, disgust with socialism, as the Soviet world had known it, disdain for the authoritarian regimes the Soviet armies had spawned and protected, that explained the euphoria of 1989? Was socialism indeed abandoned at that moment, to be replaced by a new faith in the workings of competitive markets? Was this the new freedom that was being heralded, and if so, had the time not come for a requiem to be sung for Marx, principal progenitor of the socialism that had kept a good part of Europe in thrall for decades? Frank Manuel, with his accustomed irony, writing in *Dædalus* in the spring of 1992, suggested that the moment for such a religious service might indeed have come. Disinclined to believe that communism as a political movement would soon revive, at least in its old forms, Manuel posed a more fundamental question about the Marxist utopia, never called that by those who had long insisted on its scientific truth.

Seeking to understand why Marxism had been embraced by so many, and knowing that it was not simply out of a concern for careers or a fear of totalitarian abuse — expediency alone could not explain why there had been such broad acceptance of authoritarian regimes—Manuel sought to draw up a balance sheet that might more accurately describe Marxism, in its promise but also in its reality. With characteristic verve and directness, Manuel wrote:

> For the sufferings of Karl Marx the exile, we can feel compassion; for his elaborate theoretical system, benign doubt and perhaps selective approval; for the abominable practices instituted in his name, loathing. A requiem for Marx cannot ignore the iniquities of his offspring—prophets and messiahs must share the blame for the excesses of their followers—but the banner that he unfurled need not be interred with his bones. Even a skeptical utopian like myself can still believe in the worth of the guiding principle: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.[3]

These *Dædalus* authors, like others who have written for the Journal in the last five years, have provided a unique record of what scholars, European and American, have thought of the events of this tumultuous time. They have generally avoided the kinds of

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simple analysis, so common in the mass media, that dwell largely on the personalities of leaders and the foibles of the masses. Understanding the hazards of offering conclusive judgments concerning the events of contemporary history, they have not been unwilling to make conjectures, based in most instances on their long acquaintance with the areas that transformed, that had previously seemed so frozen. Like Z, the *Dædalus* author who insisted on anonymity in late 1989 because his Soviet informants were known to the KGB and might be compromised by what he had written, they have been unafraid to hazard some prophecy about how matters would turn out. Prediction, however, has not been their principal preoccupation, nor is it the major concern of those who are writing in this issue.

It is well to remember how much has happened since Martin Malia, the anonymous Z, first submitted his manuscript to *Dædalus* in late 1989. Writing at a time when Gorbachev's stock in the West was exceedingly high, not least with the Bush administration in Washington, Malia knew the hazards of writing on contemporary history, necessarily competing with the judgments of those who imagined they knew more because they had access to all manner of secret materials, gathered by purportedly efficient intelligence services. This did not deter him from being very confident that the communist era in the Soviet Union was at an end, though no one could say when or how the final *coup de grace* would be administered, or what its consequences would be. Malia knew also that his own scholarly inquiry, based on long familiarity with Russian and Soviet history, but also on many extensive visits to the Soviet Union, including the Baltic republics, placed him in competition with journalists who pursued comparable sources with equal avidity. Still, reading the world press, he knew that journalistic accounts generally sought a different kind of truth, appealing to a different sort of audience.

There was no disparaging of the work of journalists, but the simple realization that the kind of article he had written could not be produced in the absence of years of scholarly labor. Compelling and enduring narratives, testimony to having witnessed unusual or even extraordinary events, access to those who are commonly perceived to be the principal actors and their accomplices, will indeed create the materials that a journalist can use to good effect in his

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daily reporting. For a more measured analysis, however, years of study are required, and there are few journalists prepared to alter their lives to engage in such a pursuit. It is no accident, for example, that William Henry Chamberlin's *The Russian Revolution,* written in 1935, survives even though innumerable scholars, with easier access to Soviet archives and more considerable knowledge of the period, have produced works of greater erudition and profundity. It is also no accident that Chamberlin did not base his history on his dozens of dispatches, but spent well over a decade preparing it.

When Chamberlin produced a new edition of *The Russian Revolution* in 1952, at the height of the Cold War and immediately before Stalin's death, he was fully aware of all that had happened in the seventeen years since he had written his original version. As he explained in his Introduction, these circumstances notwithstanding, he saw no need to change a single word of his text. Showing no arrogance, Chamberlin wrote: "The text of the history is unchanged in the new edition. It was written as a chronological factual record, based on examination of communist and anti-communist sources, of what occurred during the eventful years of revolution and civil war. It seemed inadvisable to alter this record in any way because of shifts in international political conditions and in the climate of public opinion."[4]

The fact, to use Chamberlin's own words, that "communist political and economic methods have prevailed over a vast Eurasian land mass, from China to Czechoslovakia," and that "approximately one-third of the population of the globe lives under some form of communist rule" did not seem to him to invalidate any part of his earlier narrative. As he said, "the special and unusual conditions which govern research by Russian or foreign historical scholars in Russia"—the purges and censorship of the Stalin years had made all manner of records both less available and more suspect—were creating problems for scholars working in the Soviet Union in the 1950s that had not existed in 1922 when Chamberlin began his study and research. Chamberlin was telling his readers that research into the communist world had become more difficult because of what a totalitarian regime was capable of doing, not least in altering and destroying records, but that in any case Kremlinology, as practiced in the United States and elsewhere, was not his subject.

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The conditions that obtained for so long in this century, that closed whole societies to serious scholarly inquiry, that made obligatory the kinds of diplomatic understatement intended to guarantee that visas to individual communist states were not denied—that an individual not unwittingly burn his bridges with too-critical judgments, jeopardizing a professional career in the process—have largely ceased to exist. The choice made by a certain number of scholars not even to seek admission to communist countries, believing that a price would be exacted for the privilege, has ceased to have any meaning. Today, in much of the former communist world, archives, though in great disarray, with shortcomings created by decades-long censorship, are increasingly open to scholarly inquiry. Yet, five years after the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet empire, it is obvious that we are only in the very first stages of the historical revisionism that is likely to go on for much of the next century, that must make the story of the twentieth century a very different one from that composed either during the Cold War years or during the time of the several so-called thaws.

If historians, sociologists, political scientists, and others who once wrote so confidently and openly about the Soviet Union and its satellite states, imagining they knew these societies, would rather forget what they once said, there is no reason to imagine that the "secret" memoranda still hidden in foreign offices and defense files showed greater perspicacity or insight. For all sorts of reasons, not least the wish to please political superiors intent on disseminating certain kinds of information about the communist world, it was difficult even for highly trained men and women with the requisite language skills to be critical of the prevailing orthodoxies in the West, as often the creation of myth as the expression of longing for a world that could never be. Because it was so difficult to penetrate societies in the Soviet sphere — orbiting satellites and spies provided only very limited information on how these societies were in fact functioning—the most outlandish theories could be propagated on how the two systems, the communist and the Western, were moving towards each other, how they would in some very proximate future come to resemble each other.

This is what made Z's contribution in *Dædalus* significant. While Z's identity was a major preoccupation of certain journalists, who saw themselves as professional sleuths engaged in "investigative

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reporting," some argued that the anonymous author had to be a person high in the American administration, perhaps someone seeking to distance himself from official policy. For an author so critical of Gorbachev at a time when the President and the Secretary of State were actively courting him, only anonymity, it was thought, could provide the protection needed. The failure to note that none of those named by these eager journalists could conceivably have written the essay, that there was no George Kennan in the administration of George Bush, was a relatively minor mistake. The more important one, certainly, related to the failure to distinguish between what a scholar might know and wish to argue and what an employee of the State Department or the White House, seeking to influence the President on his next summit meeting with his Soviet counterpart, might feel it necessary to prepare for notebooks to be carried on the Air Force One flight.

If Malia was critical of Gorbachev, if he knew in 1989 that the communist utopian experiment was doomed, that nothing could save it, this had the largest implications for policy if it was believed and acted on. There was no disposition in the Bush administration to believe Z or to imagine how policy would be changed if his *obiter dicta,* grounded in historical knowledge, had any validity whatever. In the critical year, 1989, and in the two that followed, securing new arms control agreements with the Soviets had a priority never given to other issues, whether they involved providing significant economic aid to the newly-liberated states of Eastern and Central Europe or taking account of what were already recognizable and unmistakable signs of a nascent nationalism—a wish for national self-identity—in many of the former republics of the Soviet Union. As for the growing conflict in Yugoslavia, this was thought to be an issue apart. Precious years were wasted in living with illusions about the ways in which communism would be "reformed."

If the United States had been alone in its obtuseness, this might have been ascribed to its having been for too long obsessed by the security threats posed by the Soviet Union. In fact, no other government, in NATO or outside, would ever be able to claim that any of its more prominent politicians had expressed in convincing and powerful argument the opportunities created by the events of 1989, 1990, and 1991, or the hazards that might lie on the other shore of a very temporary and far-too-indistinctly discovered island no longer

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called Utopia, but now temporarily named Euphoria. The most simple explanations circulated to account for events that had no precedent in the twentieth century and almost no historic antecedents. The sudden and total collapse of an authoritarian regime, that had in any number of earlier crises demonstrated great strength and will, ought to have called forth urbane and imaginative analyses. Instead, despite the warnings of those who knew Russia well, who recalled its pre-Soviet history, a vulgar triumphalism was offered to explain how a once mighty empire had fallen.

That the "revolutions" of 1989 did not produce an Edmund Burke—whether or not one chooses to agree with the fevered reservations he expressed about those of his contemporaries who created myths about the import of the revolutionary events in France in 1789, a mythology he declared offensive, false, and dangerous—is relevant to a larger question that needs to be posed. That question, stated simply, is why the reaction to the cosmic happenings of our own time has been so lame, why the euphoria has been so short-lived, why the institutional innovations made possible by the end of the Cold War have been so few in number. Put another way, the most disconcerting aspect of the last five years may be that indisputably large historic events have produced limited reflection and argument in the West, that they have stirred little controversy, illuminating conditions that have developed following revolutionary events with large political, economic, social, intellectual, and moral implications. The West, for complex and various reasons, has been so preoccupied with its own infinitely less serious economic and social crises that it has failed to consider what relevance events in the former communist world might have for itself or the world more generally.

There is genuine bewilderment today about Russia, and also about other former Soviet republics, the old communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, and how all this is playing itself out in politics and intellectual life. In this void, journalists sometimes venture, most often only to report what others have told them, what is being said about the health of Yeltsin, the threat of "fascism" in one or another corner of Europe, the social problems created by a market economy not providing the protection once guaranteed by social welfare policies put in place by more authoritarian communist regimes. These are issues that journalists are

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trained to dwell on. It is for scholars to deal with more long-range and basic issues, to suggest why contemporary history cannot simply be a collection of random narrative accounts, quoting the proverbial man in the street, providing the kinds of information admirably suited to the two-minute sound bytes favored by television news reporting.

We live in historic times. This may be thought an overworked cliché, but it is more true today than at any time since 1945. This, however, is not a widely shared sentiment. Much of Europe, like the rest of the world, is burdened by its great exertions to resolve problems, political, social, and economic, defined as specific to the afflicted societies. The "burden of the past" is rarely thought of, and indeed little considered. Opportunities for observation, conjecture, and analysis in this century have never been greater than they are now, at this moment of rapid and chaotic change. This, scarcely apparent to men and women who have still not taken in the full dimensions of the shock administered to any number of earlier conventional beliefs by the events of 1989, leads to analysis that is too dominated by recollections of Weimar and Hitler, too much preoccupied with what Russia will be after Yeltsin leaves, dies, or is forced to resign. It will surprise no reader of *Dædalus* that this issue is as much concerned with the Enlightenment and reason as it is with nationalism and national self-identity. The decay of any number of comfortable myths created only yesterday, intended to survive for millennia, has made earlier musings obsolescent. History—long-range memory—is called on to provide theory and analysis of societies once thought to be all alike, made so by their common capitulation to communism.

In the next century, if these and other societies remain open, even to the extent that they are today, we may expect a form of international scholarship in the social sciences and the humanities that does not now exist. Many, aware of the plight of the natural sciences in the former Soviet world today—and properly concerned about it—know considerably less about the price paid in other branches of scholarship where the absence of intellectual exchange and the presence of authoritarian censorship bred ignorance of a kind not likely to be quickly dissipated. Those who lived under authoritarian regimes for forty, fifty, or seventy-five years will show the scars of that unhappy experience for a very long time. The

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question, most urgent for those in the West and elsewhere who were spared these tragic conditions, is whether they will profit from the information reaching them, the access afforded them, whether without the threat of imminent nuclear destruction they will recognize the need for a scholarship broader and more generous than any created during the years of the Cold War. It is not enough that Kremlinology has been finally interred; a whole way of looking at the world—the Manichaean perspective—needs to be questioned.

This issue owes much to those who made possible other recent *Dædalus* volumes. Though no funds were explicitly set aside for it, grants from the Ford Foundation and the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH allowed us to engage in the kinds of planning that made it a reality. The only regret, and it is a real one, is that financial conditions made it impossible to recruit and engage a large new generation of Eastern and Central European scholars whose careers were not made under communism, who have not to this moment achieved great political or intellectual prominence. What the United States and many of its NATO allies did so successfully in the years after World War II in creating a West European-American community of scholars needs now to be done for a much larger universe. It can only have beneficial effects, destroying parochialisms that afflict those recently liberated but also many in the West who have never acknowledged that they too live in isolated and confining intellectual environments, though of very different kinds from those that still exist in Central and Eastern Europe.

S.R.G.

ENDNOTES

[1]Joachim Gauck, "Dealing with a Stasi Past," *Dædalus* 123 (1) (Winter 1994): 277.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Frank E. Manuel, "A Requiem for Karl Marx," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 19.

[4]William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1935), v.

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Tony Judt

Nineteen Eighty-Nine: The End of *Which* European Era?

Every epoch is a sphinx that plunges into the abyss as soon as its riddle has been solved.

—Heinrich Heine

POSTWAR EUROPE WAS ERECTED UPON a foundation of myths and forgetting. This is not as cynical or as dismissive as it may appear; the myths were often positive and helpful, there was much that needed to be forgotten, and the results, especially in the western half of the continent, were impressive. Nor are such exercises in collective self-construction necessarily foredoomed to futility. The treaties which ended the wars of the Reformation, the Thirty Years War, and the Napoleonic wars all depended upon comparably ambitious attempts to put the past away and all of them succeeded in some measure; their effects are with us still. But for reasons peculiar to the shape of twentieth-century history the post-1945 settlement has proven peculiarly illusory, something which was already clear in Eastern Europe by the early 1980s and which 1989 and subsequent developments have brought home to everyone. The purpose of this essay is to try to understand the era which has now closed in its historical context and to sketch an outline of the terms in which Europe might think of itself as it enters a new and distinctive stage in its history.

After 1945 there was much to forget. Most obviously, and this is a subject which I have addressed elsewhere, there was the experience of occupation and collaboration—or, in the case of those countries like Germany or Italy where fascism came to power by

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domestic means, the memory of more than a decade of dictatorship.[1] Beyond this lay the unhappy memory of World War I and its inadequate resolution; the resentments and injustices occasioned by the Treaty of Versailles; the economic debacle of the interwar decades, itself a heritage of World War I but exacerbated by autarkic and antagonistic commercial policies; unresolved nineteenth-century dilemmas of social inequity and imperial conquest; and, overshadowing it all, a deep, continent-wide sense of decline and decadence. This last sentiment, although the least tangible of Europe's inherited problems, was also in some sense the most important. It was shared by the generation that would come to power in 1945, and it accounts for their common disgust with the inadequate responses of the democracies to the interwar crisis and for their earlier susceptibility to the appeals of fascism and communism alike. It lay behind the sentiment of many intellectuals that "Auschwitz" stood for more than just a German atrocity: the Holocaust was the culmination and proof of the ultimate decline of European civilization. By May 1945 it was not only Europe's great cities which lay buried in rubble, it was the very spirit of the continent itself.

To put all that behind, to imagine a new, better Europe was a massive undertaking. It could not be done by policy and planning alone. Marshall, Beveridge, the welfare state, multiyear plans, and nationalization were the necessary conditions of European reconstruction but alone they would have been insufficient. What gave them meaning were certain foundation myths, most of which concerned questions of guilt and forgiveness. The success of these myths is illustrated in the fact that the mistakes of 1919 were not repeated, even though in 1945 there was more real guilt around. For reasons at once prudential and strategic, Germany (both Germanys) was quickly incorporated into international communities on relatively nondiscriminating terms. Potentially damaging civil wars in France and Italy were nipped in the bud by strong postwar governments at the price of burying old feuds and memories of fascist crimes or venal acts of collaboration.[2] The nationalist sentiments and national suspicions which had shaped European politics since the late nineteenth century were denied expression, consigned to a past whose ugly outcomes were now plain and by common consent unacceptable. The only acceptable collective objectives in Western Europe were now social (in the form of egalitar-

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ian redistributive legislation), economic (in the form of productivist goals), and internationalist (in the shape of a variety of possible institutions, both European and global).

In Eastern Europe something similar took place, its similarity masked by the ideological and geopolitical interests in which it was characteristically expressed. The bitter resentments of the small countries of the region—inadequately served at Versailles or Saint-Germain, truncated or abandoned in the course of diplomatic maneuverings thereafter, lacking in most cases a competent political class, economic resources, or the means to exploit them rationally, short on social justice or the means to express discontent, and most recently the chief victims of a war from which they would derive no benefits—were quickly buried beneath an obligatory myth of fraternal internationalism and the assertion (partially true) that a revolutionary transformation had taken place. Here too potential civil wars deriving from wartime or prewar divisions were snuffed out from above, and where retribution was applied it was mostly a cynical business, undertaken more to ensure the firm implantation of communist authority than to root out those responsible for collaboration with the Nazis or for domestic political crimes. In republican Italy, for analogous reasons, administrators, policemen, and others who had served the old regime and its foreign paymasters were often left in place, the reality of the continuity they represented overlain by a myth of renewal and revolution. In Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe, there was indeed real, radical change—geared to redistribution, production, and new international institutions—but here, too, the foundation myths came first and took precedence.

The need for such a radical break with the past—a discursive break no less than a political one—lay in the special circumstances of the moment.[3] In Western Europe the whole process was driven by a French search for security. After 1945 the French were doing what they had sought to achieve after 1918, but this time with more success. After a series of false starts in the years from 1945 to 1947 French policymakers realized that their best hope lay not in pursuing the existing Franco-German antagonism to their own advantage, but in "Europeanizing" their problem: incorporating West Germany, with its resources and potential, into a European community where the Germans would be bound to the French and the

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French would cease to fear the Germans. The addition of Italy and the Benelux countries was, in this context, little more than a window dressing. Men such as Schumann and Monnet sought to ascribe a European dimension to France's interests. In this, on the whole, they succeeded, until 1990.[4]

The myth of a "united Europe" was not wholly illusory. At each stage—in 1950, in 1958, in the Single European Act, and in the project of Maastricht—European diplomats and their intellectual spokesmen were compelled to describe in normative, even ethical, terms a vision of the continent which had vastly outgrown the purposes or possibilities originally assigned to it. To do less would have seemed like failure, an acknowledgment that "Europe" was and could only be the sum of the separate interests of its members. Like a middleweight boxer blown up to heavyweight dimensions, the "European idea" put forth promises of pan-European unity and offered hope and prosperity to any and all states who qualified for inclusion. The reputation of the myth of "Europe" depended upon it never being put to the test. The inclusion of three poorer countries from Southern Europe (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal five years later) stretched the resources of an entity which relied upon steady economic growth and great collective wealth. After 1989 the threats posed by the collapse of communism exceeded the absorbent capacities of Western Europe at a time when its economies were no longer expanding. The myth burst.

For some time Western Europeans have had their doubts about the "European idea." The first postwar generation was happy to believe in it, to put their faith in the thirty-year long miracle of sustained growth, and to share in the benefits of "Euro-travel," "Euro-fashion," and so forth. Their children, while dismissive of national identity and happy enough to be "Europeans," did not inherit faith in economic improvement and material security: in the 1960s they found it aesthetically unappealing and emotionally unsatisfying; after 1973 (and especially since 1987) they find it deeply unconvincing. Despite all the chatter about a common European currency, the impending removal of frontiers, 1992, and all that, a growing number of young (Western) Europeans well before 1989 had begun to take their distance from the postwar myth. This was less prominent in places like Greece or Spain, or even Italy, where "Europe" still offered the prospect of an unattained cosmopolitan

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modernity, than it was in Germany, Denmark, Britain, or even France, where its role as a screen behind which national interests could be pursued had worn thin.

The irony, of course, is that the place where "Europe" continued to function as a powerful myth and common project was in *Eastern* Europe, where dissidents, young people, and even reform-minded communist managers longed to share in the personal, political, and moral benefits of "Europeanness," to "return" to a Europe from which they had been cut off by their enforced attachment to a different and distinctly dysfunctional myth, "socialism." Here, too, "Europe" was a myth, a language, but it was part of a strategy for escaping from a hopeless past: by "returning to Europe" Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and their neighbors could not only overcome economic retardation with help from Brussels, but could find the strength to fight and defeat the forces of darkness in their own national traditions—much as de Gaulle and Adenauer had sought to do in their historic treaty of 1963.

What we have seen since 1989 is the steady erosion of these illusions in the liberated lands of Eastern Europe at the same time as the last remaining strands of the Western myth have fallen away. These are interrelated developments. Had it not been for German unification, itself the most immediate and important consequence of the events of 1989, neither Germany nor France would be facing their present dilemmas. The French would not be suffering the short term effects of high German interest rates and the long term realization that their Europe, in which France was the primary beneficiary of German economic strength, no longer exists; the Germans would not be facing, for the first time since 1950, the prospect of a seriously troubled economy and, with it, the need to rethink the degree of importance they should attach to being "Europeans" rather than Germans, given that the two may no longer be compatible. This Franco-German dilemma has not only damaged the European idea, it has revealed it as vulnerable and mythic. "Euro-talk" in Western Europe today rings cynical, when it does not sound merely naive.[5]

Meanwhile, the alacrity with which Western Europeans (notably the French) backed away from their earlier enthusiasm for a liberated Eastern Europe has seriously weakened the position of those in the former communist lands who are pro-Europe. Since the European

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Community is in no hurry to admit countries like Hungary or Poland (much less Lithuania, Romania, or Slovenia) into its midst, fearful of the added costs of subsidies and the competition from low-wage economies (not to speak of an increased flow of "immigrant" labor), the idea of Europe is looking more than a little tattered in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. As a result, those same intellectual dissidents who were most outspokenly "European" in their pronouncements and ideals are now multiply discredited with the local electorate: seemingly naive and out-of-touch with local sentiment, they are accused of being spokesmen for a foreign, cosmopolitan interest which is antagonistic to the needs of the nation. Adherence to the Western community is now the only foreign policy option in most of Eastern Europe, but affection for "Europe" is at a discount.

With the decline of the European idea, reduced now to pragmatic economic practice and administrative uniformity, other postwar illusions have been shattered. The European economic miracle was built in part on the importation of cheap, non-European (or at any rate non-European Economic Community) labor. The "open door" policy of the 1950s had the further advantage of echoing postwar ideals concerning the right of asylum, the free movement of peoples, and an end to ethnic or national discrimination. No longer required, seen as an economic burden and a social threat, these "guest workers" and their children are now "immigrants" or "aliens." Since the late 1960s the British, the French, and the Scandinavians have been putting up barriers against outsiders, a process now at its zenith with the most recent legislation in France and Germany; the unification of Germany and related post-1989 developments have made uncomfortably obvious a process already under way.[6]

The Yugoslav civil war, which has contributed to the "immigrant problem" in no small measure,[7] has also shattered two other treasured postwar illusions. If World War I was mistakenly supposed to have been the war "to end all wars," World War II did indeed seem for many years to have been just that, at least as far as Europe was concerned. The threat of nuclear disaster, the creation of NATO, and the imposition of Soviet power seemed to forever exclude a military response to intra-European crises. Rare exceptions to this norm were attributed either to domestic instability occasioned by quasi-colonial crises (as in France or Greece), or to misapprehen-

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sions concerning the realities of global power (as in Hungary in 1956). That Europeans might come to blows over such traditional matters as borders, nationality, or ethnic territorial claims seemed unthinkable; that they might do so in ways uncannily redolent of earlier conflicts hitherto assigned to history books would have seemed horrific and absurd just five years ago.

Moreover, the events in Yugoslavia reveal not only the extent to which Europe has been unable to escape its past, but how hollow was another of the continent's myths: the newly acquired capacity for sustained collective action. We have not come to an end of intra-European wars, and it is now clear that there is little that a place called "Europe" can do about them. That there was ever any reason to believe otherwise was a myth sustained during a time, from 1949–1989, when Europe was, in fact, happily powerless, when action or inaction by the United States or the Soviet Union was the only significant variable in international politics.[8] The broader promises of the postwar world—the United Nations' reiterated desires to see the whole continent "reunited" and collective European action—depended upon them never being put to the test.

* * *

Perhaps the most telling sign that a profound change has taken place in recent years is the unsuitability, the irrelevance of many of the categories of description conventionally employed to make sense of European affairs. It no longer makes any sense to describe someone as a "socialist," for example; in Eastern Europe the term is heavily polluted (although nostalgia for the pre-1989 stability in countries undergoing traumatic economic upheaval may now be giving it a brief political afterlife). In Western Europe there are politicians and political parties who still operate under that label, but neither they nor their audience attach any historical significance to the word. The Labour Party in Britain is struggling to free itself from an association with labor, though to date it has lacked the courage of the Italian Communists who, like the Italian Christian Democrats, have changed their name in an effort to erase past associations.

But it is more than just a matter of names. In Eastern Europe the very terms "Left" and "Right" no longer mean what they once did,

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and those who operate under them are often seen by their opponents and even by their own electorate as belonging somewhere else on the spectrum. The older usage of "Populist" and "Westernizer" in places like Hungary or Slovakia to capture the historical cleavage between national conservatives and urban-liberal modernizers no longer makes sense—the lines are as blurred by conservative parties with rural roots pressing for Euro-membership as they are by former communists trading on religious, provincial, and neo-Slavophile prejudices.

This problem of categories is especially acute in Eastern Europe, where for nearly fifty years collective national identity was in large measure determined by the nature of one's relations with the Soviet Union: how friendly they were, when and if they were punctuated by revolts and with what outcome, degrees of autonomy in matters of religion, economic policy, and foreign relations, etc. Since 1989 all that is gone (and consigned to a limbo between history and memory whence it will only be retrieved with difficulty). In a region whose recent past offers no clear social or political descriptors it is tempting to erase from the public record any reference to the communist era, as though it were but an unhappy and transient interlude—in its place we find an older past substituted as a source of identity and reference. This is deeply misleading. In Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe, something important happened in the years from 1939 to 1989; to explain the Czech-Slovak or Serb-Croat conflicts as "timeless historical antagonisms" as though the European past had just been waiting to get its revenge upon the illusory postwar interlude is as meaningless as attributing the resurgence of neo-Nazi skinheads in Germany to some extra-historical problem of "Germanness" reaching deep into the unresolved past.

This inclination to treat post-1989 Europe as a mere revival of the past could only make sense if one satisfactorily demonstrated that the era which has just ended was indeed the one which began with Yalta, or with Hitler's invasion of Poland, and that the passing of the postwar illusions leaves us more or less where we started. But the categories of 1939 are, as I have suggested, of little use; they are themselves part of the era which has now closed, and their current exploitation points to the present political vacuum. Where the promise of the future once helped to justify political and social programs and languages, the past, however distorted, is all that

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remains. Instead of mobilizing ideas and people in the name of things to come, national and ethnic leaders invoke times past. Reactionaries always did this, of course. What has changed is that now "reaction" occupies both its own terrain and that of the erstwhile radicals. This is as true for France as it is for Slovakia and Croatia.[9]

In the matter of defunct eras we are dealing today not only with 1945–1989 but also with 1917–1989. To say that Europe until recently operated under the sign of the Holocaust, or of Hitler, does not sufficiently or precisely explain what came apart in 1989. For both parts of Europe after 1945, just as for Europe (communist, fascist, and liberal) before 1939, the crucial reference was Lenin's Revolution. This was the event which not only shaped geopolitics in our century but also gave new life to the nineteenth-century tradition of revolution. Because of what happened in St. Petersburg in 1917 the prospect and the language of revolution made sense as an influential and seductive way of thinking about public life and collective action in our times. It is what gave the communist and even the noncommunist Left a common eschatology and provided them, at least until 1968, with a shared language, however distorted. Without that language and that reference there is no radical project in European political thought, and its absence has shaken European political sensibilities in ways that we have not yet fully understood.

Yet, 1917, too, was part of a distinctive and older tradition. Lenin provided the European Left with a means of sustaining the heritage of the French Revolution in social and international circumstances which by 1900 had threatened to render the language of 1789 hopelessly inadequate and imprecise. In other words, he saved the revolutionary political myth, albeit at the price of destroying much of its ethical credibility. This was a matter of some importance, since in the aftermath of the failed revolutions of 1848 most of the radical energies of Europe had gone into national movements of various kinds, or else had moderated their ambitions and entered the mainstream of liberal politics in fact if not in name. The confusion engendered by the shift of the revolutionary center from Paris to Frankfurt and thence to Moscow was overcome by the characteristically nineteenth-century association of revolutionary progress with industrial production; if Russia could out-industrialize the West, then its revolutionary claims would be retrospectively legitimized.

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If we have reached the end of the revolutionary era set in motion by Lenin, then we have in an important sense also closed the era opened by his French predecessors in 1789. This conclusion will come as no surprise to many in France who have been proclaiming the end of this epoch for some time now; but whereas their claims rested on domestic transformations in France, including the terminal decline of France's own Communist Party, they are now confirmed on a pan-European scale by the collapse of the Bolshevik regime, the institutional incarnation of the European revolutionary epoch. The implications are startling in that both the language and the projects of European political life rest squarely upon the terms of reference in which the heritage of the French Revolution has hitherto been grasped. Without it as a reference, the distinctive features of Left and Right blur, as they are already beginning to do in parts of Europe. Without the eschatology of revolution, "socialism" makes no sense. Perhaps more importantly, without the significance accorded to "1789," the building blocks of European political liberalism, the other great heritage of the revolutionary era, lose their form. It is for this reason that political theorists and philosophers in Hungary, Poland, Germany, France, Italy, and elsewhere have in recent years been turning to the somewhat different Anglo-American tradition of liberal political thought to see what might be grafted on to the faltering continental stem.

Revolutions, of course, are not the only mileposts of the past. Events since 1989 suggest that another era is coming to a close, that of the nineteenth-century nation-state. The demise of the nation-state was too hastily announced in recent decades, the presumptive outcome of a globalized economy and the successful Eurofication of at least the Western half of the continent. If anything, the reaction against Maastricht and the postcommunist backlash in the East would superficially suggest an altogether too healthy presence of the national idea. What, after all, are German unification, the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union, and the collapse of Yugoslavia if not the evidence of rampant national revivals?

The evidence is misleading because it confuses national identity with the nation-state.[10] The European nation-states of the last century came into being either through the successful expansion of an early-modern dynastic state into linguistically contiguous territory,

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or else through the breakup of an old empire—or both, as in the case of Germany and Italy. Whether formed early (i.e., Greece, Belgium, Serbia, and Italy) or in the last bout of state construction after World War I (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, etc.) these countries were never ethnically, culturally, or socially homogenous. Some of them became so in the course of World War II or as a result of enforced postwar population shifts. This merely underscored the point that such states were, in almost every case, the products of Great Power diplomacy (or its failure). *These* are the states which are now breaking up. The new fault lines vary, but the pattern is consistent. From Spain to Belgium, from Italy to Yugoslavia, from Czechoslovakia to the United Kingdom (a marginal case), European states are dividing into regions. The nineteenth-century settlement of Europe, itself the sediment of shifting imperial plates, is cracking.[11]

The era to which these events signal an end is the one that began in 1848, following the failure of the revolutions of that year. From then until 1945 nationalism and industrial progress substituted for revolution and social transformation across much of Europe. That nationalist sentiment and the ultimate configurations of European nation-states did not always match helps account for the domestic conflict of the new states and their angry quarrels with neighbors—Polish, Hungarian, German, and Italian nationalism took their cue from the perceived inadequacy of their geographical area and the presence of unwanted minorities within their territory. World War II and the enforced settlement that followed put an end to such disputes, but also contributed to a radical undermining of the fragile legitimacy of the newer states—between Soviet internationalism and the promise of Europe their raison d'être seemed elusive. Once free to pursue their own ends—or in the Western case to take advantage of the promise of a transnational Europe—Slovenians, Croats, Flemings, Lombards, and Catalans saw no good reason to accept the terms of earlier settlements which now seemed more restrictive than liberating.

Another way of thinking about the collapse of the nineteenth-century settlement (here taking the nineteenth century to have ended with the defeat of the Central Powers in 1989) is to note the alacrity with which the intelligentsia of much of the continent has thrown in its lot with the notion of extraterritorial identity. Until 1919, the

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idea of a "European intellectual" was almost unheard of and something of an oxymoron. An intellectual was, almost by definition, the representative, spokesman, theorist of a nation (in the case of new or aspirant nations) or of a political or cultural stream within a nation (as in the French case). In the most extreme cases (i.e., the Czechs or the Croats) the intellectuals *were* the nation; nobility or urban bourgeoisie identified with the empire (Austrian, in this case), while peasants lacked any collective consciousness or representation. Intellectuals (forgiving the anachronism) invented, or reinvented, the nation, its myths, its language, its culture, and its demands. From Fichte to Masaryk, through Palacký and Kossuth, the mark of the intellectual was his place as nation-maker. Even Jaurès or Croce, not to mention Julien Benda or Giovanni Gentile, were primarily national intellectuals concerned with domestic debates, however great their international reputation.

After 1919, and with growing effect after 1945, intellectuals were internationalized—or else attached themselves disastrously (as in Germany, France, or Romania) to an aggressively fascist aesthetic. The European idea, as a substitute for the sort of nationalism which was thought to have produced 1914 and its heritage, acquired a certain appeal, reinforced after 1945 by the idea of the intellectual as spokesman for a morally troubled world. In a curious paradox this process was uniquely slowed down in France by the accident of French postwar intellectual ascendancy, which meant that a French intellectual could be both French and universalist without apparent contradiction. Elsewhere—in Italy or West Germany, for example—intellectuals consciously addressed themselves to a cosmopolitan audience and took up a new role as spokesmen *against* the national idea.[12] In Eastern Europe the nationalist intellectual was, of course, defunct after 1945, replaced by the progressive, socialist, or communist intellectual whose vision was necessarily nonnational, the more so because so many Eastern and Central European intellectuals were exiles in their own lands, often returning home after years spent abroad as refugees from domestic authoritarianism and foreign fascism alike. But with the declining legitimacy of communism, intellectuals in Eastern Europe took on a new and difficult role: they became critics of the Soviet-imposed regime not in the name of the oppressed nation but on behalf of the individual citizen and the ("European") idea of freedom and rights.

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Intellectuals and the nation-state have a close and symbiotic relationship in modern European history. The fragmentation of this link signals a crisis for both parties. Deprived of intellectual justifications for their existence and lacking an empire or empires from which they seek liberation, the nation-states of Europe can only be grounded in economic and political necessity or local interest. In every case today this appears to point either to "Europe" (as fortress or protector) or else to multifurcation—or both, for regions like Lombardy, Slovenia, or Catalonia where the national entity of which they have hitherto been a part seems more of a drain than a benefit. For intellectuals in these places the local interest argument is unappealing. This is not to deny the very real presence of "nationalist" intellectuals in Hungary or Serbia, apologists for the retrenching and revanchist ambitions of their political leaders; but such intellectuals, men like Csurka, are thereby constrained to speak a language which is peculiarly repulsive to the sensibilities of an international intellectual community brought up on the lessons of World War II. Most European intellectuals, faced with the current crisis, may despair of "Europe" but it is all they have.

For this reason it may be that the era whose crisis we are now experiencing began not in 1945, nor in 1917, nor even in 1848, 1815, or 1789. We are living, in one special sense, the end of the European Enlightenment. On the surface this may seem an odd proposition. After all, Europe is still a continent whose political and cultural life is shaped by the dream of rationality, progress, and critical tolerance which we associate with the revolution in European sensibilities that unfolded in the century between the British and the French Revolutions— or, if you like, between the Scientific and the Industrial Revolutions. Indeed, to the extent that the characteristic political form of the European Enlightenment was enlightened despotism—of Maria Theresia and Joseph II, of Frederick the Great and Louis XVI—we live now more than ever in the glow of the Enlightenment idea. What is "Brussels," after all, if not a renewal of the goal of efficient universal administration, shorn of particularisms and driven by rational calculation and the rule of law, which the great eighteenth-century monarchs strove unsuccessfully to institute in their ramshackle lands? Indeed, it is the very rationality of the European Community ideal which has made it appealing to many European intellectuals—and especially to that educated professional

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intelligentsia which sees in Brussels an escape from hidebound practices and particularisms, much as eighteenth-century lawyers, traders, and writers appealed to enlightened monarchs over the heads of reactionary parliaments and diets. In this limited sense the European Enlightenment is alive and well and living in Jacques Delors.

And yet the Enlightenment *is* in crisis. By this I do not mean that we are about to forget the lessons of the early modern revolutions, abandon discursive rationality and experimental thought, reject the premises of social and political modernity—though we should not too hastily dismiss the notion that there are influential thinkers in Europe today who would do just that. But there is a new counter-Enlightenment in the air and its symptoms are important.

Among these the most obvious is the crisis of the European intellectuals. This may be read in two ways: In a functional sense, intellectuals are redundant and feel themselves to be so. In Eastern Europe their political influence is at a low ebb; they are perceived as culturally marginal and an embarrassment, a reminder of a time when most of their audience did not wish to associate with them and an annoying prolongation of the dissident conscience with which most Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and others had, and still have, little in common. In their marginality they speak neither for the state nor to it. They have lost their role as self-appointed spokesmen for imprisoned peoples, the only role they ever truly had in Central and Eastern Europe, and in societies where there is no integrated cosmopolitan subcommunity they are adrift. The Jewish intelligentsia of fin de siècle Vienna or Budapest might have been marginal to the Empire as a whole, but they were a very real part of a very real micro-society, and from that base they could speak to the world. Today, Czech or Hungarian intellectuals have no such base and thus speak to the world from nowhere. This is not a comfortable or sustainable pose.

In a similar sense, the intellectuals of Western Europe are also adrift. In Paris, still the intellectual heartland of the continent, there is interminable, agonized debate over the lost role of the intellectuals. The classic role of the Western intellectual, as a surrogate authority for both the prince and the people, has been lost. The identity and importance of the state have been blurred by the apparent Europeanizing of power and the privatizing of resources,

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while the moral standing of the masses has dimmed along with the great theories of human progress which established the people—or privileged elements within it—as vehicles of rational change. In the words of Margaret Thatcher, "society" does not exist. Intellectuals may speak and write and make important ethical pronouncements, but *they themselves* no longer have a theory of why anyone should listen to them.

This is the second element in the decline of the intellectuals. The Enlightenment bequeathed an ideal of knowledge, the belief that understanding the natural, social, and spiritual realms was within the human grasp, and that those who grasped it—scientists, philosophers, social theorists—had a special claim on the attention of rulers and the ruled alike. This fundamental notion—the controlling vision of European modernity—has now come under attack from so many directions that we have forgotten how crucial it is. It has been condemned in its Marxist form as a hubristic and dangerous assertion of human power; in its scientific form as a naive and no less dangerous misunderstanding of the mysteries of nature; in its economic form as a monstrous and self-destructive confidence in the myth of productivity and transformation; and in its philosophical form as the quintessential fallacy of rational objectivism.

There is, of course, much about these attacks on the Enlightenment inheritance that is contradictory and confused. Neo-Heideggerians of the Right may see industrial society as the vicious stepchild of discursive rationality, but their own arguments are no less steeped in post-Enlightenment assumptions; neo-Heideggerians of the Left (Havel might be a case in point) express an almost mystical distaste for the political and economic damage wrought by thoughtless, overconfident modernity but set against it ideals of individual freedom and civic values which took their modern form in the Enlightenment era.

It is this confusion over what exactly its critics find unattractive about our world, and why, which makes it harder to see at first glance just how much the common theme is one corrosive of the assumptions under which we have practiced society since the eighteenth century. The direct attacks on rational discourse itself, although they are the most obviously dismissive of whatever it means to be "enlightened," are probably the least important because of their marginal and self-refuting quality.[13] Not many people are

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listening to the extreme Derridians, including Derrida himself. But the broader, shallower claim that there is nothing big left to believe in, that ideals are a sham, that progress is an illusion, and that short-term self-interest is the only sustainable private goal (there being no public ones) has now moved from the sphere of public cant into that of cultural discourse. The free-thinking man in the public sphere—Kant's vision of the Enlightenment—still exists; that is what an intellectual is. But for such a person to perform his crucial role—in the Habermasian sense of speaking rationally in and to a public sphere—he must share with his audience a common epistemology. There must be an agreed sense of what constitutes rational collective projects and for what ends it makes sense to pursue them. Today the European intellectual cannot credibly offer reasons beyond the prudential for the thoughts he is propounding, and that is truly a sea change in European thought. In Bertrand Russell's words, we are discovering that there is in fact *less* in heaven and earth than was dreamt of in our philosophy.

* * *

History, as Marx was not the first to note, has more imagination than men. Whatever is now happening in Europe will lead *somewhere*. The point I wish to make in this essay is that "somewhere" will look very different from the Europe we have known since 1945. It already does. The regional dislocation of Europe is a fact; Yugoslavia will never be the same again, nor will Italy. The recent Spanish elections came very close to giving the Catalan nationalists a veto over national legislation, a veto they would have exercised to give Catalonia a near monopoly of its resources. Such regionalization, identical to that sought by the Northern League in Italy and already achieved, at too high a price, by the relatively well-off northern states of Yugoslavia, will be disastrous for the southern extremities of Mediterranean Europe, the more so as it is they who sit closest to the ever increasing demographic pressures from Africa to the south and Asia to the east. In the same way, the likely compromise, whereby the western fringe of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech lands) will become a Euro-suburb while "Byzantine" Europe (from Latvia to Bulgaria) will be left to stew in its provincial

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juices, will further exacerbate the politics of nostalgic resentment in the latter region.

This does not signal a return to the past. Between the end of steady economic growth (itself now recognized, in historical perspective, as a moment of peculiar and contingent good fortune unlikely to be repeated) and the retreat of Great Powers and great ideas alike, we can reasonably expect to experience for the foreseeable future an era of uncertainty, and with it domestic and international resentments and instability. The crucial building blocks of international moral institutions in our era—human rights, social justice, national autonomy—were philosophical and sociological epistemes which contemporary thinkers have difficulty grounding in universally acknowledged propositions.[14] To convince ourselves and our neighbors that we should continue as though these were self-evident truths is going to be all the more difficult: second order assumptions guiding such ideals no longer obtain. Our present situation, with respect to the basic political ideas which shaped post-Enlightenment Europe, is thus comparable to that of the rudimentary organs of which Darwin wrote in the *Origin of Species*:

> [they] may be compared with the letter in a word, still retained in the spelling but become useless in the pronunciation, but which serve as a clue in seeking for its derivation.

At best such guidelines for social behavior, at home and abroad, will have to be reconstructed as myths, as rule-utilitarian premises for human practice in a world where most people would dismiss anything more ambitious as "nonsense on stilts." This, however, fails to address the question of authority. Who in Europe today has the authority (moral, intellectual, political) to teach, much less enforce, codes of collective behavior? Who, in short, has power, and to what ends and with what limits? This is an unresolved inheritance from the Enlightenment—indeed it was the space opened up by the end of the Divine Right and the extinction of absolutism which first brought into the public place the very theories of representation and nation, progress and history in whose twilight we now sit. In the absence of any clear answer to this question, it seems only a little melodramatic to conclude that in a variety of ways Europe is about to enter an era of turmoil, a time of troubles. This

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is nothing new for the old continent, of course, but for most people alive today it will come as a novel and unpleasant experience.

ENDNOTES

[1]See Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," *Dædalus* 121 (4) (Fall 1992): 83–119.

[2]For the Italian case see the magisterial work of Claudio Pavone, *Una Guerra Civile. Saggio storico sulla moralitá nella Resistenza* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992).

[3]Which is not to deny that many in the previous decades had pressed for just such changes, but to no effect.

[4]The relationship between France and the Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1949–1990 curiously echoes that between Austria and Prussia after the Congress of Vienna. In both cases one partner, ostensibly the senior one, sought to use the other as both a resource and a guarantee—in the Austrian case by encouraging Prussia to participate in and strengthen the German Confederation—only to discover, in the fullness of time, that the power relationship had reversed itself and the senior partner could no longer control or contain the ambitions of its economically superior associate.

[5]For a full discussion of the European ramifications of German unification, and the uses of "Europe" in German political debate, see Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993).

[6]Curiously, this reveals the enduring strength and relevance of at least one European idea, that of "Fortress Europe," a continent united in its Christian whiteness against cosmopolitan, exotic, and threatening forces, from within or without. *This* version of the European idea, with its roots in nineteenth-century racial theory was shared by Hitler and even by some of the intellectual critics of democracy of the 1930s. It has been revived by neo-fascists and "new Right" intellectuals in Germany, France, and Italy in recent years and appears to be thriving.

[7]At least in those countries that have opened their doors to refugees—Austria and Germany in particular.

[8]Except in small ex-colonies outside of Europe, where Britain or France might still intervene with relative autonomy—but precisely *as* Britain or France, which underscores the point.

[9]A number of prominent French left-wingers, among them Max Gallo, Régis Debray, and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, have recently taken to nostalgic invocations of a sort of national republicanism, quite literally a "reaction" to the overselling of Europe and the demise of an *international* radical project.

[10]For a fuller discussion of this theme, see Tony Judt, "The New Old Nationalism," *New York Review of Books,* 26 May 1994.

[11]In the case of Belgium, the national settlement is coming apart as a result of pressure from two directions: domestically the Flemings and Walloons are splitting

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into a federated state, while internationally the image of "Benelux" in so many fields of economic and administrative action has eroded the specificity of "Belgium" as a distinctive entity.

[12]Hans Magnus Enzensberger has argued cogently that the paradoxical consequences of this new role for German writers—filling a domestic political void but in a condition of existential discomfort over their national identity—were disastrous for modern German intellectual and political life.

[13]"Some beliefs and truths are inescapable. . .there are constraints of fact and logic. A correct understanding of how, for instance, true factual beliefs are formed has no tendency to undermine them, while the opposite is typically true of ideological beliefs, for example. This is a truth, admittedly far from clear, at the heart of the Enlightenment enterprise." Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993), 216 n. 52.

[14]Witness the general reaction to the work of John Rawls, including his most recent attempt to devise a theoretical basis for liberalism—that it is only valid to the extent that it describes the sort of liberal societies where it is already practiced. Hence, too, the rather disembodied air of even the best-informed attempts to import such Anglo-American speculation into continental terrain.

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It is not easy to convince oneself that those communist decades were a kind of unnatural hole in the historical process, an empty time, a total break in continuity, a sheer waste; but it is difficult and unpleasant to include communism in the continuous course of the national past because then the nation as a whole must carry the burden of responsibility. There is such a thing as national guilt; otherwise, there would be no reason that people would need to whitewash their own nation from culpability for past crimes in which they personally had no part. Could half of Europe and half of Asia have been raped by a handful of bloodthirsty madmen, by Lenin and Stalin? Such things do not happen; it is nice to believe that they do, and to live with the innocent conscience of the rape victim.

And since communism was awful (as it indeed was), it will be normal to believe that the precommunist past, czarist Russia in particular, was an unceasing festival of hilarity. On both counts, popular historical perception will scarcely deal with reality. There is no point in deploring this. Self-deception is a necessary part of life, both in the individual and in the nation; it provides us all with moral safety.

Leszek Kolakowski

From "Amidst Moving Ruins"
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Roman Szporluk

After Empire: What?

FOR TWO-THIRDS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY the lands and peoples of the Soviet Union were defined and studied in terms of their common Soviet, or communist, identity. Eastern Europe was similarly defined for almost half a century (although differences within the region were recognized more often). Today, when communism seems to have been defeated, these areas are again viewed in terms of a common, this time postcommunist, agenda: Will they establish market economies? Will they be democratic? Will the new elites and societies manage to make a peaceful transition, or will there be violent upheavals?

In addition to asking what will emerge after communism, we must look at another "ism" which existed before communism and has not disappeared along with it. The Soviet Union was in effect a new form of the Russian Empire, and nationalism and nation-building continued in various ways in this region throughout the twentieth century in the shadow of that empire. The intertwined histories of communism and nationalism will largely determine the character of the postempire era.

The continuing relevance of history has not been sufficiently recognized because historical factors have been overshadowed by the communist construct. We need to broaden our thematic and chronological perspective in order to understand why nationalism in these areas is such a powerful force today. We also need a better understanding of what "nationalism" means because whatever the successor to communism may be, it will take a national form. The

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nations emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union are now redefining themselves, and in some cases a variant of communism may reappear.

This essay focuses on the historical experience of East Central Europe, especially the Habsburg Empire and Poland, and argues that a profound, "organic" link exists between this region and Ukraine and Russia. By studying the fall of communism together with the fall of empire one is alerted to look not only at the domestic affairs of individual countries, but for signs of a new, "postimperial" geopolitical alignment. Zbigniew Brzezinski calls this new phenomenon "geopolitical pluralism": In these new international constellations are we not witnessing the reemergence of precommunist national "neighborhoods" that had been submerged under Sovietism?

AFTER COMMUNISM: WHAT?

The twentieth century, according to some commentators, such as Martin Malia and John Lukacs,[1] began in 1914 (when the "long nineteenth century" ended) and ended in 1989. Lukacs sets the twentieth century in a narrow frame between 1914 and 1989, in the course of which the "two main events were the two world wars,"[2] and the end was marked by the collapse of communism. According to Lukacs, prewar Marxist internationalism was a casualty of World War I: "In 1914 Marxism suffered a huge blow from which it never really recovered. There was a Communist revolution in Russia in 1917; but what Lenin achieved was not an international revolution. To the contrary, it was Russia's withdrawal from Europe."[3] Lukacs does not give proper credit to World War I, which was the key factor in communism's rise to power. After 1914 Marxism knew not only defeats but had a series of great triumphs, first of all in Russia. But the history of communism—Marx's own name for his doctrine—goes back to 1848.

Because the collapse of communism also marks the collapse of the last empire in Eastern Europe, it is important to identify which issues on the postcommunist agenda constitute aspects of the *imperial* succession in their own right. The Soviet Union was the first communist state, the self-declared prototype of the future communist world, and at the same time it was a twentieth-century version

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of the Russian Empire. Communism was commonly perceived as a Russian product in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. For non-Russians the communist experience was synonymous with Russian domination.

The premodern, imperial nature of the Soviet Union was evident to the more insightful Western scholars even before its collapse. As Benedict Anderson put it: "the fact that the Soviet Union shares with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the rare distinction of refusing nationality in its naming suggests that it is as much the legatee of the prenational dynastic states of the nineteenth century as the precursor of a twenty-first century internationalist order."[4] The Russians themselves are also aware that their Soviet legacy was a Russian imperial legacy. When Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, in *Russia 2010—And What It Means for the World,* argue that Russia faces a "triple transition": from dictatorship to democracy, from a command economy to a free market, and "from a four-century-old empire to a nation-state," they summarize the main dilemmas of postcommunist Russia in a way which many Russians have done.[5]

NATIONS AGAINST EMPIRE, 1848: NATIONALISM BEFORE COMMUNISM

Nationalism emerged originally as a critique of premodern supranational empires (or of political entities that were "national" in the premodern understanding of the term). In 1848 the emerging nations in Eastern Europe asked for a reform of the Habsburg monarchy, and later in the century, when they began to lose hope that the empire could be reformed, they turned against it.[6]

In 1948, the centennial of 1848, the British historian Sir Lewis Namier published an article entitled "1848: Seed-Plot of History." Looking at the ideas of 1848 from the perspective of 1948, Namier wrote: "Every idea put forward by the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1848 was realized at some juncture, in one form or another."[7] Namier saw that in 1939–1945 the Ruthenes (now better known as West Ukrainians) had disentangled themselves from the Polish bond—a legacy of 1918–1919 and of 1848. It seemed to him that after the post-World War II territorial settlement the last of the programs of 1848 had been realized. But as we

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now know, the dissolution of the "Yugoslavs'" ties to the Italian sphere and the "Ruthenes'" ties to the Polish sphere did not complete the search for national self-determination. It was only moved into new settings and different relationships, and it was further complicated by the infusion of the other great legacy of 1848, communism. In a move nobody could have foreseen a century earlier, when Russia was recognized as the greatest enemy of "revolution," the Russian army drove communism into Central and Eastern Europe. Lukacs is correct, therefore, when he says that when communist states were founded in Eastern Europe after World War II, it was "not because of revolutions or because of the popular appeal of Communism. They were put there because of the national triumph of Russia over Germany, with the result of the Russian occupation of most of Eastern Europe."[8]

MARX AND THE NATIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1848

The Communist Manifesto states:

> National differences and antagonisms between peoples are vanishing gradually from day to day, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.
>
> The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . .In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.[9]

What 1848 means in the history of Marxism is well known. What is remembered less well, however, is that 1848 marked the first major confrontation between communism and nationalism. Marx did not equally oppose all nationalist demands. He supported a revolutionary unification of Germany, and he supported the national causes of the Poles and Hungarians, viewing the Poles as revolutionary Europe's defense against Russian despotism and "barbarism." But he regarded as absolutely reactionary the aspirations to autonomous nationhood put forward by the representatives of the so-called "nonhistoric" nations.[10]

The principal spokesman for the nonhistoric nations was František Palacký, "the father of the Czech nation," who proved that the

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Czechs *did* have a history, and whom Marx called "a German professor gone mad." According to Marx, the future of the Czechs lay in their incorporation into the German nation; the Slovaks and Croats were to become Hungarian, and the Ruthenes (i.e., Ukrainians) of Austria's Galicia were to become Polish. *The Communist Manifesto* envisioned a world without national conflicts and differences, while Palacký proposed to increase the number of nations. Delegates from new and old nations met in Prague in 1848 at the Slavonic Congress.[11] The Congress issued a document, a nationalist manifesto, announcing the right of all nationalities, large and small, to live freely in the family of nations.

In 1848 the Ruthenes defined themselves as a distinct nationality, refusing to belong any longer to the "historic" and nonethnic Polish nation. This was not the first time that the Ruthenes came to the attention of the founders of "scientific socialism." That occurred in 1846 in connection with the so-called "Galician massacres," an event that was misleadingly attributed to the Ruthene subjects of the Polish nobility; hundreds of members of the Polish nobility were slaughtered after a group of Polish revolutionary noblemen in Cracow launched an insurrection against Austria. The massacres actually took place in purely Polish parts of *Western* Galicia and were carried out by Polish peasants. However, since the 1840s, it has somehow seemed easier to explain social conflict by pointing to "ethnic" differences, as we are now witnessing in Bosnia. And this particular "ethnic" legend has enjoyed a secure life. No Polish historian upholds this narrative, but it is alive and well in textbooks and even in Western academic writing on the Habsburg monarchy today.[12]

One of the main goals of the Ruthene activities in 1848 was to become accepted as a distinct Slavic nationality. Until the revolution of 1848 the Poles generally believed, as did most politically aware Ruthenes, that the Ruthenes were Polish. The peasants in Eastern Galicia spoke a dialect different from that spoken by the peasants of Western Galicia, but nationhood was considered a matter of politics not ethnography. In 1848 the Ruthenes declared that not only were they not Polish but their nationality was not confined to the Austrian Empire: their conationals, the Ruthene Main Council proclaimed, also lived in the southern part of the Russian Empire, and their homeland extended as far east as the

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Don River. This meant that while they were not Polish they were also not Russian.

This background note explains what Namier had in mind when he viewed the inclusion of the Ukrainian parts of the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovina in the Soviet Union in 1939–1945 as an example of how the agendas of 1848 were being implemented throughout the subsequent hundred years. It also helps us see why during the decades following 1945 the successors of the Ruthenes of 1848 would want to complete their dissociation from Warsaw with a dissociation from Moscow.

SOVIET COMMUNISM: NEW CIVILIZATION OR THE OLD EMPIRE UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT?

After World War I, two of the three great empires (the Habsburg and the Ottoman) of Eastern and Southeastern Europe ceased to exist. But, as Ernest Gellner writes, "something quite different happened in the third empire. It recovered from its military defeat of 1917 and re-emerged by 1920, under entirely new political and ideological management."[13]

It is hard to find a lucid and convincing answer not so much to why Russia of all places adopted Marxism (in its Russified form) as its official creed in 1917, but rather why its leaders persuaded themselves that their country was to be the model for the world. Why did they remain committed to that "international" perspective when Moscow supposedly returned to Russian nationalism in Stalin's time, and even later?

Richard Pipes agrees with those writers, like Paul Miliukov, who viewed Bolshevism as both international and "genuinely Russian."[14] It is not essential for our purposes to consider whether Stalin's rule was a faithful continuation of Lenin's. What concerns us is that in the end the Soviet model, whatever kind of a combination of communism and empire it may have represented, became "the future that failed," to cite the title of Johann P. Arnason's book on this subject. Arnason's approach is especially valuable for our discussion because he explores the connection between the communist project, the empire, and Russian and other nationalisms:

> Imperial Russia had proved capable of assimilating or initiating modernizing processes in various areas, but incapable of moulding

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> them into a viable version of modernity. The regime which inherited its fragments had to develop a new pattern of integration. More specifically, its main task was to restructure and unify the economic, political and cultural patterns of social life; each of the three factors had had its share in the terminal crisis of the imperial order. The result was undeniably a new counter-paradigm of modernity, arguably the most important of its kind. But if it brought the imperial order back to life in a new shape, it also — as we now know — reactivated its self-destructive dynamic.[15]

After 1989–1991, if not in 1980, 1968, or 1956, it became obvious that Sovietism had failed to become a viable alternative to the Western model of modernity. It failed to impress Eastern Europe as the promise of a higher civilization. The nations of Eastern Europe had their own tradition of Marxism, which gave them an alternative reading of Marx to that upheld in Moscow. Soviet communism even failed to help solve the problems of Eastern Europe inherited from the past — especially that of the nationalities. Instead of bringing Eastern Europe up to its standards, Soviet expansion into Europe facilitated the exposure of its own society to influences from abroad. In other words, the communist model's failure within the Soviet Union was accelerated by the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union. In a polity that included the Balts and West Ukrainians, it was difficult to sustain the official position that the Russian element was the most advanced.

In the final stage of the decline of Sovietism, Russian nationalism emerged and won wide support by defining Russia as distinct from and opposed to the Soviet communism that won power in Russia in 1917. Russians are facing the dual task of coming to terms with the legacy of the communist "counterparadigm of modernity" and their imperial legacy. These two issues are not easily separated, although the difference is clear enough. The question remains: will Russia be able to distance itself from the empire?

COMMUNIST HEIRS OF THE ROMANOVS IN THE REALM OF THE HABSBURGS

The future that the Soviets had in mind for those whom they liberated from Hitler was a future constructed by Moscow designers. East Central Europe in its Leninist-Stalinist version was per-

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ceived as a *Russian* product. By 1945 these nations had considerable experience in nation-building and state-building, however imperfect their record may have been. Most of the inhabitants felt that their way of life and their ideas of a better life were preferable to the Soviet model. Even indigenous communists thought the Soviet model to be inapplicable to the conditions of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. They were proud of their own revolutionary tradition and experience. Central and Eastern European socialism before 1917 had produced brilliant thinkers in the fields of sociology, economics, history, law, and nationalities studies.[16] Eastern Europe had a rich tradition of labor organization and socialist politics, and it continued into the period between the two world wars. Why should the East Europeans have been impressed by Stalin's interpretation of Marxism or the practice of socialism that they saw in 1945? For them, the notion that Stalinist Russia was the image of their—and the world's—future appeared preposterous.

As for the future of nations and states, the East Europeans were for understandable reasons especially reluctant to accept the Soviet Marxist position on the subject. The idea of "withering away" or the "merger" of nations did not have many supporters even among the communists. The tradition of Austro-Marxism was especially original in this area as was the contribution of the main strands of Polish socialism, whether that was tied to the more nationalistically minded Polish Socialist Party (PPS) or to the "internationalist" Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania (SDKPiL), which maintained closer ties with the Russian revolutionary movement. The Bolsheviks embraced the most literal interpretation of *The Communist Manifesto* on the future of nations and languages, even when in practice, as in the 1920s, they were tolerant of linguistic and ethnic diversity. The Soviets were promoting "the building of socialism" in Eastern Europe as it was understood in Moscow but they had no special understanding of the conditions prevailing in East Central Europe and their ideology offered little guidance.

Whether Moscow wanted it or even knew it, as the paramount power in the region it inherited the mantle of the Habsburgs. The Soviet Union and its communist friends in the Balkans became involved in issues that were a legacy of the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle. This historical link was noted by the British historian

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A. J. P. Taylor, a disciple of Namier. In a book dedicated to Namier, Taylor spoke about post-1945 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as legatees of the Habsburgs:

> Only a Communist Slovakia would preserve the unity of Czechoslovakia; the price would be the ruin of Czechoslovak democracy. . . . Faced with unwelcome alternatives, the Czechs used once more the method of delay which they learnt from the Habsburgs; and hoped that industry and education might in time create in Slovakia a humanistic middle class, which would make Masaryk's idea a reality.[17]

While Taylor's expectations about the future of Czechoslovakia were not high, and his fears were vindicated in the post-1989 years, he expected Yugoslavia to do much better. He thought that the joint struggle of Serbs and Croats in "the great partisan war" against the Germans "made Yugoslavia, as the Franco-German war of 1870 made Germany." For several reasons, it seemed to Taylor that Tito just might do a better job than the Habsburgs had been able to do:

> "Democratic, federal Yugoslavia" translated into practice the great might-have-been of Habsburg history. Marshal Tito was the last of the Habsburgs: ruling over eight different nations, he offered them "cultural autonomy" and reined in their nationalist hostility. . . .There was no longer a "people of state"/i.e., an officially-designated ruling nation/; the new rulers were men of any nationality who accepted the Communist idea. . . .More fortunate than the Habsburgs, Marshal Tito found an "idea." Only time will show whether social revolution and economic betterment can appease national conflicts and whether Marxism can do better than Counter-Reformation dynasticism in supplying central Europe with a common loyalty.[18]

"Time" did show. Taylor's question was answered forty years later.

According to Namier, in World War II the South Slavs completed their 1848 agenda when the last of the lands they claimed were removed from Italian rule. Likewise, the Ruthenes completed their 1848 agenda when their historic relation to Poland ended. But from the current perspective one might raise a question that Namier did not ask: Might this "Western" extension of a Belgrade-dominated Yugoslavia on the one hand and a Moscow-dominated Soviet Union on the other have weakened Belgrade's (i.e., Serbia's) position versus the Slovenes and Croats in Yugoslavia just as it undermined

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Russia's traditional relationship with Ukraine? Tito's and Stalin's triumphs of 1945 may have contributed, then, to the process of disintegration that we saw in the 1980s. In both cases the inclusion into the older geographical and political structure of once-Habsburg possessions changed the traditional ethnocultural balance in the older states.

In addition to becoming after 1917 the heir or legatee of the empire of the Romanovs, the Soviet Union became in 1945 a legatee of *another* prenational dynastic state. At this time, imperial Austria's Eastern Galicia, which had been under Polish rule from 1919 until 1939, northern Bukovina, which had been under Romanian rule from 1918 until 1940, and Czechoslovakia's Ruthenia, which had been a part of Habsburg Hungary until 1918 were brought into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Thus, the Soviet Union also became a successor state of the Habsburgs.

One somehow feels that the dominant position of the Russian element in the Soviet Union, and with it the unity of the state, would have been much more secure without the annexation of Western Ukraine and the reannexation of the Baltic states. In the end, it appears that not only the Yugoslav and the Czech communists but also their Soviet comrades shared the Habsburgs' fate. Gorbachev, not Tito, would prove to be "the last of the Habsburgs."

DOMESTIC IMPACT OF EXTERNAL EXPANSION: FROM LITTLE RUSSIA TO A GREATER UKRAINE

Sometime in the 1850s, while living in exile in London, the Russian revolutionary Alexander Herzen wrote that by making Poland a part of the Russian Empire czarism had opened a gate, extending widely from the Vistula to the Dnieper, for the influx of revolutionary ideas into Russia. With Poland *inside* the empire, said Herzen, there would no longer be a barrier to keep Russia separate from "Europe."

There was truth in Herzen's assessment, but it may well be that the Stalinist annexations of 1939–1945 and the introduction of Soviet-style regimes in the formally independent states of East Central Europe, especially Poland, had an even greater impact on the interethnic relations, and domestic situation in general, within the Soviet Union.[19]

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The Soviet Union's war-related annexations in Europe were of two kinds: First, the Soviets "recovered" much of what their predecessors had held in 1914, before the war and revolution. And second, they acquired wholly new lands and peoples.

There is no way to prove that the Soviet Union would have been more stable domestically or that the leading role of the Russian element would have been more secure if Stalin had resisted the annexation of those lands. How does one measure the disruptive or subversive role of the Balts? How much tougher to deal with did the Ukrainian problem become after 1939?

Gellner noted an important difference within the Soviet Union:

> In the Soviet Union, generally speaking there is a difference between the so-called seventy-year-old and the forty-year-old areas of Soviet power: there is a perceptible difference between the areas that have been parts of the union ever since the Revolution, and those that were incorporated in it only at the end of the Second World War. The difference between seventy and forty years seems to affect the nature of social memory profoundly: the forty-year-ers have a sharp sense of what the other world is like, and the seventy-year-ers have largely lost it. They know no other.[20]

It needs to be added that the "forty-year-ers" consisted of two different types. In one group were the Balts, the West Belorussians, some of the West Ukrainians, and the population of Bessarabia, now known as Moldova. Although they did not come under Soviet rule until World War II, they or their parents had lived under czarist Russia long before the Bolsheviks came to power. This czarist past did not, however, make them more willing to accept the return of the Russians in 1940; their memories of independence between the two world wars were ineradicable. For some Russians, on the other hand, 1940 marked a restoration of normality in the Baltic region. Might this not help explain why so many Russians made Riga their home after 1945, thus turning Latvians into a minority in their own capital?

The second group of "forty-year-ers" was comprised of the once Polish Galicia, the once Romanian Bukovina, and the once Czechoslovak "Carpathian Ruthenia." Their connection to Russia was limited exclusively to the Soviet era. They first got to know Russian rule only in its "advanced" Stalinist form after the Great Terror of the 1930s. Their imperial experience had been under the Habsburgs.[21]

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For Galician Ukrainians the central national problem was Poland, which considered all of Galicia Polish. When, in November 1918, the Ukrainians of the Habsburg monarchy proclaimed their independence, their "West Ukrainian People's Republic" found itself at war with Poland.

The West Ukrainian Republic regarded itself as a temporary formation; its goal was the unification of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian state in Kiev, which, when the West was fighting the Poles, was engaged in a two-front struggle with both the Red and the White Russians and their respective sympathizers in Ukraine. In January 1919, the two Ukraines solemnly proclaimed their unification. But this was a declaration only. By the end of 1920, when peace was established in Eastern Europe, Moscow was in charge of Eastern Ukraine, although it legitimated its rule there by creating the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic."

By the summer of 1919, after a bitter and brutal war, the Poles had won control of Galicia. On June 25, 1919, in Paris, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers, which was then deciding the future of the peoples of the Habsburg monarchy, authorized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia. Namier, who during the war had worked for the British government and was directly involved in the Galician question, commented on the decision:

> They [the Ukrainians] strove hard to be a proper government. But a peasant nation exasperated by centuries of oppression and fighting for its life against landowners—and the foreign domination for which they stand—cannot be expected to show superhuman self control. My father was always on the Polish side and known to be closely involved with the Polish nobility. The wave of cruel reprisals could hardly by-pass him. But the responsibility rests with the Polish jingoes and those Allied statesmen who, lacking adequate energy, bungled. The last decision of the Peace Congress foredooms worse to come. All the massacres in Macedonia will seem as nothing compared with those coming to Eastern Galicia.
>
> For all my personal loss and anxieties I do insist that grievous wrong has been done to the Ukrainians. Left in peace to establish a strongly radical but decent government, they might well have organized themselves. Driven to despair, insidiously pushed daily toward bolshevism and into committing atrocious crimes, they know. . .that a Polish military occupation, as foreshadowed in the Foreign Ministers' decision of 25 June, means disaster without end. And I insist

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> that no number of atrocities however horrible can deprive a nation of its right to independence, nor justify its being put under the heel of its worst enemies and persecutors.[22]

In 1923, the Allies recognized Poland's full sovereignty over Eastern Galicia, Warsaw having promised to grant autonomy to the region. For most Ukrainians who had found themselves in Poland against their wishes, the Polish state lacked the legitimacy that they had recognized in Vienna. During World War II Namier's premonition of things "worse to come" proved to be right to a degree nobody could have imagined in 1919.[23]

When the Soviets invaded Poland in September 1939 and incorporated this region into the Soviet Union, they added to their state a formerly Habsburg land with a political and cultural experience alien to that of czarist Russia and the Soviet Union. It is very unlikely that Stalin— or his successors—imagined that this territorial gain would prove to be a time bomb. Stalin's actions had three closely related consequences that remain politically important today. First, Stalin put an end to the historic relationship between Poland and Ukraine under which Ukraine, or parts of Ukraine, belonged to Poland. In the middle of the seventeenth century virtually all Ukrainians, even those to the east of the Dnieper, lived under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then Poland's retreat began—and Russia started taking Poland's commanding place. Austrian Galicia had been the first Ukrainian-inhabited area to find itself under Polish kings—uninterruptedly from the middle of the fourteenth century until 1772, and then, after the Habsburg intermission, it remained under Polish rule from 1919 until 1939.

The long term effects of Poland's withdrawal from its historic entanglements in the East led to a change in the perception of "the Polish factor" in Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania; their main preoccupation after the war was surviving Russian domination. The Poles, too, saw the new possibilities that the geopolitical change gave them. Despite traditional Lithuanian suspicions of Polish motives, the Polish public gave its wholehearted support to the Lithuanian struggle. It is not an accident that Poland was the first nation to recognize Ukraine's independence—one day after the referendum of December 1, 1991.[24] Namier could not have anticipated the events of the 1980s and 1990s. Poland, Ukraine's "historic enemy," was transformed into, at least potentially, an ally whose support would

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be especially helpful when facing Russia, now left alone in the role of Ukraine's "constituting other."[25]

Second, by eliminating Poland as one of the powers with which Russia had divided its rule over Ukraine, Stalin laid the foundation for a change in the traditional relationship between Ukrainians and Russians. As the Ukrainian contemporary poet Lina Kostenko put it, by combining in one entity what the Poles called "Little Poland" with what the Russians called "Little Russia," Stalin made a "Greater Ukraine."

Finally, Stalin left the Ukrainians a problem that they are facing still. They could do little about it when the Soviet Union existed but they must address it now. Stalin's successors failed to work out a modus vivendi with a Ukraine enlarged in size and population, and thus qualitatively transformed. Will an independent Ukraine hold together in one nation and one state its disparate regions left over from the Romanovs and the Soviets, from the Habsburgs, and from the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, and Romanians? If Gorbachev failed in his role as "the last of the Habsburgs," will Ukraine's President Leonid M. Kravchuk escape the fate of being a Ukrainian Gorbachev?

Cultural and political movements in Ukraine since Stalin may be understood properly only in terms of a common Ukrainian identity that transcends old imperial borders. It took Eastern and Western Ukraine, acting in accord, to win independence and to avoid internal strife— ethnic, religious, or regional. But questions of national identity and unity remain, and they are inextricably tied to the legacy of communism. This essay began by insisting that when speaking about communism one needs to think about empire and nationalism. It is also necessary to think about communism and Sovietism when discussing the making of nations. Many of the problems Ukraine faces today— economic, legal, moral, social, environmental, or ecological—are legacies of the Soviet system, Soviet institutions, and Soviet values. It is on these issues that Ukrainians are divided today.

In Ukraine, the division between those who are basically for the Soviet system (or for what they think they remember the Soviet system to have been) and those who want to move away from Sovietism toward "Europe" is expressed geographically, with the Eastern industrial regions voting communist. It may even assume an ethnic form (i.e., of a Ukrainian-Russian split) if communists are

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successful in establishing themselves as spokesmen of the Russians and/or the "Russian-speaking population."[26]

RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM; RUSSIA AFTER EMPIRE?

Relations between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine and interstate relations between Ukraine and Russia will directly influence Russia's political evolution. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that "without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire." But if Russia becomes an empire, it cannot also be a democracy.[27]

Russian attitudes toward Ukraine will depend on the perception of the Ukrainian situation. Signs suggest that the import of the events summarized here has not penetrated the consciousness of the Russian public or of the policymakers in Moscow. Many continue to view Ukraine in traditionally narrow terms as an internal problem, as the question of "Little Russians" versus "Great Russians," a family dispute. They are quite unaware of the transformation of Ukraine that occurred as a consequence of its changed geopolitical and geocultural location after 1939, and they overlook the fact that many Ukrainians view themselves as European, which places Ukraine, at least in part, outside the traditionally Russian-dominated world.

Communism existed for more than seventy years in Russia, and, whether Marx or Russian history played the more important role in shaping the system, communism will forever remain a part of Russian history. For decades, Sovietism was a way of being Russian politically. Russia interacted with the communist Eastern Europe and with Western Europe under the guise of the Soviet Union, and it was as the Soviet Union that Russia was known throughout the world. Today, Russia has a dual agenda: how to deal with communism, and how to deal with empire.

To what extent does Ukraine's departure undermine Russia's claim to leadership in the post-Soviet geopolitical space? What can postcommunist Russia offer the former republics now that they have become sovereign states?

Among those Western observers who never forgot the importance of Ukraine for Russia's imperial status, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has been one of the most prominent. In her book, *The*

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End of the Soviet Empire and the Triumph of the Nations, she argued that Ukraine "is little tempted by the union [with Russia] and envisions a future of independence and rapprochement with the countries of Central Europe and even the European Economic Community. The Ukrainians ask: 'Are we, with 50 million citizens, less worthy than Hungary or Czechoslovakia of being considered a large European country?'"[28] Ukraine's independence, she continued, would have profound consequences for Russia's future. Without Ukraine and Belarus to support it, Russia would find it extremely difficult to confront the large (60 million) "Muslim bloc" in the former Soviet Union. This would be difficult for demographic, economic, psychological, and political reasons: "Russia wishes to be European, and the Muslim periphery is rapidly 're-Islamizing' itself, underscoring its distinctiveness from and opposition to Russia. . . .Without the support of the Ukrainians and Belorussians, the encounter between Russians and Muslims would have the huge drawback for Russia of drawing it into the 'oriental' and even Asiatic destiny that throughout its history it has wished to escape."[29]

This is not quite the case. There has always been a school of thought in Russia which has held that Russia is special in being European and Asian at the same time, in other words, Eurasian. But Eurasianism is definitely a minority opinion in today's Russia. The intelligentsia of Moscow and St. Petersburg certainly favors a European Russia.

The surest way for Russia to be European and democratic is for it to accept the newly independent nations of former Soviet Central Asia as equals, instead of keeping them in a Russian imperial framework. This will remove the need for Ukrainian help in ruling them. Accepting Ukraine's independence will allow Russia to avoid resorting to the violence which would be required for the reconquest of Ukraine. A Russia friendly with both Ukraine and Central Asia would remain a great power with a global presence and at the same time would be able to deal with the problems inherited from the communist era.

ENDNOTES

[1]Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York: Macmillan, 1994) and John Lukacs, *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age* (London: Ticknor and Fields, 1993).

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[2]Lukacs, *The End of the Twentieth Century,* 1.

[3]Ibid., 5.

[4]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* rev. ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 2.

[5]Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, *Russia 2010—And What It Means for the World* (New York: Random House, 1993), 6.

[6]The life and career of Thomas G. Masaryk illustrate that transition from belief in empire toward the goal of national independence. Masaryk's road to nationalism is discussed in Roman Szporluk, *The Political Thought of T. G. Masaryk* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981).

[7]Sir Lewis Namier, *Vanished Supremacies* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 28.

[8]Lukacs, *The End of the Twentieth Century,* 6.

[9]Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto,* ed. Samuel H. Beer (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), 29.

[10]In the language of the time, a nationality without an independent state bearing its name and lacking a traditional elite was a nonhistoric nation. The Poles were recognized as "historic," while the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Ruthenes were not.

[11]Lawrence D. Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress of 1848* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1978). See also Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia, 1815–1849,* ed. Lawrence D. Orton, trans. Andrew Gorski and Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).

[12]For the 1846 legend and a general discussion of Marx's and Engels' view on the Ukrainian-Polish relations in Austria see Roman Rosdolsky, *Engels and the "Nonhistoric" Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848,* trans. and ed. John-Paul Himka (Glasgow: Critique Books, 1987), 56–78.

[13]Ernest Gellner, "Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe," *Dædalus* 119 (1) (Winter 1990): 290–91.

[14]Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 500.

[15]Johann P. Arnason, *The Future That Failed: Origin and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 67–68.

[16]See Leszek Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism. Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution,* vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

[17]A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 260.

[18]Ibid., 260 – 61.

[19]See Roman Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of Eastern Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (New York, Washington, London: Praeger, 1975).

[20]Gellner, "Ethnicity and Faith in Eastern Europe," 283.

[21]Roman Szporluk, "The Soviet West— Or Far Eastern Europe?," *East European Politics and Societies* 3 (3) (Fall 1991): 466 – 82. The role of the Balts in the subversion and eventual collapse of the Soviet Empire is presented by Anatol Lieven,

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The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Path to Independence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993).

[22]Julia Namier, *Lewis Namier: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 144.

[23]This tragic subject, which many Ukrainians are reluctant to face fully even today, has been recently treated by the distinguished Warsaw historian Ryszard Torzecki. See Ryszard Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993). Torzecki has dealt with the Ukrainian question in the policies of the Third Reich in Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy, 1933–1945* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972), and with Polish-Ukrainian relations in post-1918 Poland in *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1929* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989). For a study of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919 see Maciej Kozłowski, *Między Sanem a Zbruczem. Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią, 1918–1919* (Cracow: Znak, 1990).

[24]As an illustration of the new cooperative spirit in Polish-Ukrainian relations let us cite Bohdan Cywiński, noted Polish author and civic activist, who wrote an article describing today's Ukraine as "A Fortress under Siege." Cywiński attended a conference in Kiev held at the recently restored "Kiev-Mohyla Academy." The Academy bears the name of Petro Mohyla, a Romanian prince by birth, later a Polish soldier and then an Orthodox monk, whom Ukrainians consider one of their great historical figures. As Metropolitan of Kiev, in the first half of the seventeenth century, when Kiev and most of Ukraine was governed from Warsaw, he founded a school which later became a college. It was eventually liquidated by the czarist government. In the newly independent Ukraine the Academy has been revived as an independent college. Among other things it is a reminder to the Kievans of their city's past Western ties. Cywiński was especially touched when told that as a visiting professor the next year he would be welcome to lecture in Polish. He summed up his impressions with the words: "It feels good now to be Polish in Kiev." Bohdan Cywiński, "Oblężona twierdza," *Rzeczpospolita,* 12–13 March 1994. Commemorating the 350th anniversary of its founding (1632), *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* published in June 1984 a special issue entitled "The Kiev Mohyla Academy." For an introduction to Poland's current *Ostpolitik,* see Ian J. Brzezinski, "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis," *Survival* 35 (3) (Autumn 1993): 26–37; Stephen R. Burant, "International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours—Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45 (3) (1993): 395–418; and Stephen R. Burant and Voytek Zubek, "Eastern Europe's Old Memories and New Realities: Resurrecting the Polish-Lithuanian Union," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (2) (1993): 370–99.

[25]See Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (2) (1993): 349–69.

[26]On the connection between communism and ethnicity in Ukraine today, see Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review,* May 1994.

[27]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (2) (March-April 1994): 80.

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[28]Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire and the Triumph of the Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 261.

[29]Ibid.

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The principal results of several decades of Soviet nationality policy which directly bear on the current explosion of nationalism may be summarized as follows. Soviet nationality policy, despite its professed goal of subverting ethnic loyalties and destroying ethnic differences, promoted and accelerated the process of nation building. During the Soviet period various populations which had not previously developed national consciousness acquired national identities and turned into nations. The Soviet state erected virtually impenetrable barriers between the different nationalities and by way of bureaucratic means tied individuals to their nationality groups. National cohesion was further reinforced by the creation of firm links between nationalities, their territories, and their political administrations. Also, the policy of preferential treatment of territorially based nationalities led to the growing ethnic homogenization of many ethnoterritorial units. Most importantly, in all Union republics there emerged such preconditions for independent existence as (1) their own administratively defined territories populated by titular nationalities, (2) their own political elites and educated middle classes, and (3) continuous traditions of cultural production in local languages. As Boris Strugatsky, a popular Russian writer, has argued, "The republics exhibit the full set of characteristics of independent states that have lost their independence."

Victor Zaslavsky

From "Nationalism and Democratic Transition
in Postcommunist Societies"
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Richard Rose

Getting By Without Government: Everyday Life in Russia

We are making such a large turn that it is beyond anyone's dreams. No other people has experienced what has happened to us.[1]

—*Mikhail Gorbachev*

TO DESCRIBE RUSSIA AS A SOCIETY in transition is politically convenient because it implies predictability: we know where Russia is heading, as well as where it is coming from. A destination model is the basis for policy prescriptions designed to achieve the goal of a modern market economy and a stable democracy. Transition then becomes a "mere" problem of ensuring that the necessary steps are taken to achieve the desired goal, just as classic Marxist-Leninist prescriptions addressed the "mere" problem of the transition to socialism.

By contrast, an origins model starts with Russia as it is today. The state of Russia today is a matter of inheritance not choice; it reflects the legacy of seventy years of communist efforts to build a new civilization by rejecting the market economy and ruthlessly suppressing the institutions of civil society. Some Russian experts argue that the legacy also includes antimarket and antidemocratic elements of czarism. From this perspective, the creation of a market economy and a stable democracy requires transformation, an unpredictable and sometimes erratic search for escape from dissatisfaction with the past and present through a process that Joseph Schumpeter described as "creative destruction."[2]

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The next steps in Russia's journey from a turbulent present to an as yet undetermined destination must start from where Russia is today. The "de-statization" of a society that was once ruled by a party with a totalitarian vocation[3] is both satisfying and disturbing. Russians want to put the repression and waste of the past behind them, but it is difficult to live amidst the wreckage of the old system.

To understand how Russians are getting by we need to adopt a bottom-up perspective. This means paying less attention to leading individuals (Yeltsinology), institutions (Kremlinology), or abstract aggregates (GDPology) and paying more attention to everyday concerns of ordinary people, especially since the collapse of the old system has given Russians a chance to ignore politics. The party that claimed to know what ordinary people think no longer has the whip hand.

A SOCIETY UNDER STRESS NOT A MODERN SOCIETY

A modern society is not so much characterized by its material technology as by the sophistication of its social and institutional technology. It is a network of complex institutions that operate according to transparent and efficient cause and effect relationships. It is also a civil society in which the state governs through the impersonal rule of law and institutions can be organized independently of the state.

A Pseudo or Surreal Point of Origin

In an anthropological sense, the institutions of the Soviet regime could be described as functional since they produced benefits for social groups that thereby gained an interest in making them work. But societies can function in many different ways. Winiecki's analysis of *The Distorted World of Soviet-Type Economies* describes the Soviet system as "pseudo-modern" because of its reliance upon nonmarket mechanisms. Z, in "To the Stalin Mausoleum," describes the system as "surreal" because of the incongruous relationship between ideology and reality.[4] By contrast, other Soviet experts argued that in the 1970s and 1980s the functional imperatives of economic and social development were leading to the moderniza-

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tion of the Soviet system, making it more like the West. Gorbachev's reforms were often interpreted in this light.[5]

Although the Soviet system was complex, it was not modern; it operated in an opaque and inefficient way. Janos Kornai's *The Socialist System* describes the pathology of a command economy that relied upon bureaucratic methods rather than prices to allocate goods and services. Its opening chapters emphasize power and ideology as fundamental elements of that economy. The system could command, but it could not make efficient calculations or learn from its mistakes. Power was substituted for observation of cause and effect.[6] The czars had "Potemkinvilles," artificial villages, constructed to show the czar how the people were meant to be prospering. The Soviet Net Material Product was a system of national economic accounts constructed to impress Soviet leaders, Western economists, and the CIA with the alleged might of the Soviet economy.[7]

Soviet agriculture illustrates how "antimodern" the system was. The collectivization of agriculture under Stalin was a gigantic step in differentiating the Soviet system from a modern society. It substituted collective farms for peasant farming. Confronted with massive resistance, it relied upon terror and famine to achieve this objective. Notwithstanding enormously rich land, the new system was incapable of producing food efficiently. People learned not to rely upon the state's delivery of food to shops. The majority of urban residents have a small plot of land where they grow potatoes and some vegetables. Most of the people who grow food in Russia today are not farmers but factory or office workers or retirees. And they do not grow food for sale but for their own consumption.[8]

A modern society is a civil society operating under the rule of law. In the Soviet Union, however, the promise of benefits was complemented by terror. The thoroughness of Stalinist terror made what came after seem less repressive, but the Soviet system continued to be based upon doctrines of socialist legality that rejected fundamental assumptions of the *Rechtsstaat,* a necessary institution in a modern society. The bureaucracy, too, was not modern in the sense of being an impersonal system of imperatively coordinated hierarchical decision-making. The unrealistic nature of targets in the annual economic plan encouraged deceit and corruption in

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large organizations as well as in everyday life. Enterprise managers had to engage in "off the books" transactions to secure supplies. When the World Bank estimates that 20 to 30 percent of Soviet food production is wasted, this can be interpreted as evidence of the inefficiency of a pseudo-modern system or of its corruption, insofar as produce recorded as wasted was in fact expropriated by producers for unofficial sale, barter, or their own consumption.[9]

The institutions of Soviet society were controlled by the Communist Party. Unions, enterprise managers, university professors, and other leaders were part of a single pyramid of power, with the party-state at the top. Individuals did not have to believe everything the Party said, but they could not organize an alternative. There were tensions between the dictates of the Party and functional imperatives of institutions. The Soviet system of dual administration, with Party commissars shadowing technical and professional experts, was devised to prevent technical and professional norms from overriding what the Party wanted or was prepared to accept.

Whatever path is followed, the Russian journey toward modernity, begun less than three years ago, will be very different from those taken by the United States, Western Europe, or the modernizing societies of the Mediterranean. The words that Albert Hirschman wrote about Colombia, another society with many assets and also great problems, are apt for Russia too: the society can only move forward "as it is, in spite of what it is, and because of what it is."[10]

A Society Under Stress

The stresses in Russia today are created by the fact that the existing complex of institutions does not function effectively, efficiently, transparently, or according to the rule of law. Weber's dictum, "Power is in the administration of everyday things,"[11] applies if one also recognizes its complement: Weakness is in the ineffective administration of everyday things.

The starting point for a society under stress is very different from that of a traditional society. Where a traditional society modernizes by expanding complex, rational, and civil institutions, a society under stress can only become modern by introducing new institutions amidst the duplicity, favoritism, and ineffectiveness that continue to serve many interests. Otherwise, behind the appearance of

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new institutions old practices will continue to frustrate modernization.

The system which was brought to maturity under Brezhnev and was the object of Gorbachev's reforms is not what it was. In some respects the process of "deconstruction" has been radical: the Soviet Union has dissolved, and the Communist Party too. And positive changes are occurring in the economy. For example, the material shortages that were common in the command economy are now disappearing. At the beginning of 1992 nine out of ten Russian households had one member spending at least an hour a day queuing for goods in short supply; today only one out of six spends this much time queuing. Now the problem is a shortage of money to buy all the goods available in the market. More than one-fifth of Russians are regularly employed in privatized state enterprises, new private enterprises, or are self-employed. There is even the prospect of new laws recognizing bankruptcy. Such changes substitute new stresses for old.

To understand transformation from the bottom-up perspective of ordinary Russians we must first understand the nature of socialization under communism. The party-state propagated official views about what people were expected to do and not do. It could not abolish all forms of private life, but it could and did prevent informal networks from organizing and expressing opinions publicly.[12] Unlike the German survivors of the Third Reich, whose frame of reference extended back to pre-Nazi Germany, the Russians, until 1989, knew only the Soviet system. Russians also differ from Central and East Europeans, for whom the period of communist rule was shorter, and resistance there was strengthened by the fact that communism was imposed by an alien force.[13]

In a geographical sense, the majority of Russians live remote from Europe. Whereas East Berliners could see the effects of the German *Wirtschaftswunder* by looking out their windows or at their television screens, a Muscovite could not. Nine-tenths of Russians do not live in Moscow; more than one-third live in Asian parts of the Russian Federation; and one-half live in villages or small industrial cities. Few Russians would idealize the "idiocy of rural life" or the despoliation through pollution of many urban centers. Three-quarters of Russians have never been outside the territories of the former Soviet Union, and nine-tenths have no friends or

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relatives living in the West. When asked if they think of themselves as Europeans, a majority say they do not.

Most surveys in Russia focus upon current events (views of ephemeral parties or political personalities), material or abstract phenomena outside the experience of most Russians (Do you prefer regular Coke or Diet Coke? A free market economy or a social democratic economy?), or destinations (Would you rather Russia became like Sweden or like America?).[14] Asking Russians how they are getting by is common courtesy as well as common sense. Even though (or because) Russians do not know much about business practices as they are taught at Harvard Business School, they do know coping strategies that are not taught there.

EVERYDAY LIFE IN RUSSIA TODAY

What does it mean when a Russian says that everything is normal? It means that things often do not work, and one must rely upon informal or even illegal connections to get things done. People are less concerned with getting rich than with avoiding dissatisfaction; satisfaction can occur at a lower (or different) standard of living than in a modern society.[15] The immediate concern of a person thrown into deep water is to keep afloat.

How Do Russians Live on $100 a Month?

The short answer is, they do not. Although foreign businessmen and journalists find plenty of takers of dollars in Moscow and St. Petersburg, most Russians live hundreds or thousands of miles from cosmopolitan cities. Only 5 percent say they sometimes have access to a hard currency. Any attempt to convert ruble incomes into American dollars is doubly misleading. First, prices in Russia do not yet reflect normal market rules of supply and demand, particularly for such necessities as housing and heat, and foreign exchange rates do not reflect purchasing power. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) calculates that the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the Russian Federation was $492 at the official 1992 exchange rate, but almost seven times greater at an exchange rate adjusted for purchasing power parity.[16]

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Macroeconomic statistics rely upon official Russian sources and are, therefore, ruble accounts. The World Bank, for example, reports that between 1990 and 1992 the official Russian economy contracted by 37 percent. A footnote adds the caution: "Data on the former USSR are subject to more than the usual margin of error."[17] Standard national accounts in forms used in market economies will only become accurate as Russia becomes more a market economy and less a nonmarket economy in which official statistics often exaggerate the value of much that is produced and take no account of production in unofficial shadow economies.[18] Economic reform has introduced the semblance of a price mechanism but the demoralization of state administration has also made it possible for those in the know to make large transactions "off the books." For example, the Institute of International Finance estimates that $40 billion of the $90 billion made on oil, gas, and other exports in the past three years has not been repatriated because of fear of confiscation through taxes or inflation.[19]

Getting By With a Multiplicity of Economies

It is a gross ecological fallacy to infer the conditions of individual Russians from aggregate data about the Russian economy.[20] Empirical research shows that nearly every Russian household is seeking to get by through a strategy of "defensive demodernization," relying upon a multiplicity of economies, official and unofficial, monetized and nonmonetized, legal, "alegal," or uncivil. This strategy was developed of necessity in the old command economy and will remain important until Russia nears its economic destination.[21]

Of the nine forms of economic activity shown in *Table 1,* only employment in the official economy and receipt of a social security pension are consistently recorded in official statistics. Nearly every household also draws upon social economies, which are nonmonetized and therefore outside official records. The only requirement to enter a social economy is the willingness to lend a hand. Uncivil economies, monetized but illegal, and therefore also off the books, involve almost half of Russian households. The limited proportion of people working in the cash-in-hand second economies is not a reflection of effective law enforcement but rather a reflection of the problem of effective demand: not many Russians are able to pay workers with cash in hand.

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TABLE 1. Participation in Nine Economies

	Percentage of Russian households
OFFICIAL economies: monetized and legal	94%*
Employed in official economy	81
Pensioner	16
SOCIAL economies: nonmonetized and "alegal"	96%*
Household produces food, performs home repairs	81
Receives regular help from friends and relatives	27
Exchanges favors	37
Queues more than half a day a week	66
UNOFFICIAL economies: monetized and uncivil	48%*
Works in a second economy	27
Is paid as a connection	35
Uses foreign currency	2

* Represents percentage involved in at least one economy in the category.

Source: New Russia Barometer II, 1993.

Just as investors in market economies have a diversified portfolio of assets, so Russian households combine their multiple activities into four different portfolios according to family circumstances:[22]

Defensive (43 percent). The destabilization of money income through inflation and the introduction of market prices reinforces a lesson learned from the command economy: money is not everything. Households with a defensive portfolio combine a money income from the official economy or pension with resources from a nonmonetized social economy.

Enterprising (23 percent). Some individuals are able to deal with the inadequacies of the official economy by having two types of cash income: one from a recognized job and another from an uncivil economy. Such a portfolio is rational for the individual able to earn extra cash, but it is counterproductive for modernization since enterprising ways of making money are usually in "fly by night" activities that cannot be expanded into modern enterprises.

Vulnerable (22 percent). Only one-quarter of Russian households today say that they rely solely upon official sources of income. Vulnerable people are not necessarily poor, and may have done well under the old regime. Those who relied solely upon official resources are most vulnerable to the effects of transformation, for they have

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neither a second job producing additional cash income nor a garden plot producing food.

Marginal (12 percent). Paradoxically, households in which people say that money income is unimportant are less at risk from transformation. Because they subsist on the fringes of society, they do not rely upon any official or uncivil economy. Their standard of living is likely to be low, but their peripheral position makes it unlikely for decisions in Moscow to make it worse.

When Russians are asked the straightforward question, "Do you earn enough to meet your everyday needs?," two-thirds or more say they do not. As the transformation has progressed, it has become harder for people to earn enough from one job to make ends meet. At the start of economic reform in January 1992, 28 percent of Russians said their first job provided them with enough to cope; it was 3 percent higher in the summer of 1993. But by April 1994, only 13 percent said they earned enough from one job to get by.

TABLE 2. The Effect of Multiple Economies on Meeting Everyday Needs

	1992	1993	1994
Percentage who are getting by:			
With one job	28%	31%	13%
With a portfolio of activities	43	49	69
Total	71	80	82
Percentage who are not getting by:	29%	20%	18%

Source: New Russia Barometers I, II, III.

Taken at face value, these numbers imply that 87 percent of Russians are now threatened with poverty. In fact, more than four-fifths of Russians are getting by[23] today in spite of low wages by relying upon their portfolio of economic activities. After taking into account all their different activities, only 18 percent report that they still have difficulty getting by.

Since the start of the transformation process in 1992, the percentage of Russians able to get by with one job has fallen by 15 percent, but the proportion able to get by with a portfolio of activities has increased by 26 percent. Altogether, the proportion of Russians able to get by is virtually the same as in such market economies as Great Britain or Austria. The difference is that in a market economy

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nearly everybody who copes does so because of regular employment, whereas in Russia a majority do so because of unofficial resources.

Losers from Transformation

"There is no such thing as a free economic transformation" might be the contemporary equivalent of Lenin's revolutionary dictum about not being able to make an omelet without breaking eggs. To believe otherwise is to repeat the communists' mistake of believing that Russians can live in Utopia. In the short run, the losers from transformation will likely outnumber the winners. Hence, it is necessary to consider two questions: How many Russians are in dire need? Are their discomforts temporary or persisting?

Russians are not destitute in the absolute sense. Although a majority of Russians report that their living standard has fallen in the past five years, one-quarter of households have cars and three-quarters have a color television set. Living standards are not at American or Swedish levels, but they can reasonably be compared with those of Western Europe in the 1960s and are higher than those in some Mediterranean countries at the time they joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the European Community (EC).[24]

An increase in unemployment is a necessary condition of economic transformation. The expression of fears about unemployment becoming "too high" implies that there is such a thing as the right amount of unemployment. If so, what is it? The target level of unemployment should be measured in units of time rather than as a percentage of the labor force. If the average duration of unemployment is eight weeks, then six different persons could be unemployed in the process of adding one "person-unit" to the annual level of unemployment. If the annual level of unemployment were 5 percent and the average duration eight weeks, then as much as one-third of the labor force could experience short-term unemployment during the year. If unemployment were 10 percent, then nearly two-thirds of the labor force could experience unemployment at some time during the year.[25]

From a Rawlsian perspective,[26] the more widely a given annual level of unemployment is spread, the fairer its distribution. As the number of people experiencing unemployment increases to become

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a majority of the labor force, almost everyone can conceive of losing a job. Widespread but temporary unemployment is also desirable from an economic perspective, for labor mobility is a necessary condition for the efficient operation of a market economy, and this is especially so in a labor market that has been as stagnant as Russia's.

Unemployment in Russia today is like a lock on a river, with a steady flow of people into the ranks of the unemployed and a steady outflow. If a factory announces one thousand job losses, the people who lose their jobs do not remain unemployed forever, or even for the rest of the year. Three-quarters of Russians who have been unemployed at some time in the past year are now back at work. Since the basic economic unit in Russia is the household, the loss of a job does not mean that an individual is without any resources. The majority experiencing unemployment live in households in which at least one other person is employed. Moreover, the flow of resources from a multiplicity of economies is not stopped by the temporary loss of a regular job. Thus, the effect of unemployment upon a household's economy is likely to be temporary and marginal.

Only 1 percent of Russians say they are constantly without food or heat, essentials for survival. Only 4 percent say they are constantly without medical treatment, and 7 percent say they are in need of clothing. The proportion of Russians constantly without essentials is as low as in the United States.

TABLE 3. The Extent of Belt Tightening by Russians

	Never	Rarely	Often	Constantly
Percentage of households that has had to do without:				
Heating	91%	6%	2%	1%
Food	43	35	21	1
Medical treatment	68	18	9	4
Clothing	22	37	34	7
Gasoline for a car	76	7	6	11
Household goods	18	34	35	13
Newspapers	35	21	19	24
Household repairs	29	22	23	26
Cinema, theater	16	12	16	43

Source: New Russia Barometer III, 1994.

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Belt tightening is one strategy for adapting to stress; stretching goods to make them last longer is another. The strategies that Russians are using to get by are rational ones. They have become proficient in learning how to get by in a society under stress.

FREEDOM FROM THE STATE, THE FIRST FREEDOM

Russians were able to get by under the old regime, but doing so was a constant struggle. To protect themselves against claims of the state, many Russians practiced "defensive alienation." Apathetic conformity was the mask shown to authorities.

Freedom from the State

The collapse of the communist system has done far more to advance freedom than to advance the market. The ultimate test of freedom is not what the statute books say but what individuals feel they can do without sanctions by the state. The New Russia Barometer asked Russians to compare the new regime and the communist regime in terms of a host of everyday activities that constitute the essence of a free society. For each activity, people were asked to say whether things were better, much the same, or worse under the new regime. Two-thirds or more feel freer today to say what they think, to join any organization they wish, or to decide for themselves what religion they will practice. Only a small percentage say conditions are worse.

In a civil society, an individual should feel free to participate in organizations of his or her choice. To Russians, this also means being free *not* to participate in politics, that is, not having to be a Communist Party member in order to get a job, a promotion, or a better house. Sixty-two percent feel freer now to decide for themselves whether or not to take an interest in politics.

The achievement of freedoms taken for granted in a civil society is the biggest benefit that Russians have received as a result of the collapse of the old system. This is not the only goal of political activity, but as Isaiah Berlin has emphasized, viewed against past history, freedom from the state is a distinctive and real achievement.[27] In Russia freedom has not come about, as in England, by the gradual evolution of a system of laws and norms of behavior. Nor has it come about, as in the American south, through a gener-

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ation of successful court cases. It has come about through the demoralization and collapse of the state's institutions of repression.

Democracy Without Government: The Legacy of Distrust

Democracies can accommodate distrust in some parties and individuals as long as others are trusted. This is not the case in Russia today, where the communist regime has left a legacy of distrust. A majority of Russians distrust political parties, Parliament, President Yeltsin, local government, trade unions, the police, television, the KGB, and the courts. The Army is trusted by half of Russians, but only one-sixth are generally predisposed to trust institutions of representative government.[28]

An election produces a representative government if those elected are trusted representatives of those who voted for them. The current Russian government is democratically elected but distrusted. Distrust of both the Parliament and the President is extremely high, and more than three-quarters of Russians do not identify with any political party.

TABLE 4. Elections without Representative Government

Percentage of those surveyed who:	
Trust parties	6%
Trust the Parliament	12
Trust the President	18
Identify with a party	23
Believe the Constitution guarantees:	
The territorial unity of Russia	15
A lawful, democratic state	17
Think the shelling of Parliament could recur	60

Source: New Russia Barometer III.

An optimist might describe the Russian electorate as consisting of floating voters who, lacking a stable party preference, split their ticket. But describing the weak partisanship of Russians in terms used in the United States misreads the context. Russians are not floating voters but fugitive voters, fleeing from the party that has sought to dominate their lives and unwilling to put their trust in any party seeking power.

The December 1993 election offered Russians the opportunity to vote for or against a new Constitution. Up to a point the Constitu-

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tion can be described as presidentialist in the manner of the French Fifth Republic. However, the French Constitution requires that if the President proclaims an emergency allowing rule by decree, Parliament is automatically called to session and cannot be dismissed as long as emergency rule continues. This prudential check on dictatorship does not appear in the new Russian Constitution.

Election returns reported that a majority of the eligible electorate voted and a majority of voters endorsed the Constitution.[29] But an overwhelming majority of Russians do not believe that the document is adequate to the nation's needs. Only one-sixth think that the new Constitution can guarantee the territorial unity of Russia or ensure lawful government within the country. Three-fifths think that a future dispute between the President and the Parliament is likely to be resolved by force, and only 8 percent feel confident that force will not be used (see *Table 4*).

The rule of law is also declining in the streets. Russian-style mafiosi have filled vacuums left by the state's loss of power, organizing monopolies in local markets or turning to extortion to collect money at gunpoint from those who have profited from the market. A report by Morgan Stanley estimates that about three-quarters of commercial banks and privatized enterprises are paying substantial sums to organized crime, equivalent to as much as half their profits. The murder rate in Moscow is now ten times higher than that in the most violent West European city and as high as in New York.[30]

Distrust of parties and disregard for constitutional niceties detract from Russia's claims of legitimacy. Corruption in the ministries and in the market place, often backed up with the threat of force, and crime in the streets show there is no legitimate monopoly of force, a necessary element of being a modern state in the Weberian sense. The chief difficulty in negotiating with Russia today is not the existence of conflicting interests but the incapacity of Russians to fulfill their obligations.

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?

In the raw language of Marxism, Russians need to address only two questions: Who is to blame? What is to be done?[31]

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Who is to Blame?

When Russians are asked "Who is to blame for Russia's economic problems?," they have no difficulty in pointing the finger, and do so in a not unrealistic way (see *Table 5*). Two-thirds mention the breakup of the Soviet Union, a fundamental point that is often overlooked. It forced a highly integrated economy to operate across fifteen different countries with as many currencies or noncurrencies. Although future historians are likely to lay the blame for most of Russia's problems in the 1990s on communist mistakes in the preceding decades, less than half of Russians see their former leaders as the cause of the current problems. Just under half think that they themselves are to blame. Most blame is heaped on those who have held high offices in the post-Gorbachev era. A majority of Russians blame the government generally, promoters of reform, President Yeltsin, Gaidar, and local government, and two-fifths blame the current Parliament as well. The Mafia is also frequently cited as a cause of difficulties; indirectly, this implicates the government because of its inability to maintain law and order.

TABLE 5. Who is to Blame for Russia's Economic Problems?

Percentage who blame:	
The government	73%
The breakup of the Soviet Union	66
Promoters of reforms	66
The Mafia	66
The *nomenklatura*	65
The President	64
Gaidar	60
The local government	59
The Russian people	49
The current (1994) Parliament	44
The communists	41
Businessmen	38
Foreign governments	21
Capitalists	19
Jews	8
Workers	7

Source: New Russia Barometer III.

Given the anxieties induced by the shocks of transformation, the Russians could easily have projected blame onto remote symbols of

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power. In fact, only one-fifth blame foreign governments or capitalists, and even fewer blame the workers. In view of the history of anti-Semitism in Russia and the virulence of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, it is noteworthy that only 8 percent blame the Jews.

How is Russia to be Governed?

When Russians are asked to rate their current system of government and to rate the old communist regime, the verdict is mixed: 36 percent give the present regime a positive rating and 51 percent give the communist regime a positive rating. This is a very different pattern than that found elsewhere in postcommunist Europe. From Tallinn and Bucharest to Prague and East Berlin, the majority of Central and Eastern Europeans prefer their new regimes.[32]

When individual views of the past and present are combined, Russians appear even more divided. The largest group (36 percent) are reactionaries, having a positive view of the old communist regime and a negative view of the present system. The second largest group (28 percent) are skeptics, disliking both the old and the new regimes. A total of 21 percent are democrats, preferring the new regime. In view of the alleged submissiveness of Russians, it is noteworthy that only 8 percent are indiscriminate "*da*-sayers," approving of both the old and the new regimes.

A return to the past is not a realistic political platform. Too much has happened to return to the superficial order and stagnation of the Brezhnev era. When people are asked about a series of alternatives to the present system, only 23 percent say that they would welcome a restoration of the communist regime, and even fewer, 9 percent, endorse the alternative of the return of a czar.

There are three realistic alternatives to the present system of Russian government: military rule, rule by a strong man, or government by technocratic experts. In many troubled areas of the world, including Eastern Europe between the wars, the military has taken over amidst disorder or has destabilized an elected government. Even though the Army is more trusted than any other Soviet institution, it is not trusted to take charge of the country; only 11 percent of Russians would prefer the Army to rule in place of the present regime. Given that the Soviet Army was designed to fight abroad, its leaders probably share the popular aversion to the Army

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taking responsibility for managing the economy or fighting crime in the streets.

Russians are divided over the statement, "We do not need a Parliament and elections but a strong leader who can make decisions and put them into effect fast." Forty-three percent agree with the statement, 40 percent disagree, and the remainder neither agree nor disagree. The percentage endorsing a strong, effective leader is much higher than the percentage saying they would vote for President Yeltsin or Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In other words, Russians are looking for a "white knight" who has not yet appeared on their political horizon. They regard the alternatives that they know as ineffective and untrustworthy.

Fifty-four percent of Russians endorse the statement, "Experts, not the Parliament and government, should make the most important decisions about the economy."[33] This does not contradict statements blaming promoters of reforms for the present economic difficulties (see *Table 5*). Rather, it suggests that the problem of reformers was not a lack of popularity but a lack of effectiveness—inflation followed price liberalization and the output and cash flows of large enterprises are contracting. What is lacking in Russia today is not the right personality but policies that will work not only within the framework of theoretical models that exogenize all the difficulties, but also in the peculiar historical context of a society under the stress of transformation.[34]

Lacking a Churchill and given massive popular resistance to another Stalin, what will become of Russian government? Pluralist politics are likely to continue because the present fragmentation of power serves many interests. Former Party bosses in the provinces and managers, entrepreneurs, and kleptocrats in former state enterprises have an interest in preventing the government from becoming strong enough to take away what they have carved out for themselves in the past few years. A broken-backed regime offering freedom, disorder, and ineffective government is not a noble goal, but in a society under stress it may be preferred as a lesser evil.

How Long will Russians Wait?

The communist system cannot be unbuilt in a day. But will people wait? The frustration-aggression hypothesis predicts that if changes in society raise popular expectations and if these expectations are

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not met, then the result will be aggressive behavior, whether calculated or irrational.[35] Global telecommunications are now showing Russians a picture of Western living standards that had previously been unseen by them. How long do Russians expect it to take to raise their living standards to levels that they can see each evening on television?

Russians remain realists. When asked how soon it will be before they reach a standard of living with which they are content, only 2 percent say they are already content. Most are unsure (see *Table 6*). Such an answer is far more honest than a prediction that economic contentment can be achieved in a few years if the appropriate macroeconomic policies are followed. It is also more honest than saying contentment can never be achieved. Paradoxically, because the deterioration in the official economy has created negative expectations, people will not be surprised if the official economy turns worse. A "revolution of falling expectations" also implies that even the slightest upturn, if sustained, could create disproportionate enthusiasm.

TABLE 6. Political and Economic Patience

How long before you are satisfied with:	Economic system	Political system
	(in percentages)	
Already content	2%	2%
1 to 2 years	2	1
3 to 5 years	7	7
6 to 10 years	4	5
More than 10 years	3	8
Never	18	12
Do not know	64	65

Source: New Russia Barometer III.

Russian expectations about government are also low. Past experience and the absence of an effective alternative justify these low expectations. This need not disrupt everyday life, however, for Russians learned long ago how to get by without, or in spite of, government. Low expectations are not grounds for optimism, but they at least prevent frustration, and the acts of aggression that may follow.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Mikhail Gorbachev, speech at Khabarovsk, 15 April 1991.

[2]Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* 4th ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), chap. 7. Cf. Richard Rose, "Escaping From Absolute Dissatisfaction: A Trial-and-Error Model of Change in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4 (4) (1992): 371–93.

[3]The Communist Party may not have been perfectly totalitarian but then a market economy is not a perfect market. The concept of totalitarianism remains useful for distinguishing the old Soviet regime from authoritarian regimes. See Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), 175–412.

[4]Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum," *Dædalus* 119 (1) (Winter 1990): 298ff; Jan Winiecki, *The Distorted World of Soviet-Type Economies* (New York: Routledge, 1988).

[5]For reviews of the Soviet system that debate the relevance of modernization, see Frederic Fleron Jr. and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds., *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sociology* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993); and Owen Harries, ed., "The Strange Death of Soviet Communism: An Autopsy," *The National Interest* 31 (Spring 1993).

[6]See Janos Kornai, *The Socialist System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially pt. one, and the very relevant passages in Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963), 105ff.

[7]See Anders Åslund, "How Small is the Soviet National Economy?," in Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf Jr., eds., *The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden* (San Francisco, Calif.: ICS Press, 1990), 13–61.

[8]Cf. Richard Rose and Evgeny Tikhomirov, "Who Grows Food in Russia and Eastern Europe?," *Post-Soviet Geography* 34 (2) (1993): 111–26; Frederick L. Pryor, *The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[9]Cf. World Bank Studies of Economies in Transformation Paper Number 1, *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992).

[10]Albert Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963).

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[11]Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* 5th ed. (Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), 126.

[12]For an account of the classic system, see Stephen White, "Propagating Communist Values in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 34 (6) (1985): 1–17. Cf. Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[13]For survey evidence showing under what circumstances and to what extent non-Russians respond differently than Russians to transformation, see the report of the Ten-Nation New Democracies Barometer of the Paul Lazarsfeld Society in Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "Mass Response to Transformation in Post-Communist Societies," *Europe-Asia Studies* (formerly, *Soviet Studies*) 46 (1) (1994): 3–28.

[14]This article draws upon data from the New Russia Barometer (NRB), an annual nationwide sample survey of Russians developed by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, as part of a program to monitor mass response to the transformation of fifteen postcommunist societies. Unless otherwise noted, all survey data reported here come from New Russia Barometer III, a nationally representative survey in March-April 1994 of 3,535 Russians. The survey was organized by the Paul Lazarsfeld Society, Vienna. For full details of the three NRB surveys, see Irina Boeva and Viachyslav Shironin, *Russians Between State and Market: The Generations Compared,* Studies in Public Policy no. 205 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1992); Richard Rose, Irina Boeva, and Viachyslav Shironin, *How Russians are Coping with Transition: New Russia Barometer II,* Studies in Public Policy no. 216 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1993); and Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, *New Russia Barometer III: The Results,* Studies in Public Policy no. 228 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1993, 1994).

[15]Simon's ideas of satisfaction and avoiding dissatisfaction are more relevant in Russia today than are ideas of profit maximization or optimization. See Herbert A. Simon, "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," *American Economic Review* 68 (2) (1978): 1–16.

[16]International Monetary Fund, *IMF Economic Reviews 8: Russian Federation* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1993), 85.

[17]World Bank, *Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data,* 1993 ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993), 32.

[18]See Tim Heleniak and Albert Motivans, "A Note on *Glasnost* and the Soviet Statistical System," *Soviet Studies* 43 (3) (1991): 473–90; Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, eds., *The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[19]Anthony Robinson, "Quiet Revolution Pays Dividends for EBRD," *Financial Times,* 19 April 1994.

[20]For a discussion of the appropriate uses of economic statistics in postcommunist societies, see the papers by Janos Arvay and Bruno Dallago and the comment by Richard Rose in Robert Holzman, Janos Gacs, and Georg Winckler, eds., *Measuring Output Decline in Eastern Europe* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, forthcoming).

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[21]For classic analyses of multiple economies in the old regime, see Gregory Grossman, "Informal Personal Incomes and Outlays of the Soviet Urban Population," in Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton, eds., *The Informal Economy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 150–70, and Aaron Katsenelinboigen, *Studies in Soviet Economic Planning* (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978).

[22]After being interviewed in detail about involvement in each of the nine economies described in *Table 1*, each respondent was handed a card listing all the economies and asked to identify the two most important ones. The answers given are the basis for assignment to different portfolios. For more details see Richard Rose, "Contradictions Between Micro- and Macro-Economic Goals in Post-Communist Societies," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45 (3) (1993): 419–44.

[23]Operationally, "getting by" is defined as the capacity of people to sustain themselves indefinitely without borrowing money or spending savings. Individuals are classified as getting by in *Table 2* if they report earning enough from their first job to meet their needs or if in the past year they have not needed to borrow money or spend their savings, activities that cannot continue indefinitely.

[24]See the evidence of social indicators marshaled in "Comparing Welfare Across Time and Space," *Welfare in a Civil Society,* Annex II (Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, 1993).

[25]To estimate the maximum number who could be unemployed during the year, divide fifty-two weeks by the average duration of unemployment, eight weeks, and multiply this quotient, 6.5, by the annual average of unemployment. At 5 percent annual unemployment, as much as 32.5 percent could be unemployed for eight weeks at some point in the year, and at 10 percent annual unemployment, up to 65 percent.

[26]John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[27]See Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[28]For details, see Richard Rose, "Distrust as an Obstacle to the Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (3) (1994).

[29]Whether these figures are accurate is a matter of dispute. A Kremlin-appointed commission has concluded that up to 9 million votes were falsified in order to create a turnout high enough to meet legal requirements for enactment of the Constitution, and that the Zhirinovsky vote was also padded. See John Lloyd, "Massive Electoral Fraud Alleged in Russia," *Financial Times,* 6 May 1994.

[30]See *The Guardian,* 29 April 1994.

[31]Lustration is hardly an issue in the *ur*-communist state, in which 39 percent of respondents in NRB III said that they or a member of their family had been a member of the Communist Party. Consequently, Russians are spared a third question that has caused concern in other postcommunist countries: What is to be done with those who are to blame?

[32]See Rose and Haerpfer, "Mass Response to Transformation in Post-Communist Societies," 23.

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[33]In the May 1994 election, the Hungarian Socialist Party successfully campaigned with the slogan, "Let the experts govern."

[34]On the problematic nature of "technopol" rule see the comments by John Williamson, Robert Bates, and John Toye in John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 9–48.

[35]See the classic work of Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

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Mark Medish

Russia: Lost and Found

AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA and the other postcommunist countries well illustrates George Bernard Shaw's theory that there are two great misfortunes in life—not getting your heart's desire and getting it. For over four decades, the paramount objective of US foreign policy was the containment of the perceived threat of Soviet communism. Scarcely an expense was spared in this historic struggle. Although the staggered disintegration of the Soviet Empire from 1989 to 1991 left America and the West the victors of the Cold War, at least by default, subsequent developments in Russia and the other Soviet successor states have been a source of growing disappointment and alarm. The Western Alliance has failed to respond in meaningful and effective ways to the opportunities and dangers of postcommunism. Today, standing over the ruins of its old arch rival, America is uncertain of what to do next.

The Soviet Union expired unceremoniously and bloodlessly on Christmas Day in 1991 as a result of the *ultra vires* agreement reached among the troika of Slavic republican leaders: Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich of Belarus.[1] The secessionist troika had neither mandates for change from their respective legislatures nor prior approval of the other constitutive republics of the Union.[2] The national referendum conducted nine months earlier at Gorbachev's initiative had overwhelmingly approved preservation of the Union.[3] The formal illegality of the trilateral decision at Minsk, as well as the decisionmakers' scant consideration of the possible consequences of

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their action, was emblematic of the difficulty of a postcommunist transition based on lawfulness and democracy.

The Minsk Accord, which established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), left Soviet President Gorbachev without a country and Washington policymakers in the lurch. As in the miraculous days of November 1989 when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the unimaginable transpired before our very eyes, and there were no contingency plans. A story that must be told, and is only now being explored in greater detail despite the CIA's obvious interests in concealment, is that of the systematic failure of Western intelligence services to forecast the demise of the Soviet Union, much less its timing and precise nature.[4] A similar story describes the predictive blind spots of most Western Sovietologists, the policy-scholars who sought to be relevant but often at the price of their critical distance from the basic operating assumptions of those in power.

The sudden, pathetic irrelevance of Gorbachev, the unmoved mover of *glasnost* and *perestroika* and the erstwhile "man of the decade," was a surprise and an embarrassment—not only for Gorbachev himself, but also for all those whose image of Russia depended on his being in power. Gorbachev proved to be a man of the decade and nothing more. Without Gorbachev, the new epoch might not have begun; with him, it would not continue.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

News of the Soviet Union's extinction and Gorbachev's retirement was ill timed in Washington for several reasons. By the winter of 1991, quadrennial political pressures were mounting at the White House. It was plainly apparent that President Bush's popularity after the Gulf War had a far shorter life than one might have expected, and that long ignored domestic issues, such as the budget, crime, education, and urban blight, were at last coming to the fore.

Believed by some to have special insight in foreign affairs, Bush was thoroughly flummoxed by Gorbachev's abrupt exit from power. The Bush administration had failed to heed the advice of experienced experts, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, not to fall for media hype about saints and demons in Russia and not to "overpersonalize" US relations with the Soviet Union by relying too heavily on Gorbachev or Yeltsin. Strong personal rela-

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tionships among leaders may be of extreme usefulness in diplomacy, but they must not be mistaken for the sum total of bilateral relations or for a foreign policy.

The White House's lack of preparedness for the monumental developments in Russia was reinforced by its apparent lack of interest. Throughout 1992 Secretary of State James Baker was otherwise preoccupied; first productively with the Middle East, later less successfully with the reelection campaign of his boss, whose foreign policy focus was increasingly seen as an electoral liability. The Baker State Department evidently considered the technical finalization of historic arms control and reduction agreements to be sufficient attention to Russia.[5] Both Bush and Baker seemed uncomfortable working with Boris Yeltsin, an unpolished maverick who lacked Gorbachev's or Shevardnadze's appreciation of summitry.

Since the autumn of 1990, when the so-called 500 Days Reform Plan, a comprehensive economic transition scheme drafted by Gorbachev's senior advisor Stanislav Shatalin, was on the table in Moscow, Bush had flirted with the idea of massive financial aid to Russia in order to shore up market reform. The Shatalin plan boldly proclaimed:

> Humanity has not yet developed anything more efficient than the market economy. . . .A precondition to ensure the effective functioning of the market is the *de jure* equality of all types of property, including private property. . . .Revenue from property must be recognized as lawful profit.[6]

Such a fundamentally Lockean premise was truly revolutionary for Soviet Russia, even in the heady days of *perestroika.* Shatalin's "shock therapy," as the plan was dubbed by some at the time, appeared to open the door for rescue of the postcommunist Soviet economy. It also may have been an ideal occasion for significant foreign assistance, as was provided during the Polish "big bang," admittedly on a much smaller scale.

But Bush systematically failed to deliver. Instead of a programmatic commitment, he merely named attorney/magnate Robert Strauss US ambassador to Moscow. At one level, the gesture made eminent strategic sense, both domestically and externally. By tapping the Democratic Party kingmaker, Bush signaled his valid belief that

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Russia was a bipartisan issue. Moreover, because Strauss was a pragmatist, his selection would be a clear sign to the Russians that Washington believed that the ideological tension of the Cold War was a thing of the past and that America was ready to do business. However, Strauss proved to be a disappointment—he delivered few keen insights into the new Russian reality and complained of his living conditions in Moscow. He did not help the White House galvanize lasting support at home for serious American engagement with Russia, nor did he galvanize the White House.

A serious political problem for those who advocated substantial assistance was that, although Gorbachev energetically solicited foreign support for *perestroika* at most of his major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) road stops, the Kremlin's line on reform was inconstant, encouraging the "radical reformers" here but appeasing the "hard-liners" there. In the winter of 1991, Gorbachev veered sharply away from the Shatalin plan in favor of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov's far less ambitious, centrist proposals. The old Bolshevik dialectical "zigzag" was hardly reassuring to outsiders.

Another obstacle was the lack of Group of Seven (G7) consensus on the wisdom of massive aid to Russia, in part the result of incessant rumors that Gorbachev could not "hold the center" and that a crackdown was imminent. Gorbachev's outgoing Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had warned in December 1990 that "a dictatorship is on the offensive," and it was not at all unreasonable to believe that a Soviet Tiananmen was a distinct possibility.

But there are deeper, structural reasons for G7 hesitancy on Russia, then and now, having mostly to do with America's allies. Japan's traditional mistrust of Russia made, and still makes, G7 coordination on aid to Russia difficult. Neither the Cold War nor World War II is over between Japan and Russia. Russia refused to sign the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty with Tokyo, and although full diplomatic relations have long been in place there is yet no formal peace between these two countries. The main reason for the impasse is that the Japanese Foreign Ministry continues to demand as a precondition of peace the return of the so-called "Northern Territories," or Lesser Kurile Islands, which were punitively seized by Stalin and annexed to the Russian Federation in September 1945.[7] America has always been in an excellent position to broker

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a settlement of the territorial dispute, but has shown little inclination to do so. During the Cold War, the excuse was the US interest in driving a wedge between Tokyo and Moscow; what is it today?

The European view on assistance to the former communist bloc is more complex but also familiar. In general, the West Europeans have been more attentive to the new democracies in Eastern Europe—in particular, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, those with the most promising economies—than to Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Europe's overall commitment has been unimpressive. One would have thought that Western Europe's overwhelming geopolitical interests in bolstering the new democracies would have led to concerted action. But by the same token one would have thought that the Europeans could have successfully responded to, if not preempted, the situation in the former Yugoslavia. In the current period of deep recession, political realignments, and resurgent nationalist moods, Western Europe has been engrossed in profound questions of self-identity posed, inter alia, by Maastricht. But some observers also might conclude that the Europeans, who twice in this century failed to prevent international disaster, have simply been selfish.

Britain hosts the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) headquarters. However, since the departure in 1990 of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the first Atlantic leader to identify Gorbachev's great promise, British foreign policy has been all but rudderless. Britain, like America, appears to be in a period of national introspection, or at least self-absorption. Italy, which has more recent experience with economic transformation, also has a headless foreign policy. The thrust of Italian involvement with the East, which is not nugatory, has been through its private sector.

Germany, on the other hand, must be credited for its patient, decades-long *Ostpolitik*, which set in motion many of the processes of East European transformation that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Because of its unique situation, the Federal Republic has had its hands full, economically and politically, with the reunification and reintegration of the Eastern *Länder*. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been the most consistent spokesman for substantial G7 support for all the postcommunist countries, and accordingly the Federal Republic's economic gift has been taxed the hardest.

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France has taken a relatively detached posture on aid to the former Soviet Union. Jacques Attali, the former head of the EBRD, was a solid advocate of economic engagement with Eastern Europe despite France's own economic malaise. However, President François Mitterrand, who considers himself an internationalist, has tended to hedge his bets. The most notorious example was his friendly telegram to the committee of Moscow coup-plotters in August 1991, sent on the apparent assumption that the coup had succeeded. In short, for a variety of good and not-so-good reasons, the European performance has confirmed Richard Nixon's suspicions and advice: Europe may play an important part, but America must lead.

By the summer of 1991 Bush, Kohl, and the other G7 leaders had managed to raise expectations of assistance to Russia. But the promises of a "Grand Bargain," the alluring term for a new Marshall Plan coined by Graham Allison, Roger Blackwill, and Grigori Yavlinsky, soon evaporated amidst talk of an impending coup. It was by all accounts too late to "help Gorbachev."

The putsch-manqué of August 1991 confirmed to many foreign observers that Russia was a bad investment risk. To others, the putsch attempt was a sign that more ought to have been done in the first place. When Gorbachev returned to Moscow from his vacation-under-house-arrest at Foros in the Crimea, he sought to reassure the world as he deplaned: "We are in control," he said. Within months the game was over for Gorbachev.

Bush proved to be chronically halfhearted about a crucial opportunity to strengthen the "new world order" he had fought for in Desert Storm. Perhaps he was deterred by strident neo-isolationist voices within the Republican Party, such as that of Patrick Buchanan. It was primarily the threat of being upstaged by then presidential candidate Bill Clinton on foreign policy and the prodding of former President Richard Nixon that impelled Bush to formulate a $24 billion G7 pledge of support for reform in Russia, which he announced at a press conference on April 1, 1992. The heart of Nixon's exhortation to Bush was that America must lead because it is in the national interest to do so and because no other country would. Having spent trillions of dollars to win the Cold War, the Western Alliance would realize a false economy if it failed to support reform in Russia generously. Less than a year later, sensing

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continued indecision at the White House, Nixon would repeat the same argument to President Clinton.[8]

In late 1992 Bush gave some added force to the promised G7 aid package, which was to be comprised mostly of International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt relief and World Bank loans, when he signed into law the Freedom Support Act authorizing USAID-administered assistance on economic reform and the Nunn-Lugar Act for defense sector conversion in the Russian Federation and the rest of the former Soviet Union.

The Clinton administration inherited the Freedom Support Act, the Nunn-Lugar Act, and the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 from the Bush administration. After the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Vancouver in March 1993, which boosted the national G7 commitment to $32 billion, Vice President Gore took charge of the new task force on assistance to the former Soviet Union. Since then Freedom Support funds for megaprojects like "privatization" and "rule of law" have continued to trickle through USAID's Byzantine contracting machine. The Nunn-Lugar monies have been used intermittently, and not always successfully, by the White House to "incentivize" Soviet successor states' adherence to arms reduction treaties signed by the Soviet Union.

The mosaic of G7 aid to Russia and the other New Independent States (NIS) is truly chaotic, and at times scandalously so. Some disorder is to be expected since those countries span a fairly wide spectrum of development, and regional particularisms abound. However, thanks to the manic growth drives of the Soviet period, few of them resemble traditional Third World aid clients. Their goal is systemic "transformation," akin to some Latin American and East Asian models, but not to the wretched subsistence patterns of Sub-Saharan economies. To be effective, assistance to the NIS probably requires development expertise different from that typically applied to Chad or Madagascar. The aid community has been extraordinarily slow in responding to the specific needs of the former communist countries.

"Aid" to the NIS has been loosely defined and includes international debt relief, new multilateral and bilateral loans, concessionary and tied grants, and technical assistance. So far, only a fraction of the promised aggregate amounts has been delivered. There has been surprisingly little trade development, arguably the best way to

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integrate those economies in the world markets. The sheer number of agencies through which aid flows, albeit at sclerotic rates, is daunting: USAID, USIA, IMF, IBRD, the Ex-Im Bank, EBRD, OPIC, TDA, and the Eurasia Foundation, to name but a few. Quantity does not mean quality, however, primarily because coordination of G7 interagency efforts is absent or ineffective. Moreover, the Russians, familiar with divide and rule strategies, take advantage of duplicative programs. So, too, do squadrons of Western consultants who have opened boutiques on "transformation economics" in order to capture often lucrative USAID and EBRD contracts.

POST-COLD WAR FATIGUE SYNDROME

Conscious of his role as America's first post-Cold War president, Clinton has said many times that support for reform in the former communist bloc, and especially in Russia, is imperative.[9] As the White House is always ready to point out, it is not Clinton's fault that his predecessors bequeathed him "a superpower without cash." But the amount of aid is not the real issue. Follow-through, in terms of active policy engagement and leadership, has been virtually nonexistent. Throughout 1993, Clinton's team pursued, at best, a quixotic strategy toward Russia.

Overall, Clinton's foreign policy has been widely perceived as unremarkable, except perhaps that major wars have been avoided. NAFTA may have been his biggest achievement, but the Uruguay Round is yet an unfinished symphony. Positive developments on Clinton's watch, such as the democratic transitions in South Africa and Palestine, have been counterbalanced by serious trouble spots around the world, for example in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Haiti, North Korea, Rwanda, and Somalia, to which the US response has been faltering. Moreover, the United States has relatively lukewarm and unproductive relations with Japan, the People's Republic of China, and Russia, and there is little evidence that the Administration has many new ideas or strategies to improve matters.

The Clinton policy team appears to be noncohesive, understaffed, and lacking a depth of knowledge on Russia as well as other key regions. Recurrent doubts about the President's commitment to focus systematically on important international issues have been fueled by reports that National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and

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other key counselors meet with Clinton only irregularly and that those strategy sessions tend to be inconclusive. There is also a common perception that US foreign policy is media-driven. Far more serious, there is a growing opinion in some foreign capitals that the word of the Secretary of State may not necessarily carry the President's full faith and credit. In short, US credibility is at risk, now more than ever.

A substantive initiative on Russia and the rest of the postcommunist world will be the true test of the Clinton administration. Failure to meet this challenge would mean a historic loss for America. It will require the courage to look beyond the polls or, better still, to have the vision and dynamism to forge a new consensus among the American people. But President Clinton and his team have to work hard to convert the Bush-Baker pabulum about multilateralism, which proved effective in a military context in the Persian Gulf, into a reliable and effective tool of post-Cold War foreign policy.

American foreign policy is, in a sense, a victim of the gap between Bush's uninspired pragmatism and Clinton's sometimes insouciant and often unconvincing optimism. If the Bush administration exhibited a singular lack of imagination on Russia, the Clinton administration has shown an excess of "the vision thing," wishful thinking. The result is that the period from 1990 to 1993 may have been a grand missed opportunity with respect to Russia, much as George F. Kennan describes the squandered "moment. . .for serious talks. . .about the future of Europe" around 1947, which he hints could have averted the Cold War.[10] Not unlike the Bush administration, the Clinton team has had a hard time emerging from the Cold War's shadow.

The Cold War has had many lingering material and psychological effects on the country. One such effect was the development of a bloated military-industrial complex (MIC), a cluster of interest groups without basic accountability that wields inordinate political power. Even after the Cold War the MIC has managed to retain most of its old privileged share of the federal budget. Supporters of the Pentagon's marathon spending habits have argued that its unbridled propensity to funnel dollars into high technology research and development, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, ultimately led to the Soviet Union's defeat. Although defense-driven technological innovations like lasers may have yielded collateral benefits

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for the American economy, the larger claim is highly suspect. The Soviet Union had overcome far greater foreign threats in its history. The defense acceleration in the early 1980s simply put the world at greater peril, contributing to the exhaustion of both superpowers.

During the Cold War the American conception of national security was reduced to military hardware, or "hard power," to use Joseph Nye's phrase.[11] Kissinger discerned very early that our foreign policy had taken "a flight into technology."[12] A few years later, Martin Luther King intoned: "We have guided missiles, but misguided men." Security was measured by the radius of the "nuclear umbrella." Insecurity meant "missile gaps" or "windows of vulnerability." To understand that mutual assured destruction (MAD) was the summum bonum of the superpower relationship is to see the conceptual and moral sterility of the Cold War and its arms race. Today, despite the diabolical sophistication of its defensive and offensive weapons alike, the United States finds itself ill equipped for the harder task of building peace.

Even the most Tocquevillian democrats did not expect that "people power," not nuclear summitry, would end Soviet tyranny across Eastern Europe. Spoiled by nuclear security and the technological "quick fix," Americans neglected to study how to succeed in adverse situations abroad, against old enemies—poverty, hunger, disease, and social strife—without recourse to its trumping military advantage. Nye is correct when he says that America needs to learn the ways of "soft power," but without going soft.[13]

The post-Cold War era is an occasion to pursue not only traditional national interests of strategic and regional stability, but also deeper goals of international well-being. To paraphrase Richard Pipes, survival is not enough. The attempt to rekindle what one might call "national vitality"[14] has understandably become the key political fact of life in America as well as many of the other post-Cold War democracies. The primacy of the domestic agenda is an important popular response to the characteristic socioeconomic indifference of the Cold War. But, as even the Clinton campaign speeches reminded Americans, it would be a grave mistake to believe that there is a meaningful choice between domestic and foreign policy in the context of an interdependent, "borderless" world. As Nixon said, "foreign and domestic policy are like Siamese twins—one cannot survive without the other."[15]

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"Preventive diplomacy" is a New Age shibboleth in leadership circles, thanks to the gifted wordsmiths who work for UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The underlying idea, presumably upon analogy with preventive health care, is a good one. To be successful, preventive diplomacy requires an especially clear picture of what one seeks to promote, to prevent, and the price one is willing to pay in the process. In other words, it may call for a degree of sagacity rarely encountered in mortals, and almost never seen among the recent denizens of the policy planning staff at the State Department or at the National Security Council. Intelligence ought never to be confused with wisdom. By definition, timing is vital in the prevention business. It does not follow, however, that once prevention has failed no response is necessary. Preventive diplomacy must be backed up with common sense and international responsibility.

The savings from inaction today will be squandered by the costs of action, on less favorable terms, tomorrow. Why is it so difficult to see that a plausible "future" for Russia, if it is ignored and isolated, will be to play yet once again the role of an expansionist state hostile to liberty? The most relevant analogy between Yugoslavia and Russia is not the prospect of interethnic strife, but the folly that comes from indecision on the part of powers who could make a difference but instead choose to watch and wait.

A hidden consequence of the Cold War for America, related to the hypertrophy of military security, was the general impoverishment of its cosmopolitan imagination, limiting its notion of what actions might be taken. The nature of the competition with the Soviet Union exacerbated the universalist, reductionist, and messianic elements of the American foreign policy "mental set." The superpower rivalry was conceived by propagandists on both sides as one of opposing great ideas: the free market versus the command economy, liberal democracy versus the "dictatorship of the proletariat," bourgeois freedom versus socialist freedom. In Eisenhower's words: "Forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history. Freedom is pitted against slavery, lightness against dark."[16]

The contest between the two cosmic principles could be, and was, played out in horrendous ways in Korea, Indochina, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, and a dozen other unfortunate

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Third World localities. America's national interests and foreign entanglements became truly globalized, but the country learned relatively little about the strange lands of the world, much less about its nemeses in the "evil empire." What was there to learn if America's mission was to teach, liberate, and save?

As Kennan astutely observed, American foreign policy has a marked tendency to seek unconditional surrender. Truman and the Allies exacted it from both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan after World War II, and it became the basis for prolonged occupation and thoroughgoing reconstruction of both those countries. Similarly, Bush, a veteran of World War II, initially threatened to terminate Iraqi sovereignty and conduct a Nuremberg-style trial of Saddam Hussein and his generals after the war's end. In a sense it appears that the American leadership implicitly expected unconditional surrender from Russia after the Cold War, together with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the United States must be careful not to overplay its hand.

Silly triumphalism is apparent in America's urge to redeem Russia. Perpetuated in the media, it stems from the interaction of an uncritical self-image and a romantic image of the "real" Russia, believed to have always existed beneath its false communist shell. The implicit belief is that although Peter the Great, Alexander II, Lenin, and Gorbachev—the great "westernizers" of Russian history—failed to change Russia by ukase and by force, America can reinvent it, with the good counsel of experts from the International Monetary Fund, Price Waterhouse, and the entrepreneurial wing of Harvard University's economics department.

The picture being sold in Washington is at once magnificent and technocratic. While it may be true that Lenin's leadership style would have benefited from management consultants, Mother Russia is not General Motors. A key difference is that the directors of General Motors want to make more money and, presumably, better automobiles, while Russians are quite content being Russian. In a land as disenchanted as postcommunist Russia, it is doubtful that American consultants, even with the encouragement of former Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, could ever "write [their] will across the sky in stars" in the manner of T. E. Lawrence.

Such blind romanticism has led America into trouble, or at least serious disappointment, in the past. Grave misunderstanding of the

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Strange Alliance of World War II, an anti-Axis marriage of convenience in which Roosevelt invested inordinately great expectations, begat the Cold War. In the 1970s, détente's deceptive packaging—its pleasant-sounding Frenchness—led to intercontinental recriminations and the brink of confrontation. In early 1994, after looking for a suitable partner in democratic Russia and finding neofascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the die-hard Russophiles at the State Department concluded that "the honeymoon is over."

In Moscow for a visit that coincided with the December 12, 1993 general elections and constitutional referendum, Vice President Gore was compelled to cancel plans for a victory celebration with the leaders of Russia's Choice, Gaidar's shock therapy party, because there was no victory in sight. Gore was ill advised to sharply criticize Zhirinovsky, leader of the preposterously named Liberal Democratic Party, and by association to indict the millions of Russians who voted for him. It is one thing for Washington to support democratic processes in foreign lands but quite another for it to try to micromanage the election results. Soon after the ballots were counted, a voice at the highest level of the State Department endorsed international newsman Vladimir Pozner's call for "more therapy, less shock."

As Strobe Talbott, then Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS, probably discovered, to speak the truth can be a big mistake in diplomacy. By pulling the brake on the program his team had wholeheartedly endorsed, his words did much to undermine the credibility of American "soft power." But his was a no-win situation. Against a preponderance of all the evidence, the State Department had banked on the improbable—that Russia could be more like us and that the good words of Gaidar, Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and a thin stratum of other Russian Amerophiles had true purchase in Moscow, indeed in the hinterland. In hindsight, this was wishful thinking, a "pathetic fallacy" par excellence. Washington had been presuming the unconditional surrender of old Russia.

Ambassador Talbott's minor *lapsus linguae* complemented another malapropism of Clinton diplomacy, namely the Tarnoff Doctrine. Possibly drawing on "declinist" historian Paul Kennedy's notion of "imperial overstretch,"[17] Tarnoff warned a group of assembled foreign affairs correspondents in May 1993, "We simply

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don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence. . .and we certainly don't have the money to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive results anytime soon."[18] The talk was ostensibly about the use of force only in extreme situations, a variation on General Colin Powell's maxim that the United States should use force only when absolute victory is certain—what Stanley Hoffmann has called a doctrine of "combatant immunity." Regrettably for Tarnoff the speech came to represent the idea of a larger American retreat from the world.

Taken together, the Talbott and Tarnoff dicta, both of which were instinctively retracted by the State Department, strongly suggest that Washington does not know what kind of Russia is within reach or how to get there, and even if it does know, the United States probably lacks the resources and commitment to achieve its ends. This is symptomatic of what may be called the post-Cold War fatigue syndrome.

"COMMON DESTINY"

The preamble of the democratically approved December 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation observes that "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, [are] united by a common destiny on our land." The 137 articled constitution does not specify exactly what that destiny might be. What is Russia's fate? Can Russia be free? Can it be free of its past, in the way that America seeks to be?

These are cursed questions; the Russians call them "eternal." Statesmen, scholars, and artists have pondered the reformability of Russia, often reaching discouraging conclusions. Many have opined that Russia, in one sense or another, is a captive of its own thousand-year history: the Mongol Yoke (1220–1480) retarded Russia by depriving her of the Renaissance and preconditioned Russia's resistance to modernity; the traditional caesaropapism of the Russian Orthodox Church weakened the roots of civil society and permitted the dominance of a patrimonial state; Ivan the Terrible's abusive *oprichnina* guards, Nicholas I's Third Department, and Alexander III's *okhrana* predisposed Russia forever to be a kind of police state; there is a necessary and direct line from Lenin's early writings to Stalin's gulag; and the current period of transition is

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merely a repetition of the seventeenth-century "Time of Troubles" and the revolutionary period from 1905 to 1920. The Moscow sociologist Yuri N. Afanasyev has recently bemoaned Russia's "vicious circle."[19] A tempting and trite Weimar analogy is usually not far behind.

Ironically, it was the Old Bolsheviks, and perhaps Nikita Khrushchev, who most fervently—and deterministically—believed in Russia's future and its capacity for change. Russia has been rich soil for all species of historical, as well as cultural (Weberian) and economic (Marxist-Leninist), determinism. The end of the Cold War has substituted one tendentious eternal question (capitalism or communism?) with another (can Russia reform?).

The most prestigious literary premonition—and admonition—about Russia's destiny is perhaps found in Dostoevsky, in Ivan Karamazov's mystical story of the Grand Inquisitor recounted to his younger brother Alyosha. The Grand Inquisitor is a metaphor for humankind's spiritual weakness and what might be called the "totalitarian temptation," to borrow a phrase from the Cold War. Dostoevsky was prescient about the disturbing and dangerous tendencies of the so-called "new man" who was emerging in the 1860s and 1870s, the grandfather of the "new Soviet man" of our century (*sovok,* a slang acronym). If one bends Dostoevsky's legend to German philosophy, one may conclude that what gets the Russian *narod* into trouble is what Nietzsche calls its "slave mentality." The Old Testament teaches that Moses needed only a short time to drive the Jews out of slavery, but forty years to drive slavery out of the Jews. The 1861 emancipation of the Russian serfs by Emperor Alexander II, known posthumously as the "liberator," is a case in point: emancipation was followed by two generations of redemption payments.

Whatever the power of these images, they are not the last word on Russia. As Dostoevsky's greatest interpreter, Mikhail Bakhtin, argued, the genius of Dostoevsky's art lies in its "dialogical" nature. His characters are inner voices, and their text is inherently open to outside interrogation. Dostoevsky, at times an obscure Slavophile,[20] probably intended the Grand Inquisitor as an affirmation of freedom and a warning, not as an epitaph. Russia's text is open, within certain limits of probability.

To use Roberto Unger's term, the eternal questions about Russia's history smack of "false necessity."[21] The strongest argument

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against determinism is what has happened since 1985, and particularly since 1989. During the Brezhnevite winter, who could have predicted the Gorbachevian spring? Even in the Gorbachev years, who could have foreseen the peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union?

Rather than presume the existence of a script for the play's future action, we should prepare for contingency and the gradual, winding course of progress. In rejecting false necessities, whether optimistic or pessimistic, Americans and Russians alike should avoid the opposite error of shifting paradigms before history is ready to comply.

THE UNREVOLUTION

From the outset Gorbachev contradicted the Chinese model of reform and placed political change (*glasnost*) ahead of economic liberalization (*perestroika*). It is widely agreed that Gorbachev lost control of the pace of political change, at times both too fast and too slow. Four short years ago Gorbachev justified his reforms as "Leninist." That would be unthinkable today, but the consequences—or, to use Pasternak's phrase, the "consequences of consequences"—of Leninism continue to be felt.

The ongoing Russian Revolution is somewhat anomalous among revolutions because the agents of change are not the former custodians of the ancien régime. The key figures, Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Kozyrev, and even Gaidar, are all creatures of the old Communist Party *apparat*. Today's angels of change were yesterday's managers of the status quo.

The politics of reinvention has been thriving in Russia and the other Soviet successor states, where former communists as well as neocommunists are predominantly back in power today. With the exceptions of Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia, Lennart Meris of Estonia, and Levon Ter-Petrosian of Armenia, the old guard are in power, namely, Eduard Shevardnadze (Georgia), Nursultan Nazarbaev (Kazakhstan), Askar Akaev (Kyrgyzstan), Sapamurad Niyazov (Turkmenistan), Shushkevich's interim replacement Mechislav Grib (Belarus), Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan), Rakhmoud Emomali (Tajikstan), Algirdas Mykolas Brazamskos (Lithuania), Mircea Snegur (Moldova), Heydar Aliyev (Azerbaijan), and, of course, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. The virtual identity of the old and the new, the former communist and the postcommunist, makes the

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situation resemble that of Baron von Munchausen, who claimed he had pulled himself out of a bog by his own hairs.

The accumulated mediocrity of the Soviet past still takes its toll on the Russian present. Bereft of ideas, its special constitutional "stratum" status, and its life's savings, the Russian intelligentsia is exhausted. Thanks to *glasnost,* Gorbachev's greatest legacy, the free media have enjoyed an unprecedented voice, but the rest of civil society is still relatively weak. Religious freedom is a reality, and the rush hour of missionary activity is its crudest reflex.[22] Enterprise managers and mafiosi have become the new "new class." The old "new class," the political *nomenklatura,* lacks credibility but holds on to titles of power. The institutions of state, which come and go under changing names, lack well settled authority. The military, traditionally partial to stability but not known for its reinventive abilities, is a variable. The rule of law is but a theory.

Soon after the abortive August putsch it was thought by some in the Kremlin and abroad that the birth of the new Russian democracy should take place through a Nuremberg-style process. A series of trials would provide an opportunity to accuse the Soviet past and to legitimate the Russian future. In the absence of a new constitution, this approach seemed to be a political imperative. In retrospect, Yeltsin would have been well advised to form a democratic reformist party, to replace the Supreme Soviet, and to introduce a new interim constitution for Russia. Instead, Yeltsin chose simply to outlaw the activities of both the CPSU and its Russian chapter, to confiscate their properties.

ARTICLE 6 of the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union and Russian Socialist Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) constitutions, which conferred "leading and guiding force" status on the Communist Party, was repealed only in March 1990, leaving a narrow window for the charge of usurpation. Nevertheless, Yeltsin's decree outlawing the Party, which seemed expedient when it was issued, was extremely difficult to square with the basic principles of free speech and political pluralism, for which the new democratic Russia purportedly stood. The trial of communism was something of a "show trial," but the Court under Chief Judge Valeri Zorkin can be credited for the subtlety of its published decision. In November 1992 the Court issued a compromise determination, allowing the communists to

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organize, but only at the grass-roots level, and implicitly reprimanding Yeltsin for his authoritarian proclivities.

The other opportunity for a legitimation trial was the criminal investigation of the August coup plotters for violations of the RSFSR Criminal Code. After all, those men were traitors, communist hard-liners who had endeavored to reverse the political and economic reforms of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Over time, however, the case against them for treason became legally and politically problematic, not only because the Soviet Union, the presumptive object of their treachery, had ceased to exist but because the plotters asserted that they were the ultimate patriots who sought to save the Soviet Union. More disturbing, they spread the word that a reform-weary Gorbachev had been privy to the August putsch in the first place.[23]

Having survived legislative impeachment by a handful of votes in December 1992, Yeltsin remained at an impasse with the Gorbachev-era parliament, which was largely unwilling to support Yeltsin's Gorbachevian emergency powers to rule by decree. Yeltsin was compelled to replace his acting prime minister, the young Gaidar, with Viktor Chernomyrdin. In April 1993, Yeltsin made a plebiscitary end run around parliament, and both he and his reform program won narrow approval from voters. After an unproductive summer, with Yeltsin oscillating between centrism and radicalism, the confrontation with parliament reached its endgame.

In late September, finding that the Supreme Soviet had "lost its ability to fulfill the main function of a representative body—the function of harmonizing state interests,"[24] Yeltsin prorogued the parliament by presidential decree and then, with last minute support from Defense Minister Grachev, disbanded by force the rebellious "hard-liners" who were inciting violent counterrevolution. The tank fusillade on the Russian White House made for extraordinarily dramatic news coverage around the world. However, these developments did not bode particularly well for the spirit of Russian democracy.

The Yeltsin Constitution was approved by less than one-third (32.9 percent) of all eligible voters of the Russian Federation—a bare majority of the apparent bare majority who voted.[25] The political endorsement for the Constitution from Zhirinovsky, who instinctively prefers strong executive powers, may have been critical to its adoption. As a result of the narrow popular support for the

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new charter, as well as the unbalanced, quasi-dictatorial power structure established by it, the Yeltsin Constitution is likely to be a transitional arrangement.

Pursuant to the power of amnesty accorded the Duma under the new Constitution, members of the August junta were released from Moscow's Butyrki and Lefortovo Prisons in January 1994, together with the October rebels—former Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov, Yeltsin's renegade vice president General Alexander Rutskoi, and General Albert Makashov (who led the bloody assault on the Ostankino television station). This was a speedy rehabilitation for all, certainly by Russian standards, more reminiscent of times of "national reconciliation" in Uganda or Kampuchea.

For cynics who believe in the life-cycle theory of revolutions, there is an old Soviet joke that is appropriate for times like these. A new Kremlin leader always receives three sealed envelopes from his predecessor. The first message reads, "Follow my policies but if that fails open the second envelope." The second advises, "Implement the opposite policies and if they fail then open the third envelope." The third simply says, "Prepare three envelopes."

Its obvious imperfections notwithstanding, Russia's road to democracy is still open. After all, even in the history of our own liberal democracy, immaculate conception was not a precondition for a well-ordered society. Russian political institutions—with or without Yeltsin at the top — will gain fuller legitimacy and competence only by accretion, by trial and error over time.

"IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID"

The merits of gradualism may be especially pertinent to the field of economic reconstruction and transformation. By 1992 "shock therapy" came to mean economic medicine that is capable of producing an imitation of Western laissez-faire capitalism, as it is formulated in textbooks. The notion that the Russian economy can be rapidly redesigned from above is a quintessentially Leninist error and is as dubious today as it was during the horrendous period of War communism, from 1918 to 1921.

It is true that the Soviet peoples endured Stalin's great industrialization drive of the 1930s, which, *durch Blut und Eisen,* happened

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to "prepare" the country for the Nazi invasion. However, as was demonstrated in the December elections, the willingness of long-suffering people to suffer more cannot be assumed. It is cruel punishment to expect people who have been forced to make long sacrifices in the name of communism to do so freely in the name of capitalism. The election results were fairly interpreted to mean that average Russians consider themselves to be *unizhennye i oskorblennye* (degraded and offended). The man-on-the-street view of privatization is that it amounts to a cover for *prikhvatizatsiya* (expropriation or plunder) by mafiosi and enterprise managers. In response, Yeltsin's government slowed down the pace of change, or at least the talk about it: more therapy, less shock. Gaidar and Fyodorov were fired. The State Department issued a belated call for an emphasis on "safety nets" in aid programs for the NIS. Foreign consultants and investors would be well advised to heed the warning.

Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Åslund, the quasi-official economic advisers who were dismissed by their Russian "radical" reform clients after the election, argue that "shock therapy" should not be judged a failure because it was never actually tried in Russia.[26] The advisers point to the stinginess of foreign assistance and the clear pattern of unfulfilled G7 and IMF promises to support radical reform, on the one hand, and to the incompetence and half-measures of the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin administration on the other. These criticisms are in some part justified.

But the shock therapists presumed too much. They failed adequately to "Russify" their "big bang," which was an absolute necessity in the absence of unconditional surrender and occupation. Moreover, the radicals worked with excessively narrow political-economic models, ones that ignored the operative legacy of decades of command economics and incomes policy. They also ignored a prerequisite of economic transformation, a commonly accepted vocabulary of change at the grass-roots, economic actor level.

Radical reform was a victim of the bitter Russian winter of 1993–1994. At least temporarily, capitalism and foreign experts have a bad name in Russia—again. The lesson for the Chicago School is that politics matters. Economic reform cannot be implemented in a proverbial vacuum. There may never be an opportunity to discover whether the Sachs paradigm would have worked in Russia, but there is ample room for maneuver. Chernomyrdin's

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team, including the remaining radicals, such as Anatoly Chubais, may be able to maintain a gradual course of economic reform. The initial post-Gaidar economic indicators are not bad; hyperinflation has been avoided.

Unfortunately for Russia and the other NIS, private-sector direct foreign investment also generally avoids vacuums. The net flow of capital to Russia has been nil to negative, thanks in large part to illicit capital flight. Promotion of economic security through law enforcement and government-backed insurance, which would greatly improve Russia's investment climate, should be a priority for Chernomyrdin and for the G7.

The international investment community has been of two minds about Russia. A prominent Japanese investment banker termed the Russian economy "a sinkhole," even as he studied the Vladivostok stock exchange for suitable acquisitions. An American lawyer compared doing business in Russia, which he does rather successfully, with surviving in a Wild West populated by former Soviet apparatchiks.

Russia's markets are potentially sizable but substantially undercapitalized. The country's natural resources are immense, but its reliable avenues of export are limited. Labor is affordable, but the labor laws are onerous. Contracts with Russian "biznismen" and joint-venture partners are exceedingly easy to sign, but honesty and enforceability are in short supply. Criminality is rampant. The mafia is ubiquitous and powerful; the government is capricious (because it is corrupt) though relatively weak. Foreign investors and indigenous entrepreneurs alike are compelled to swim between the Scylla of extortion and the Charybdis of exorbitant taxation. In short, Las Vegas rules apply: Do not bring into the casino financial instruments or other valuables you are not prepared to lose. But this should not shock the aleatory conscience of true entrepreneurs, who are supposed to have a sixth sense at pitch-and-toss.

BEYOND EMPIRE AND DEVOLUTION?

The sudden diminution of Russia's imperial real estate did much to reduce the costs of empire as well as the international tensions of the Cold War. However, under the guise of national self-determination, countless "ancient animosities" have sprung forth in the former

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Soviet Union (FSU). It is by now an aching truism that the Marxist-Leninist slogan "national in form, socialist in content" grossly underestimated the importance of nationalism and ethnicity. As Solzhenitsyn asked in his neo-Pan-Slavophile message from abroad even before the Soviet Union dissolved, how should we Russians rebuild Russia?[27] The "borderless world" turns out to be fraught with border disputes. As the experiences of postcolonial Africa and, most recently, the former Yugoslavia show, internal or administrative borders do not translate easily into meaningful demarcations of sovereignty. There often are no clear or convincing legal solutions to these conflicts.

The nationalities question confronts us at several levels in the FSU: within the non-Russian NIS, among the NIS and Russia, and within the Russian Federation. In retrospect, George Bush's controversial speech at Kiev in the fall of 1992, in which he warned the disgruntled Soviet republics not to move rashly for independence, may have been wise.

Because Russia-centered economic interdependence (e.g., for fossil fuels) did not cease when the Soviet Union was dissolved and also because there are sizeable contingents of ethnic Russians (approximately 25 million) in the so-called "near abroad," powerful centripetal forces, abetted by Russian irredentism, are still at work. Let me cite a few examples: Belarus, which just entered into a "ruble union" with Moscow and may be reabsorbed into the Russian Federation; the Crimea, which has voted for a return to Russia after forty years in the Ukrainian wilderness; Kazakhstan, the northern corridor of which is predominantly Russian; parts of Moldova and Tajikstan, which are occupied by the Russian army; and the Kaliningrad (Königsberg) region, an extraterritorial enclave of Russia in the former East Prussia, is in limbo. In addition, some new countries, like Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, do not appear to have a chance of gaining economic viability any time soon.

Centrifugal forces are also readily discernible. The Transcaucasian countries are in a state of fragmentation. The Chechen-Ingush autonomous region has splintered and is in secession from the Russian Federation. There is talk about the creation of an independent Far Eastern republic in Siberia. Sakhalin may declare its independence. The Yeltsin Constitution provides for an unprecedented degree of local autonomy within the Federation, but the mechanics

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of such a devolution are unclear. The fate of the Federation Treaty itself, signed in March 1992 but not incorporated into the new Constitution, is also uncertain.

The next equilibrium for this ethnic vortex is impossible to predict. The Russian Federation may try to expand its influence and dominion, perhaps under the mantle of the CIS. As Kennan put it over forty years ago, "we may hope for a new Russia. . .that it will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion."[28]

The Clinton administration has cautiously hinted at its general acquiescence in a Russian "sphere of influence" over parts of the near abroad. Though this policy risks awakening containment's concerns, it may be unavoidable. Moscow must not, however, confuse toleration of the "Grachev Doctrine" with sanction of a new Brezhnev doctrine. The strongest legal presumption must be given to self-determination, but the need for preventive, and preferably multilateral, measures to preserve regional stability—for example, protection of nuclear command and control or counteraction of Islamic fundamentalism along the porous Southern Tier—must be recognized.

Russia's foreign policy beyond the near abroad is inchoate but is growing more assertive. Foreign Minister Kozyrev's volte-face from darling to demon in 1993 appeared to take the State Department by surprise, as did the Kremlin's diplomatic intercession in Bosnia and its proposals for mediation in North Korea.[29] Secretary of Defense William Perry's "partnership for peace" plan is a good provisional vessel for balancing NATO's Western core against its Eastern interests—so long as the West does not confuse partnership with marriage. We should expect that Russia—still in possession of a large nuclear arsenal—will respond to its own vital national interests and operate as a "great power." In this sense, we live in a world restored.

AMERICA'S RESPONSE

Shaw's witticism about the two misfortunes in life, with which this essay began, is only a partial truth: it is much better to get one's heart's desire. In foreign policy, however, wants must match possibilities, and the heart must follow the mind's directions. To Amer-

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ica's disappointment, President Carter discovered the pitfalls of conducting foreign policy in the subjunctive mood. In the post-Cold War setting, the Clinton administration may still have significant opportunities to take advantage of the expanded realm of the possible. By and large during Bush's watch openings for some form of "grand bargain," for a new world order, for genuine multilateralism were grossly squandered. After more than a year in office, it simply is not clear that the incumbent administration is committed to meeting the challenge to do better.

The United States has three broad options: passivity, consolidation of gains, and active engagement. The first option, a version of the Tarnoff Doctrine, is bound to fail in the long run, for reasons already discussed: polls are short, foreign policy is long. Succumbing to the post-Cold War fatigue syndrome would almost surely set the world up for a miserable twenty-first century. Fortunately, President Clinton is not by nature a "declinist."

The second option is to consolidate the recognizable gains of the collapse of communism. It sounds pragmatic. Those who advocate this approach have also tended to reprimand the Clinton team for being too "Russocentric" and have criticized the "partnership for peace," calling instead for immediate or expedited admission of the former Warsaw Pact states, except for Russia, as full NATO members. The working assumptions of the consolidation school are that NATO itself makes sense as a vehicle for postcommunist policy, that sustainable progress in Russia is probably unattainable, and that we have already "lost" Russia. There are two primary flaws with this argument. First, the postcommunist socioeconomic dialectic in Eastern Europe, which is hardly affected by NATO membership or nonmembership, may not be significantly different from that in the FSU. Second, and more important, if the gains in *Russia* are not consolidated—and if the realistic potential for progress there is not explored—the security of Eastern Europe will not have been advanced by much.

The third option is active engagement with Russia. Put simply, both out of profound self-interest and love of humanity, the United States must strive to prevent Russia, now arguably a "USAID country," from reverting into a "DOD (Department of Defense) country." America and the rest of the G7 should rigorously support Russian reforms, as Russians choose to pursue them. In other

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words, we should let Russia be Russia. As Russia's former ambassador to Washington has suggested, "reform in Russia will never fit the American model."[30] Rosy romanticism and wishful thinking must be avoided. Promises should be kept, or credibility will be lost.

There is a saying in Ilf and Petrov's *The Twelve Chairs,* a satire of the 1920s, to the effect that the rescue of those who are drowning is their own business. Applied to Russia, this means that Russia must save itself. The Russians must learn to be free. The appearance of a new Russian socialism, as long as it plays by free and fair democratic rules, is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, the Mensheviks were reasonable people, and the West was perfectly able to work with the likes of Gorbachev.

Rather than act as a global gendarme-turned-instructor, America should engage in a generous, constructive, and critical dialogue with Russia, as well as the other NIS. The United States and the other G7 members should learn to view their strategic investment in Russia as though it were a thirty-year mortgage; the initial payments are all interest and the impact may appear to be marginal, but in the long run it will prove worthwhile. We must be more tolerant of the postcommunist evolution into new forms of capitalism and social democracy, and "multiculturalism" should be put back into foreign policy, where it belongs. Above all, we must encourage leaders to seize the day, or what remains of it, and to "sin boldly." These simple points ought to become the basic tenets of a new catechism of engagement with the postcommunist world.

This proposed catechism is not an article of faith. It is based on extremely prudential considerations. In the seventeenth century, Pascal put the point thusly: It is better to believe in God if He does not exist, than not to believe in God if He does. Today, such a wager, designed to persuade our latter-day Hamlets, can be translated into foreign policy: It is far wiser to aid Russia even if it is not reformable, than not to aid Russia if it is reformable.

ENDNOTES

[1]The authority for trilateral dissolution of the Soviet Union was explained by some Russian officials on the grounds that the Union was established on 31 December 1922 by the Russian Socialist Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Ukraine, Belorussia, and the then unified Transcaucasian Republic. The explanation fails

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to account for the absence of representatives of the Transcaucasian successor states. As a legal argument, it is tantamount to amendment of the US Constitution by action of the original thirteen states.

[2]Ukrainians approved independence from the Soviet Union and elected Kravchuk president on 1 December 1991.

[3]The accuracy of the referendum was marred by the abstention of the six smallest republics (Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, and the Baltic trio) and by the loaded formulation of the question on the ballot. Over 80 percent of those who voted approved preservation of the Union.

[4]The last intelligence oversight of such significance was probably the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the 1979 revolution in Iran.

[5]For a thorough account of the Bush-Baker arms control negotiations, see Strobe Talbott and Michael R. Beschloss, *At the Highest Levels* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1993).

[6]Quoted in *The Economist,* 15 September 1990.

[7]For a synopsis of the Kurile Islands dispute, see Mark Medish, "A Kinder, Gentler North Pacific?," *The Los Angeles Times,* 11 April 1991. The best Russian treatment of the subject is Oleg Bondarenko, *Neizvestnye Kurily* (Moscow: "VTI-Deita Press," 1992).

[8]Richard Nixon, "Clinton's Greatest Challenge," *The New York Times,* 5 March 1993.

[9]The new comprehensive foreign assistance bill submitted to Congress by the Clinton administration, which would supersede the outdated Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, states: "The Congress finds that. . .the international community has an unparalleled stake in the success of the democratic and economic transformation taking place in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the integration of those states into the community of peaceful and democratic nations." Discussion Draft, 22 November 1993, sec. 2201.

[10]George F. Kennan, Jr., "The Failure of Our Success," *The New York Times,* 14 March 1994.

[11]Joseph S. Nye, *Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[12]Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), 1.

[13]Nye, *Bound to Lead,* 200.

[14]See Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle," in Council on Foreign Relations, *The Strategic Qudrangle in East Asia* (forthcoming).

[15]Nixon, "Clinton's Greatest Challenge."

[16]Quoted in Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1986), 372.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Quoted in *The Sunday Telegraph,* 30 May 1993.

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[19]Yu. N. Afanasyev, "Russia's Vicious Circle," *The New York Times,* 28 February 1994.

[20]Dostoevsky denied he was a Slavophile. He preferred to call his school of thinking *pochvennichestvo* (soil-rootedness).

[21]See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, *False Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[22]For the view that "the most important single fact about post-Gorbachev Russia is the reemergence of the Russian Orthodox Church," see Irving Kristol, "Russia's Destiny," *The Wall Street Journal,* 12 February 1994.

[23]Boris N. Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Belka Publications Corp., Times Books, 1994), 65–66.

[24]Presidential Decree of 21 September 1993.

[25]Under Russian constitutional rules, a majority of eligible voters must cast ballots in order for a referendum to count. In Moscow, there have been credible allegations of a deliberate miscount of the number of eligible voters. Should such allegations be substantiated, the results of the constitutional referendum may be invalidated.

[26]For a Russian view supporting Sachs and Åslund, see Boris Fyodorov, "Moscow Without Mirrors," *The New York Times,* 1 April 1994.

[27]*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 18 September 1990.

[28]Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1951).

[29]See Andrei Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us," *The New York Times,* 18 March 1994.

[30]Vladimir Lukin, "No More Delusions," *The Washington Post,* 3 April 1994.

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These problems, however, do not simply arise out of the breakdown of "traditional" empires, the transition from some "premodern" to fully modern, democratic society, or from a distorted modernity to a relatively tranquil stage which may well signal some kind of "end of history." The turbulence evident in Eastern Europe today bears witness to some of the problems and tensions inherent in modernity itself, attesting to the potential fragility of the whole project of modernity.

These turbulences highlight tensions inherent in the modern political process, which are indeed characteristic of this process. The most important are tensions between different and often competing conceptions of the "general will," and the relation of these conceptions to the representation of the discrete interests of various sectors of society; i.e., tensions between aggregative policies and politics of the common good, between the articulation and aggregation of different interests and of different conceptions of common good, between—to use Bruce Ackerman's formulation—the routine and "revolutionary" politics.

S. N. Eisenstadt

From "The Breakdown of Communist Regimes and the Vicissitudes of Modernity"
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Jacques Rupnik

Europe's New Frontiers: Remapping Europe

THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL SYMBOLIZED the end of the partition of Europe, of a bipolar system which was called Yalta. Once the initial euphoria over the triumph of democracy and the reunification of the continent blew over, new dividing lines were identified, especially in the West: the old ideological and military divide of Europe was to be replaced by a new line that related to the rise of nationalisms and economic and cultural differences. It is indeed tempting to oppose the process of integration in Western Europe with the ongoing fragmentation in East Central Europe, the relative prosperity in the West European single market without borders with the dangers of "third worldization," and the creation of new borders in the East. As Bronislaw Geremek warned, "The East wants to go West, but might end up in the South."[1] In short, as Eastern Europe enters the twenty-first century, it is reverting to nineteenth-century ideologies centered on the building of nation-states.

These contrasts highlight some of the key issues and dilemmas of post-Cold War Europe. But it is too neat to be true. It glosses over the diversity of the new political geography of the continent and the open-ended character of the present transition in postcommunist Europe. Above all, it ignores the interaction between developments in what used to be Western and Eastern Europe. Renationalization is the common denominator of this interaction: forceful, sometimes violent in the East; softer, more contained in the West. The postimperial return of the nation-state takes place in the context of a new

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geopolitical landscape and centers around three related issues: borders, national minorities, and migrations.

NEW POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORICAL DIVIDES

The collapse of the Soviet bloc has brought about a new political geography which sometimes resembles precommunist or even pre-World War I patterns.[2] The concept of Eastern Europe has become almost irrelevant: at best it can be used for Russia or the European part of the former Soviet Union. Central Asia and Transcaucasia compensate for the partial withdrawal of Russian influence with a new role for Turkey, which is rediscovering the assets of language and religion in a formerly Ottoman space stretching, in the words of former Prime Minister Demirel, "from the shores of the Adriatic to China."[3] Central Europe is back on the map even though its contours remain unclear. The prelude to this return started in the 1980s as a search for a cultural identity, a mixture of Habsburg nostalgia and postcommunist utopia.[4] Today, from the Baltic states to Slovenia, it is becoming a geopolitical reality. A negative component in the shaping of its identity is the attempt to insulate itself from the resurgence of nationalist tensions in the Balkans and on Russia's periphery.

This is where new geography catches up with old history, where the shaping of geopolitical boundaries overlaps with ancient religious and cultural divides between civilizations. When one looks at a prospective map based on the socioeconomic criteria (industrialization, urbanization, and communications) that identify the postcommunist regions most likely to "reconnect" with Western Europe,[5] one is struck by its similarity to Europe in 1914. The "Habsburg factor" seems to be an important ingredient in assessing the chances of the democratic and market-oriented transition and of a successful "reconnection" with the European Union (EU) countries. Another historical query for the future concerns the extent of German influence in this process knowing that East Prussia used to stretch to Kaliningrad, alias Königsberg. Clearly, the Baltic states put some (perhaps exaggerated) hopes in the possibility of reviving historical ties with Germany and Scandinavia.

If the Baltic states are added to "Habsburg" Central Europe, we come close to another dividing line in the "reconnection" process:

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the line between Western and Eastern Christendom. One should beware of historical or cultural determinism, but the correlations between the three maps are striking.

The new political and economic geography distinguishing Central Europe from the Balkans and Russia provides a follow-up to the 1980s debate on the cultural identity of Central Europe, launched by Milan Kundera's controversial thesis about the "tragedy of Central Europe" as a "kidnapped West."[6] For Kundera Russian communism was not just an abhorred political system but "another civilization." The argument was not altogether new; it traced the origins of Russian autocracy and the absence of a civil society to the Orthodox tradition of Church subordination to the state (Caesaropapism). In contrast, the separation of the spiritual and the temporal, the Church and the state, is among the antecedents of the autonomy of culture and civil society in Central and Western Europe.

The end of the Cold War and of the ideological division of the continent has reactivated some older cultural demarcations, religious and national. In postcommunist Europe they cut across existing states from the Balkans to the Caucasus. To be sure, the "desecularization of the world" is by no means just a European phenomenon. Samuel Huntington argues that these dividing lines between several major civilizations could become front lines of actual conflict in the future.[7] With the end of the ideological division of Europe, the thousand-year old divides between Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims return to the fore. Hence the temptation for some observers to see the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in this light, given that the front lines correspond "exactly to the centuries old line of confrontation between West Rome and East Rome."[8] However important cultural or religious "deep structures" may be, the reading of the "third Balkan war" as a religious one can be misleading, as most serious historians of the area have shown:[9] the legacy of Titoism and the uses and abuses of nationalism by postcommunist elites are more to the point.

The collapse of communism has had a dual impact on Europe. It affirms a European identity vis-à-vis non-Europe (Islam) or "semi-Europe" (America and Russia). But it also brings back into the open some intra-European divides which Rémi Braque traces to ancient East-West and North-South cultural and religious antecedents.[10]

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The great question is what is Europe, and where does it end? The answer, of course, changes over time, there is no single definition of Europe, and there are certainly different ways of belonging to Europe. "Asia stands on the Elbe" said Adenauer in 1946 and West Europeans had for (too) long a tendency to identify Europe with the economic and political space of the European Community (EC). Central European intellectuals (Kundera, Milosz, and Konrad) have argued that Europe was not just a "common market," that Central Europe was the spiritual and cultural heart of Europe: the commitment to European/Western values remains strongest where it was most threatened by communism. The primacy of a cultural or religious divide with the Orthodox East is related to a political and economic boundary. Meanwhile, Russians (or Serbs) argue that *they* are the defenders of the one European boundary that will matter in the future: the boundary between Christian Europe and increasingly assertive Islam in the Balkans or in Central Asia. In other words, there are different ways of belonging to "Europe": One is always someone else's "barbarian."

FROM EMPIRES TO NATIONS

The breakup of the Roman and the Ottoman empires took a couple of centuries, that of the Soviet empire took a couple of years, or so it seemed. Those who thought that it started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 confused the suddenness and the smoothness of the collapse with the lasting effects of unsettling processes which are still under way and which might well take years if not decades to stabilize.[11] The "confusion of feelings," to use Stefan Zweig's phrase, which accounts for some of the West European unpreparedness to face the challenge or disappointment with the postcommunist East, stems from the fact that the geopolitical consequences of the peaceful collapse of the Soviet system are comparable to those following the two world wars (which were also "European civil wars") of this century. Post-1989 changes should be seen in the same category as those which followed 1945 or 1919, with one major difference: after 1989 there was no victor ready or willing to impose a "new world order."

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The current recasting of Europe amounts not only to the undoing of the Yalta partition of the continent and of its main instigator, the Soviet Union, but also that of the Versailles system: no Yugoslavia, no Czechoslovakia, and the list of new nation-states is still incomplete. States that had been created in 1918 in the name of the rights of nations to self-determination have dissolved themselves in the name of the same right to self-determination claimed by nations breaking from the communist fold. Nation-state building and the redrawing of borders were no longer contained by an international system based on the balance between Great Powers.

Two main explanations are offered. One puts the emphasis on archaism and the return of the suppressed. The second, in contrast, sees the current drive for belated nation-state building as a necessary, if often unpleasant, stage on the East European road to "modernity."

The first thesis uses the metaphor of the refrigerator (mea maxima culpa):[12] communism froze old nationalist ideologies and rifts which we now find splendidly preserved half a century later. A variation on this theme is the metaphor of the pot: now that the Soviet lid has been lifted, suppressed aspirations and old hatreds can be vented. Although it is clear that the collapse of the Soviet empire created an environment where old unsettled scores can resurface, that is, to put it mildly, an oversimplification of the recent conflicts. Yet, this is the prevailing interpretation in the media and in political discourse of both the protagonists and the Western political elites. President Clinton said in his inauguration speech that "a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by ancient hatreds."[13] President Mitterrand referred to "*la haine ancestrale*" in the spring of 1992 at a conference fittingly entitled, "*L'Europe et les tribus.*"[14] While Europe marches onwards and upwards to the radiant postnational future of Maastricht, backward oriental tribes revert to their primitive feuds and allegiances.

This kind of interpretation falls into several traps. Today's national problems are seen only through yesterday's glasses. If we are dealing with "tribes" ("far away countries of which we know nothing," said Chamberlain in 1938 apropos Czechoslovakia), we do not have to think about the possible connections between the

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rise of nationalism in the postcommunist East and the renationalization under way in Western Europe. If postimperial deconstruction and nation-building can be expelled from West European history (archaism) and geography ("oriental tribes") then, of course, we can be spared getting involved (except for humanitarian aid). Insulation will do.

The experts on modernization theory, such as Ernest Gellner,[15] are less squeamish about the means and more political about the purpose of nation-state building. They see the idea of correspondence between a territory and a people as the by-product of Western modernity exported to East Central Europe since the French revolution. The process of correspondence between nationhood and political boundaries has been slow, even gradual in the West. It came with a time lag and was more abrupt in the Eastern part of the continent. It could only be brought about with radical change in the international system. This method is by no means elegant ("ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans or in the Caucasus brings these societies closer to the Hobbesian "nasty, brutish, and short" way of life than to the Western liberalism) but the nations concerned view it as the necessary price for state-building as part of their access to identity *and* modernity. Besides, was nation-state building in Western Europe such a smooth process anyway? Eugene Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*[16] suggests that Jacobin homogenization was completed much later than most French history textbooks would admit and that only a long socialization process through the schools and the army succeeded in turning Breton and Occitan peasants into good citizens of the Republic.

In short, what is unfolding in postcommunist Eastern Europe is seen as the last stage of nation-state building, a "catching-up" process for those who missed the nineteenth-century train which brought German and Italian unity. In this perspective, the end of the Soviet empire after 1989 completes what followed the end of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. The most relevant historical comparison, in terms of the interaction between the change of the international system and nation-state building, is that with 1919, but only if certain specific features of the "national question" in East Central Europe were absent in both prevailing interpretations. Three very different observers of that process provide interesting

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insights into the nature and the implications of a process still at work today.

The first was Oskar Jaszi, the Hungarian democrat who, after a brief role in the Hungarian republic of 1918, warned against the dangers of creating a "*Kleinstaterei*," the division of the region into small states which was likely to bring about "fatal instability" and the formation of nonviable nation-states, quarreling with each other, divided internally, who could easily become pawns in the games of the Great Powers. The author of *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* pointed to the crucial link between divisions inside (minorities) and tensions outside.[17]

The second insight comes from the French historian Jacques Bainville, who in 1920 published an essay entitled "Les conséquences politiques de la paix"— a companion volume to Keynes' *Economic Consequences of Peace*. From his reading of the Versailles Treaty ("written by Bible readers *for* Bible readers") he accurately predicted what indeed was likely to be its outcome. His main concern (which cannot be dismissed due to the author's nationalist leanings) is the imbalance between extreme political fragmentation (the word "Balkanization" was already used) in East Central Europe (the proliferation of new states from twenty-six to thirty-two) and the weight of Germany:

> *Auprès de cette mêlée des nationalités, des religions et des races, il reste l'Allemagne, seule concentrée, seule homogène, suffisamment organisée encore, et dont le poids, suspendu sur le vide de l'Europe orientale, risque de faire basculer un jour le continent entier. . .De quoi l'Allemagne est-elle ceinte? D'un chapelet de Serbies. Et encore!*[18]

The third relation of the past to the present is that of Elie Halévy, whom Raymond Aron considered a prominent representative of the liberal school of sociology inspired by Montesquieu and Tocqueville. In a lecture delivered at Oxford in 1920 Halévy questioned the wisdom of the Wilsonian approach of redrawing the map of Europe according to the right of nations to self-determination. He did not reject the principle of self-determination ("*le principe des nationalités*"), but argued that to build a lasting stable order in Europe one had to combine it with other principles: natural borders and the European

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balance of power. Halévy also considered the implementation of self-determination "too simple" and therefore dangerous:

> *Les idées simples sont des idées révolutionnaires et guerrières, parcequ'elles ne peuvent se poser qu'à l'exclusion et par la destruction de toute autre idée. Elles font violence à la complexité des choses. . .le principe des frontières naturelles et le principe d'équilibre européen sont au même titre que le principe de libre déterminations constitutifs de la paix internationale durable.*[19]

Historical parallels have their limitations, but the three issues raised at the time of the post-World War I settlement seem highly relevant for our assessment of the present-day recasting of Europe: *1)* The question of the internal viability of nation-states (and thus of their new democratic institutions) in an area where ethnic and political borders do not coincide. *2)* The relative weight of Germany in the building of nation-states in postcommunist East Central Europe. *3)* The need to reconcile self-determination with the European balance or rather, in today's perspective, with European integration.

NATION-STATES, BORDERS, AND MINORITIES

Borders

Post-1989 Europe is marked by the fragility and the delegitimation of existing borders. This may be the result of more than just the dissolution of the two blocs: Eastern and Central European borders are relatively new and they do not coincide with ethnolinguistic dividing lines. Less than a quarter of them predate the nineteenth century, about a quarter had been established around the time of World War I (1910–1922), and about one-third emerged in the aftermath of World War II. Well over half of all European borders are twentieth-century creations.[20] European borders are more recent than African borders!

The newness of borders concerns primarily the Eastern half of the continent. We can thus distinguish West European states with old established borders, big nations with varying borders (Russia and Germany), and small nations with relatively new and uncertain borders. The borders of the Balkan states were established in two

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phases: at the Berlin Congress in 1878 and between 1910 and 1920. In Central Europe, the treaties of Versailles, Trianon, and Saint Germain (1919–1920) established the borders of the newly created states. The borders of the former Soviet Union with its East Central European neighbors were established at the end of World War II. No less important, however, is the fact that the overwhelming majority of these borders had been established at postwar international conferences rather than by bilateral agreement (only 18 percent) and thus were often perceived as having been imposed by the Great Powers. As the international environment changes, we are witnessing a delegitimation of existing borders between states but also within states. Indeed, the main change in the breakup of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union concerns the status of internal borders between republics of a federal state changing into external borders between states.

The noncorrespondence between ethnic and political borders is the legacy of multinational empires which have dominated Eastern and Central Europe. It led to what Hugh Seton-Watson called a "private civil war" between the successor states. Hitler used it skillfully to exploit the resentments and territorial claims of Hungarians against Romanians, of Romanians against Russians, of Croats against Serbs, and of Slovaks against Czechs. The post-1945 status quo found a Central Europe without Jews, without Germans, and with territorial issues stabilized if not settled by the new imperial status quo. This issue of noncorrespondence of ethnic and political boundaries has resurfaced after 1989 in several forms: the postimperial syndrome, the division of existing federations, and the problem of national minorities.

The Postimperial Syndrome

Russia's attitude towards the issues of its borders and minorities will be of major importance for the whole of post-Soviet Europe. After centuries of expansion, 1989–1991 marked the sudden retreat of Russia, though it is by no means clear where the limits of Russia and its periphery are likely to stabilize. Who can tell what the identity and the borders of Russia are supposed to be without an empire? Unlike Britain and France, which were nations before they became empires, Russia and its empire were virtually synonymous because of the gradual and continental nature of its expansion.

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"Russian history is the history of a country which has colonized itself" wrote Kliuchevski. Count Witte used to say that he knew not of Russia, only of the Russian empire. The loss of the empire for the Russians is therefore a more difficult and traumatic experience than it was for the French and the British. Not just because in Britain's case it took place in a context of economic prosperity, but because Britain without India was still Britain. Similarly, France without Algeria was still France. But what is Russia without its empire? No one has yet provided an answer to the question which touches the very heart of Russian identity but also the contours of Russia's borders.[21] Are Russians supposed to call themselves citizens of the Russian Republic (RSFR) in the former Soviet Union? If so, what about the twenty-five million Russians living outside Russia, mainly in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Baltic states? The answers to these questions are all the more difficult since they depend on the outcome of the present domestic political struggle. Until the fall of 1993 the struggle was presented as European modernizers opposing national communists, a remake of the nineteenth-century conflict between Slavophiles and Westerners. Today we see a continuum emerging in Russian foreign policy from a mild version of Russia's claim over the "near abroad," presented by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, to an unabashed great Russian neo-imperial claim, formulated by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the victor of the parliamentary election of December 1993. His prospective map of Europe, published in the Italian geopolitical journal *Limes*, is particularly worrying for the Poles, Finns, and Slovaks since it places them in the Russian orbit.[22]

In 1989 the geographer Vladimir Sokolov published an article entitled "Democracy and Borders" which captured the essence of the Gorbachev approach: "If we want to preserve our external boundaries we must know what to do with our internal boundaries."[23] Sokolov argued that the Soviet Union could resist nationalist temptations through radical decentralization and the redesign of administrative boundaries. The attempt to use regionalism to defuse nationalist separatism was an underestimation and a misunderstanding of the nature of nationalist separatism in the former Soviet Union. But it also points to the fact that the problem of Russia's borders is by no means confined to the relations with the former Soviet republics.

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The breakup of the Soviet Union is now followed by the possible breakup of Russia. This process of fragmentation goes hand in hand with the widespread crisis of the authority of the state, and not just on ethnic grounds: as the Chechens, the Ingushs, the Tatars, and the Yakuts call for "sovereignty," entire regions in Siberia are considering autonomy (even independence) as an alternative to Moscow's rule. With historic/cultural arguments ("Eurasian" and "Sibiriak" identity are revived by intellectuals), economic interests ("our natural resources for ourselves" is the motto of new entrepreneurs and old *nomenklatura* cadre), and on political grounds (the power struggles in Moscow and the paralysis of the government), Russia is now breaking up from within along regional rather than ethnic lines. Yeltsin seems to be repeating the Gorbachev syndrome: the more powers he accumulates in the center, the less effective these powers become in the society, especially at its periphery. Beyond the confrontation in the fall of 1993 between the president and the parliament, between legitimacy and legality, the future of Russia depends on Moscow's capacity to find a constitutional compromise with the representatives of the regions: redesigning the Russian state and its inner boundaries is a precondition for coming to terms with its new outer boundaries.

However, while these centrifugal trends in Russia appear as the extension of those which broke up the Soviet Union, there are already centripetal forces at work in the opposite direction. In September 1993 nine former Soviet republics signed an agreement with Russia concerning economic cooperation. As the newly-independent republics discover the economic limits of independence, Russia already claims a stabilizing mission on the periphery (the "near-abroad") of its former empire. And where economic pressure is insufficient, the old imperial "divide and rule" method is used, as Moscow's support for the separatist Ossetian and Abkhasian minorities in Georgia has shown. All this among warnings to Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians that their application to join NATO would be seen as unfriendly by Moscow.[24] It is not quite an attempt to rebuild the empire, but the present realignment of post-Soviet borders suggests a series of "concentric circles": Central Europeans are out of the Russian orbit, but they are not immune to the instability on their Eastern borders; the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) seem to enjoy the degree of

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autonomy Central Europeans used to have while autonomous republics within Russia step in the shoes of the former Soviet federal republics.

Successor States to Federations

It is tempting to see the dissolution of three federal states (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) as cases of postcommunist fragmentation. In each case the state was too identified with a dominant nation (Russian, Serbian, and Czech) and the word "federation" (just like the word "socialism") was too discredited by communist centralism. The nonviolent nature of the transition from federation to nation-state rests on the feasibility of a transformation of internal borders between constituent republics into external borders. The peacefulness of the Czecho-Slovak divorce owes a great deal to the fact that there were no conflicts between the two republics concerning borders or national minorities (some 200,000 Slovaks currently live in the Czech lands out of personal choice and they do not claim a territorial base). Neither of these conditions applied to Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. The "velvet divorce" brought the return of historical and geopolitical predicaments to both nations: for the Czechs the German question (the Sudeten Germans), for the Slovaks the Hungarian question (the Hungarian minority).[25] But that very fact represents a moderating influence on Czecho-Slovak relations after the separation.

Another way of reading the end of multinational federal states is to view their development as a mere phase in the process of nation-building. With few exceptions (Czechs, Serbs, and Croats who can refer to their medieval kingdoms), we are not dealing, as is sometimes suggested, with the "return of the nation," but rather with the making of nations or of nation-states.

The Baltic states had been independent for twenty years between the two world wars. In the Middle Ages they were under the influence of the Teutonic Knights, in the sixteenth century they fell under Polish rule, and in the eighteenth century they fell under Russian rule. Today they are independent but 40 percent of their population is comprised of Russians. Georgia was independent from 1918–1921. Nowadays its independence, undermined by Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities, can only be sustained with the goodwill of the old imperial power. Moldavia-Bessarabia belonged

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to Russia and from 1918–1944 to Romania. Today, it claims independence, but can the region have two Romanian states? If independence is not acceptable to the Russians of Transnistria, would partial annexation by Romania provide a solution? More likely it would promptly herald the return of the question of Transylvania with its large Hungarian minority. Belorussia never was an independent state—some even doubt whether it is a nation. Ukraine was undoubtedly the largest European nation without a state: the size of France with a population of 52 million, it has been independent since December 1991, but it has no clear natural, historical, or ethnolinguistic boundaries. Kiev politics balances between Western Ukraine (where the Uniate church is dominant), which considers itself the Piémont of the nation, and the industrial East, largely russified, where most of the 11.5 million Russians live; a balance between independence and the search for a compromise with Moscow.[26]

The greatest likelihood of conflict is in ethnically mixed areas where the same territory is claimed by two or more nations as being pivotal to their national identity: one territory for two dreams. The classic cases are the Kosovo (claimed on historical grounds by the Serbs and on demographic grounds by the Albanians), Macedonia (with competing claims since the first Balkan war in 1913 by Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians, Albanians, and Macedonians), and Transylvania (a recurring object of controversy between Romania and Hungary). Borders are time written in space. They are focal points ("*lieux de mémoire*" to use Pierre Nora's phrase[27]) for conflicting historical memories of nations. In times of historical change there is only one step from conflicting memories to actual conflict.

The emergence of new nation-states covers a very wide range of situations and is therefore in itself neither a sign of "maturity" or "modernity," nor of "archaism" or "regression."[28] The issue is whether it is likely to enhance the development of a pluralistic "open society" and European integration or whether it is conducive to authoritarian solutions and a "closed society."

National Minorities

The issue of paramount importance for the future of postcommunist Europe is that of national minorities. It highlights the contradictory nature of nation-state building in ethnically mixed areas. Hans J.

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Morgenthau defined this paradox as follows: Nation B asserts the principles of national self-determination against nation A, but denies them to nation C:

> There are no inherent limits to the application of the principles of nationalism. If the peoples of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia could invoke them against Turkey, why could not the people of Macedonia invoke them against Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia?...Thus yesterday's oppressed cannot help becoming the oppressor of today because they are afraid lest they become again oppressed tomorrow. Hence the process of national liberation must stop at some point, and that point is determined not by the logic of nationalism, but by the configuration of interest and power between rulers and ruled and between competing nations.[29]

This formulation is still relevant for the present developments in the Balkans or on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Estonia's citizenship law of June 1993 (which was later amended) de facto excluded from citizenship a third of the population and thus provoked an outcry from the Russian speaking minority as well as from Moscow. The new Croatian and Macedonian states define themselves as the states of the Croatian and the Macedonian nations whose constitutions provide a very wide range of rights to minorities, yet these rights are perceived by the minorities (Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Macedonia) as giving them second class citizen status.[30] The Serbs in particular are adamant that they are a "state people" and will never accept being treated as a minority. Hence their bid in Croatia or in Bosnia to create separate "autonomous republics" (headed respectively by Martinovic and Karadzic), aiming at joining a Greater Serbia in the future.

The logic of redefining borders along ethnic lines now seems to prevail, and in Bosnia it is even endorsed by the international community. The consequences of the Bosnian precedent are far-reaching for the stability of borders in Europe: the conflicting claims of Greater Serbia, Greater Albania (with the Kosovo and part of Macedonia), and Greater Bulgaria might lead us to a return of the Balkan wars. It will also represent a precedent for all those (i.e., Hungarians) dissatisfied with the present state of their borders who might consider "legitimately" protecting *manu militari* their nationals in neighboring states: there are 25 million Russians living outside Russia.

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The corollaries to the ethnically defined nation-state are the border changes and the displacement of people from ethnically mixed areas. "Ethnic cleansing" and migrations are two aspects of the same "solution" to the minorities question. For Hannah Arendt the refugee epitomized the *worldlessness* of a situation which she described as "the decline of the nation-state and the end of human rights." Today it is associated with the forceful assertion of the nation-state.

The contest between the civic and the ethnic definition of the nation is of crucial importance for the future of Europe, not only for the stability of the borders of the postcommunist states but also for the transition to democracy. Writing at the end of the last war, the Hungarian thinker Istvan Bibo saw one of the main obstacles to democratic development: "following a cataclysm or an illusion, the cause of the nation separates from the cause of freedom. . .a historical quake breeds the convulsionary fear to see freedom threaten the cause of the nation."[31]

GERMANY AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The opening up and modification of existing borders was an essential by-product of the democratic revolution of 1989. If one had to identify a single turning point in the collapse of East European communism, it would probably be the opening of the Austro-Hungarian border at Sopron in May 1989. This was the first major breach in the Iron Curtain (through which tens of thousands of young East Germans, voting with their feet, fled to West Germany) which eventually helped to bring down the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. As the initials "GDR" came to be an acronym for the "gradually disappearing republic," the demonstrators who chanted "*Wir sind das Volk*" switched to "*Wir sind ein Volk*": from democratization to reunification. The first major consequence of the collapse of communism in Central Europe was German reunification, i.e., the disappearance of an internationally recognized border between states.

While few in the West realized the implication of German reunification, it certainly was not lost on most Central and East Europeans. Janos Kis, one of the leading figures of the Hungarian opposition, noted in November 1989 that:

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> German reunification means that borders inherited from the last war and considered "unjust" can be modified. The overwhelming majority of Hungarians considers the Hungarian borders established at the Versailles and Trianon treaties and confirmed after World War II illegitimate. The immediate consequence of German reunification will be that the question of Transylvania (or similar issues) will again be posed.[32]

And so it is, not simply because Germany, as some have suggested, stands to benefit from the East Central European process of fragmentation (notably the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), to establish its sphere of influence in *Mitteleuropa*.[33] Germany, as the argument goes, has a vested interest in undoing the settlements sanctioning two German defeats and is implicitly working towards a Europe drawn with a pre-1914 map combined with that of 1941. It is economic not military expansion that is finding a favorable environment in the postcommunist recomposition: in Central Europe, from Königsberg to the territories of what used to be part of East Prussia[34]; in the Balkans where Slavic (and mostly Orthodox) people are torn between the competing influences of a strong Germany and a strong Turkey.

The losers of World War I are back; such is the gloomy outlook of geopolitical analysts and retired generals. But it misses the obvious. The link between German reunification and the breakup of Yugoslavia (or Czechoslovakia) is not a new *Drang nach Osten* but simply its precedent: the primacy of self-determination of nations over the postwar status quo. How could Germany deny to Slovenia, Croatia, or the Baltic states the implementation of the right to self-determination which it had just used for its own reunification? No less importantly, Germany did nothing to encourage the secession of Slovenia and Croatia until the war broke out at the end of June 1991. The fact that, unlike other West European countries, Germany's constitution prevents it from intervening militarily outside its borders did not prevent the Serbian defense minister from claiming, shortly after sending troops to quash Slovenia's and Croatia's bid for independence, that "Germany has attacked us for the third time this century."[35]

The result might well be a greater imbalance between the smaller and weaker Central European nation-states and their increasingly powerful German neighbor. The new nation-states' "sovereignty"

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could bring some of them into a state of economic or even political dependency on Germany and Austria. But that, surely, would be the consequence — not the cause — of their bid for independence.

The second aspect of Germany's role concerns its relationship with neighboring Poland and Czechoslovakia. These two countries were the first targets of the Third Reich's expansion and both expelled their large German minorities at the end of World War II. The contrast between their relations with Germany illustrates two approaches to post-Cold War international relations. The Czech, or rather Václav Havel's, approach was based on a moral stance as far as the legacy of history and the benefit of the doubt for the future were concerned; it assumed the emergence of a "new international order" (the demise of the two military alliances and the prospect of European integration). The Polish approach was to hope for the best and to prepare for the worst: Germany's return as part of the return to a traditional balance of power policy.

Only days after his election, President Havel visited both German states and apologized for the postwar expulsion of nearly three million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. Havel was faithful to what he stood for as a dissident. In November 1989 he wrote to President von Weizsäcker:

> I personally, like many of my friends, condemn the postwar expulsion of the Germans, which struck me as a deeply immoral act, inflicting heavy damage not only on the Germans but perhaps even more on the Czechs, both moral and material. To respond to evil by committing another evil does not eliminate evil but allows it to go on forever.[36]

Four years later Havel's gesture has not been reciprocated. His meeting with President von Weizsäcker in Prague in March 1990 was an attempt to turn over a new leaf in Czech-German and European history.[37] But no concrete results followed. The treaty signed in 1992 left out the only seriously contentious issue inherited from history: the Czech demand that Munich, as well as the property claims of the expelled Sudeten Germans, be considered "null and void from the onset." This was interpreted by the latter's associations (*Landsmanschafts*) but also by the *Bundestag* to mean that these questions remain open. In other words, we are back at square one: Havel's gesture was a missed opportunity which is unlikely to return.

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The Polish government never apologized for the expulsion of its German inhabitants at the end of the war (twice as many as from Czechoslovakia). It spoke relentlessly about the one and only condition for good relations with Germany and indeed for German reunification itself: the unconditional recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, a border which is historically artificial but politically necessary. The pressure was relentless (Mazowiecki used to come to Paris hand in hand with Jaruzelski to muster French support. Both also agreed that Russian troops should stay in Poland so long as the Germans did not confirm the border). Finally they obtained what they wanted in the "4 plus 2" negotiations on reunification despite Kohl's legalistic arguments about the need to return to the borders of 1937! As soon as the border was confirmed, the anti-German hysteria in Poland subsided and the prime minister of a country which had been divided four times by the Germans could afford to say: "our road into Europe leads through Germany."[38]

The contrasting approaches and results are striking: Havel's moral gesture was a failure because it was interpreted by the Germans as a weakness (giving the false impression that Czech guilt is stronger than German guilt) while Poland's more classical combination of nationalism and realpolitik has proved effective. National interest and the balance of power rather than a policy based on ethical values and the promise of a "new world order" are the motto of the day for Central Europe's relations with Germany.

A major new element in Germany's relations with its Eastern neighbors is regional cooperation stretching across existing boundaries. Bavaria is at the forefront of the regionalist movement combining attachments to "roots" with a sharp critique of the "Brussels bureaucracy." Bavaria's president Max Streibl convened a conference in 1989 on the "Europe of regions" and is today promoting "Euroregions" with new Eastern partners. It just so happens that all of them concern territories lost by Germany in 1945: Silesia, Pomerania, Eastern Prussia, and "Sudetenland." The economic benefits derived by both sides are obvious. But there is also fear on the part of the Czechs and Poles of a possible instrumentalization of "Euroregions" by groups keen on a peaceful "reconquest" of a lost "*Heimat.*"[39]

The change in Germany's attitude to borders provides a metaphor for the whole of Europe. The opening of its borders coincided

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with the liberation from communism and the reunification of the nation. Four years later Germany is trying to close its borders, arguing that the stability of the new nation-state is threatened by an unprecedented wave of immigration from the East and the Southeast. Postwar Germany absorbed immigrants as long as they were German: 12 million from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) since the late 1940s; 1.5 million ethnic Germans from the East between 1950 and 1987 and one million between 1988 and 1991. In 1992 alone Germany received almost one million immigrants: 250,000 ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, 250,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia, and a half million asylum seekers.[40]

In this context, Maastricht (and the still delayed implementation of the Schengen agreement) represents a closing as much as an opening of borders. It also raises questions about the content of the proposed "European citizenship" as an addition to the one granted by the member states of the Union. The current trend, especially but not only in Germany, seems to be to change the asylum laws in a context of rising xenophobia and the toughening of immigration policy, which could be somewhat crudely summed up as: ethnic Germans in, foreigners out. This is carried out under the umbrella of the Schengen agreement which allows Germany to transfer the burden of its immigration problem to its Eastern neighbors. It also illustrates the legacy of the German definition of the nation (and thus of nationality) based on ethnicity (blood) rather than place of birth (soil). "Ethnic Germans" from the Soviet Union who are thoroughly "sovietized" and do not speak a word of German are automatically entitled to citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany while *Gastarbeiters* who settled in Germany sometimes for two or three decades and whose children are born in Germany remain increasingly unwelcome "guests."[41]

The evolution of Germany's definition of nationhood is of importance for the whole of Europe. The question of citizenship is being redefined in the EC. Keeping it intact, as "ethnic cleansing" spreads in the Balkans and increasingly violent manifestations of xenophobia occur, is likely to lead to further internal strains and encourage nationalist isolationism rather than European integration. One of the important questions for the future of Europe is whether Germany can modify its traditional definition of nationhood as an ethnically

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and culturally homogeneous *Gemeinschaft* in favor of a territorially and legally defined *Geselschaft*.

L'EUROPE DES VASES COMMUNICANTS

While post-Soviet Europe experiences the de*legitimation* of borders, Western Europe is experimenting with the "devaluation" of borders, from the single market to the European space and the "Europe of regions." The trend is very much in line with the aspiration of the "founding fathers" to downgrade the role of nation-states, as Robert Schuman wrote:

> *les frontières politiques sont nées d'une évolution historique et ethnique respectable, d'un long effort d'unification nationale; on ne saurait songer à les effacer. A d'autres époques, on les déplaçait par des conqêtes violentes ou par des mariages fructueux. Aujourd'hui, il suffira de les dévaluer.*[42]

This perspective has now been challenged under the combined effects of what is perceived as a massive immigration wave and an economic recession (over 10 percent unemployment on average in the European Economic Community [EEC]). Three types of migration must be distinguished: economic, political, and those induced by new ethnic conflicts (namely in the former Yugoslavia and at the periphery of the former Soviet Union). These divisions are not always easily established and the strongest migrations occur when there is a combination of ethnic and economic reasons. Although the threats of a massive wave of refugees from the former Soviet Union did not materialize (Gorbachev's aides in 1990 warned of an inflow of 20 million refugees),[43] the migrants from the East now compete with economic migrants from the South for acceptance in Western Europe.

The attitude of EEC countries has changed not only due to this new post-1989 situation but also because (with the exception of Ireland) all of them have become lands of immigration. France had an old tradition in this respect; Britain, Germany, and Holland became immigration lands after World War II; and now even Italy, Spain, and Greece (traditionally lands of emigration) are becoming lands of immigration.

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This creates a double consequence for West European politics: *1)* Maastricht and the Schengen agreement guarantee the opening of borders inside the Community, but also a closure vis-à-vis the world outside the Community. *2)* Immigration and the related issue of integration is increasingly influencing the political agendas in the EC. The issue of asylum laws (modified recently in Germany, Holland, and France) and the broader question of citizenship are being redefined— a major test for the democratic political culture of Western Europe.[44]

This is where attitudes towards developments in the Eastern part of the continent have important implications for the West. Post-World War II European integration was based on the categorical rejection of the notion of "ethnic cleansing" or of border changes imposed by force. Yet this is now taking place in Bosnia, whose partition along ethnic lines is being condoned by the representative of the EU. Those who believed that Maastricht would insulate the West from the effects of Sarajevo have now discovered that for the West European public it became impossible to give credibility to Maastricht's plan of a common security policy while Sarajevo was in agony.[45]

Similarly, there is an unexpected impact of political fragmentation and nation-state building in the East on developments in the West: The Czecho-Slovak example inspires Belgium (and Quebec).[46] The arguments of the Leagues in Northern Italy vis-à-vis the South echo those of the Czechs vis-à-vis the Slovaks. The return of the nation-state is by no means the only by-product of the collapse of communism or of East European political backwardness. Today's Europe is that of the *vases communicants*: integration may spread from the Western part to the Eastern part of the continent or fragmentation may spread in the reverse direction. To paraphrase Harold Nicholson, we must "Europeanize" the Balkans if we want to avoid the "Balkanization" of Europe.

ENDNOTES

[1]Bronislaw Geremek's statement at a conference on "The Foreign Policies of Central Europe," at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 29 March 1993.

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[2]Compare the maps of Europe in 1815, 1885, 1924, 1942, and 1991 presented in André Sellier and Jean Sellier, *Atlas des Peuples d'Europe Centrale* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 28-37; and Gérard Challiand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Atlas Stratégique* (Brussels: Ed. Complexe, 1993), 108–10.

[3]*Cumhuriyet,* 24 February 1992. On Turkey's new role, see Semih Vaner, ed., *La zone de coopération economique des pays riverains de la mer Noire* (Paris: CEMOTI, 1993).

[4]See Jacques Rupnik, *The Other Europe* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), chap. 1.

[5]See Observatoire Européen de Geopolitique, "La nouvelle géographie européenne," *OEG* (1) (1990).

[6]Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," *New York Review of Books,* 26 April 1984.

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3) (Summer 1993): 22–49.

[8]Johannes Wilms in *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* 6 February 1993.

[9]See Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 141–74; Paul Garde, "Ex-Yougoslavie: une fausse guerre de religion," *Politique Internationale* (58) (Winter 1992–1993): 45–63; and Stevan Pavlowitch, "L'héritage titiste," in Jacques Rupnik, ed., *De Sarajevo à Sarajevo, l'échec yougoslave* (Brussels: Complexe, 1992), 51–86.

[10]See Rémi Braque, *Europa, La Voie Romaine* (Paris: Criterion, 1992).

[11]A point made by Václav Havel in an interview with Jacques Rupnik, "La nouvelle frontière," *Politique Internationale* (Paris) (58) (Winter 1992–1993): 18.

[12]Jacques Rupnik, *L'Autre Europe, crise et fin du communisme* (Paris: Ed O. Jacob, 1990), 357–59.

[13]President Clinton's inauguration speech, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 20 January 1993.

[14]François Mitterrand first formulated this thesis of the historical fatality of the conflict in an interview in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* 29 November 1991 and reiterated the argument at a press conference in Munich, *Le Monde,* 10 July 1992, and again in an interview in *Le Monde,* 9 March 1993.

[15]For the theoretical framework see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

[16]Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979).

[17]Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1971), 453.

[18]Jacques Bainville, *Les conséquences politiques de la paix* (Paris: La Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1920), 19, 50.

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[19]Elie Halévy's 1920 lecture was published in October 1938 in *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* and reprinted in *Commentaire* (Spring 1992): 125–27.

[20]Cf. Michel Foucher, *Fronts et Frontières* (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 471–512.

[21]See Marie Mendras, ed., *Un Etat pour la Russie* (Brussels: Complexe, 1992), 19–44.

[22]See Vladimir Zhirinovsky's authorized "imperial" maps in *Limes* (Rome) (1) (1994). Zhirinovsky, the victor of the December 1993 elections with nearly a quarter of the vote, was made chairman of the newly created "geopolitical committee" of the Russian Parliament. His support, expressed in Belgrade in February 1994, for Serbian-style ethnic cleansing and redrawing of boundaries is the clearest signal so far of the direct impact of the Balkan precedent for the future of the Russian periphery.

[23]Vladimir Sokolov, "Demokratia i granicy" ("Democracy and Borders"), *Literaturnaia Gazeta,* 2 August 1989.

[24]Jan Krauze, "Un partenariat pour la paix," *Le Monde,* 24–25 October 1993.

[25]Jacques Rupnik, "The International Context of the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia," in Jiří Musil, ed., *The Break-Up of Czechoslovakia* (London and Budapest: Central European University Press, forthcoming, 1994). Cf. A. Dastakian, "Le malaise des Hongrois de Slovaquie," *Libération,* 7 January 1994.

[26]The parallels between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia concern the interaction between the disintegration of communism and that of a multinational federation. The similarity of the predicaments of Russians and Serbs is striking.

[27]Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

[28]See Alain Finkielkraut, *Le Crime d'être né. L'Europe, les nations, la guerre* (Paris: Arléa, 1994).

[29]Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Paradoxes of Nationalism," *Yale Review* 46 (4) (June 1957): 481–88.

[30]Cf. Marie-Paule Canapa, "La formation des Etats en milieu pluriethnique dans l'ex-Yougoslavie," Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 1993.

[31]Istvan Bibo, "Les raisons de l'hystérie allemande," in Istvan Bibo, *Misère des petits Etats d'Europe de l'Est* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1986), 115.

[32]Rupnik, *L'Autre Europe,* 356.

[33]Pierre Gallois, "Vers une prédominance allemande," *Le Monde,* 16 August 1993.

[34]Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993).

[35]On Serbian Germanophobia see Florence Hartmann, "Les préludes du 4e Reich," *Le Monde,* 13 July 1991.

[36]Václav Havel, "Letter to R. von Weizsäcker," 5 November 1989, Czechoslovak Documentary Center. See also the excellent study by Milan Hauner, "Czechs and Germans: Yesterday and Today," The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., September 1991.

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[37]Václav Havel, *L'Amour de la vérité doivent triompher du mensonge et de la haine* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1990), 81–88.

[38]Cf. Jacques Rupnik, "Mit Nemce za sousedy," *Lidové Noviny,* 18 August 1993.

[39]Cf. Max Streibl, *Bayerns Stellung in Deutschland und Europa* (Munich: Deutschland-Magazin, 1991–1992), 32ff. The fourth "regionalist" conference took place in Linz, Austria with delegates from thirty-seven regions representing ten European states. See Frank Bolot and Rudolf Hilf, *Bayerisch-böhmische Nachbarschaft* (Munich: Bayerische Ladeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1992).

[40]See Patrick Weil, "Les défis de l'Europe de l'immigration," in Raymond Barre and Klaus Kinkel, eds., *Les Nouvelles Frontières de l'Europe* (Paris: Economica, 1993), 53–67.

[41]See Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalisms* (London: BBC Books, 1993), 42–76; and Philippe Bernard, "L'épouvantail du droit d'asile," *Le Monde,* 22 September 1993.

[42]Robert Schuman, *Pour l'Europe* (Paris: Nagel, 1963), 23.

[43]Cf. Vitaly Zhurkin's speech at the Council of Europe conference in September 1990, *Europe: les chemins de la démocratie* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1991),148–49.

[44]For the impact of Eastern immigration see Pierre Hassner, "L'émigration, problème révolutionnaire," and Catherine Withol de Wenden, "Le choc de l'Est, un tournant historique pour les migrations?," both in *Esprit* (July 1992): 96–100, 101–11.

[45]Opinion polls show that, contrary to their political elites, in May 1993 a majority of West Europeans were favorable to a military intervention in Bosnia (Italy and Holland 64 percent, Great Britain 60 percent, and France 59 percent). Cf. *The Financial Times,* 25 May 1993.

[46]Cf. the speech by Francis Delperée, dean of the Law School at the Catholic University in Louvain, "Propos sur le fédéralisme au départ de l'expérience belge," delivered at the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament, 17 April 1991. See also the dossier, "La Belgique fédérale, an 1993," *Le Soir,* 15 December 1992, and F. Van de Woestyne, "Que veulent les Flamands?," *La Libre Belgique,* 13 January 1993. On Quebec see Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging,* 108-34; and Guy Laforest, *De la Prudence* (Québec: Boréal, 1993).

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Elemér Hankiss

European Paradigms: East and West, 1945–1994

THE LAST FEW DECADES HAVE TAUGHT us once again something that we have often forgotten and are likely to continue to forget: culture is not a luxury. In slightly melodramatic terms, culture is a question of life and death for human societies. To survive in this strange and dangerous universe people seem to require the protective shield of myth and religion, knowledge and belief, values and tradition—in other words, culture. If this protective shield is impaired, if it loses its relevance, if it cannot provide meaningful answers to questions and fears, then a period of uncertainty and anxiety may follow, a cultural crisis may develop.

The same is true of the various "paradigms" within a culture or civilization.[1] The concept of paradigm is used in this paper in the sense of a configuration of ideas and beliefs, myths and elements of empirical knowledge, values and norms, which, when taken together, allow and prompt people to experience, interpret, and control their world in a particular way. Societies generate, both unconsciously and consciously, paradigms that protect them against the uncertainties and anxieties of their lives by projecting the image of a habitable world, while also helping them develop behavioral patterns, goals, and rules of social cooperation that enable them to survive in a dangerous world.[2]

Several paradigms may simultaneously function in a single civilization, or even in one society. People respond to periods of radical change by developing new attitudes, beliefs, and identities. In other words, they have to modify existing paradigms or develop new

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ones. When paradigms are slow to adjust to radical external change, periods of uncertainty and anxiety may result.

The convulsive surges that define the recent history of Eastern and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe have forced these societies and their paradigms to adjust, even redefine, themselves several times. This paper will focus on two paradigms that the people of Eastern and Western Europe developed to cope with life on their respective sides of the Iron Curtain in the decades of the Cold War, following them through the cataclysmic changes of 1989.

For forty years the people of Western and Eastern Europe lived separate lives and had separate destinies. They had to cope with different problems, had different means, gave different answers to different challenges. Yet, they were bound tightly together, engaged in a strange and silent dialogue throughout those forty years (or perhaps it was only two monologues, since it was not too important that either side listen to the other). For each, the other became an indispensable source of values and meaning. Their very opposition held together a Europe that had been split by World War II.

Seen from the East, the Iron Curtain was both a wailing wall and, mixing metaphors, a window of hope. Seen from the West, it was a flattering mirror as well as a comforting protective barrier. Facing the Wall from two sides, living in two different worlds, Eastern and Western Europeans developed two different "paradigms": in the East, the "Paradigm of the Prisoner"; in the West, the "Paradigm of the Missionary."

THE PARADIGM OF THE PRISONER

The communists systematically destroyed East European societies. They dismantled the institutions of democracy and market economy. They destroyed the rich web of social networks, identity, dignity, and self-esteem. They created a murderous vacuum around and in the hearts of people, leaving a lonely crowd without any hope or means of resistance. Or so they believed.

Eastern Europe under communist rule was one of the best proofs of the enormous strength and adaptability of humankind.[3] People in Eastern Europe had to, and did, develop a modus vivendi in response to their situation. They had to acquire a certain understanding of the world in which they found themselves. They had to

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protect themselves against the dangers and absurdities of this world. They had to fill in the emptiness around them by developing a new set of values, attitudes, and identities to replace those destroyed, banned, and stigmatized by the communists. This necessity led to the creation of the "Paradigm of the Prisoner."

It must be emphasized that the "Paradigm of the Prisoner" did not affect all social groups in the same way or with the same strength. It may have been stronger, more relevant, in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia than in some other East European societies. It may have characterized the older generation more than the younger one. Furthermore, it was not the only paradigm that was developed in those decades of oppression. There were other, traditionally better known paradigms that reemerged, or were generated: *The Paradigm of the "Untertahn,"* a protective sphere of lethargy, millennial indifference, and humility coupled with day-to-day survival techniques of the subject or the serf; *The Paradigm of the Laborer,* those who retreated into the small, closed world of their families and traditional values, who worked with dignity and self-discipline, excluding the outer world from their lives; *The Paradigm of the Man on the Horse,* the oligarchs who considered themselves the revolutionary guard arriving in grand gallop and bringing justice and happiness to the country from the outside (this later developed into the *Paradigm of the Commodore,* the indispensable captain of a ship on rough seas); and the *Paradigm of the Reformer* which allowed technocrats and enlightened party members to preserve their moral integrity and self-respect.[4]

During their decades of imprisonment, the East Europeans suffered from cold and hunger; they were deprived of the freedom of shaping their own lives and the joys of a self-fulfilling life. But the world in which they lived had its comforts and tempting gratifications. The communist oligarchy relieved its prisoners of all real duties and responsibilities, keeping them anaesthetized with childish irresponsibility. They lived in a simple and transparent world where the complexities of life were reduced to the Manichaean dichotomy of "good" and "evil," democracy and communism. By developing the consciousness of martyrdom, East Europeans could further improve their spiritual situation: yes, it was difficult to be a prisoner but it was delicious and gratifying to be a martyr. Playing the martyr provided people with strong feelings of identity and self-

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esteem; it gave them a sense of purpose. Their simple and transparent world was enhanced with a metaphysical brilliance. They were seduced by their own innocence, convinced that somebody else was responsible for all the ills and evils of life, all the sufferings of mankind.

Most importantly, the "Paradigm of the Prisoner" fostered a sense of hope among those who saw themselves as prisoners. People living in the East had hopes for a new and authentic life, an earthly paradise beyond the Wall. For them Western freedom and prosperity was not only a goal to emulate but also invincible proof that life was worth living, that it was not devoid of value and meaning, that oppression, humiliating compromises, and an existence without dignity were only a transitory episode in their lives. The West shone in the distance, the light of hope in a world of defeat and despair.

THE PARADIGM OF THE MISSIONARY

For people living in the West, the world of despair and defeat beyond the Iron Curtain was a unique and indispensable source of meaning, identity, and mission: "evil" was the source of "good," as the German philosopher Schelling would put it.[5] From the late 1940s to the 1960s the threat of communism was a powerful incentive to build up the institutions of the welfare state and to lay the foundations of a strong and united Western Europe. It also enhanced the success of the model and gave a powerful boost to the self-consciousness and self-esteem of people living in the West. It daily reinforced faith and pride in the Western way of life; the failure of the East lent a glorious radiance to Bonn, Paris, and New York.

The existence of the other helped people living in the West to develop the "Paradigm of the Missionary."[6] This paradigm became a source of strength and satisfaction, even for armchair missionaries. The task and duty of liberating the East and defeating communism offered a fascinating, Saint Georgian role and identity to those who lived within this paradigm. It filled their lives with a sense of mission and vocation. It lent them the flattering aura of moral grandeur. It gave them the alibi of unselfishness.

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THE INTERLUDE

For forty years these two paradigms counterbalanced and complemented each other. And then, suddenly and unexpectedly, the gentle revolutions demolished the Wall separating the two worlds. The "Paradigm of the Prisoner" and the "Paradigm of the Missionary" lost their relevance and collapsed almost overnight.

In the East, the "Paradigm of the Prisoner" was replaced, for a fleeting moment, by the "Paradigm of the Revolutionary," the victorious and divine people rising against the evil powers and gloriously defeating them. There was a sudden change in the West, too: at the first news of the gentle revolutions, the armchair missionaries jumped to their feet and rushed to help those who were emerging from under the ruins of communism. Unfortunately, this happy interlude did not last long.

THE SHOCK OF FREEDOM

Freedom came as a shock to Eastern Europe. A blessing and a plague, it opened up fascinating new possibilities for hundreds of millions of people, but it also opened a Pandora's box of horrendous conflicts that had remained unsolved for centuries. It brought independence to some nations and a new form of dependence to others. It brought light and joy to the streets of Budapest and Prague, and ruins and tears to Mostar and Sarajevo. It opened stock exchanges and built prison camps. It brought the colorful bazaar of the market economy and destroyed the jobs of tens of millions. It brought new hopes and new fears, the promise of a better life to the few, uncertainty to the majority, the terror of poverty to the rest. It brought democracy to some countries and new forms of authoritarian rule camouflaged by quasi-democratic institutions to others.[7]

The people of Eastern Europe were not prepared for the realities of freedom. They lost the protection of their old paradigm and have not yet found answers to the challenges in their new world. They cannot consider themselves martyrs anymore.[8] They have lost the moral grandeur and the beatific simplicity of their lives. They have lost their identity, self-esteem, and dignity. They have become the poor and irrelevant relatives of the rich living in the West.[9]

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A new type of infantilism has emerged. Many have escaped from the new responsibilities by turning their backs to politics and regressing into catatonic indifference and resentment. They blame those in power, the new political elite, for all their problems and miseries.

The Manichaean simplicity provided by the presence of a universal evil has been replaced by confusion and chaos. Among the ruins of the old world and the labyrinthine complexities of the emerging market economy and democratic polity, the people of Eastern Europe do not understand why freedom has brought them poverty and unemployment, why democracy has replaced old types of injustice with new ones, why they cannot sell the milk and pork they produce, why Western Europe is closing its gates after having solicited the demolishing of the Iron Curtain for forty years. And there is no place to turn for relevant answers. The new political elite is too involved in creating the new institutions and playing its power games to listen to the more and more desperate questions. The churches have to reform themselves and find their own answers before they are able to answer the questions of their flock. The intelligentsia, the opinion makers, are themselves confused, trying to make sense of the changing world around them.

In the field of ideas and ideologies, the West has not been able to offer much help. It has arrived almost empty-handed. The social democratic ideology has been in retreat now for more than a decade; it has not been able to renew itself or to credibly distance itself from other forms of socialism. Classical conservatism has not been able to break the resistance of a basically egalitarian and anti-elitist East European populace. Liberalism has become an important element of public discourse, but its mainly or, in the case of neo-liberalism, exclusively economic and political philosophies have no answers to the everyday problems and existential anxieties of ordinary people.

Most experts brush off these disquieting symptoms, referring to them as "postrevolutionary spleen" or "postvictory blues," temporary conditions which will imperceptibly pass away—as they did in Spain in the 1980s—with the economic recovery of these countries. I hope they are right. But these symptoms may indicate a deeper social, cultural, and spiritual crisis which could jeopardize any real recovery in the coming years. The example of the post-Yugoslav

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civil war warns us that social, cultural, and spiritual factors can easily develop into dangerously intractable political factors.

A SPIRITUAL CRISIS IN THE WEST?

The situation in Western Europe is ambiguous. On the one hand, the old routines are still working, the old umbrella of ideas and *Weltanschaungen* still offer a certain feeling of safety, the institutional system is still functioning more or less efficiently, and the everyday lives of a majority of people are still more or less peaceful. On the other hand, there are signs which seem to indicate that the collapse of communism and the present political, economic, and social situations have reinforced several trends of decline which were already present but hidden.

The collapse of communism came as a shock not only to the East but to the West as well and brought more problems than solutions.[10] With the loss of the enemy, Westerners also lost a major motive force, an essential organizing principle, a source of identity and moral righteousness which strengthened their conviction that their world was indeed a good world.[11]

In a lecture in late 1990 Zbigniew Brzezinski, giving voice to "a gnawing philosophical anxiety," said:

> Democracy has won. The free market system has won. But what in the wake of this great ideological victory is today the substance of our beliefs? To what is the human being in the democratic West now truly committed?. . .hedonistic relativism?. . .[N]o absolutes, no commitment, and the good life defined by indexes of artificially generated consumerism as the substance of our goals. . .I think this emptiness, this potential emptiness, if not yet the reality, is dangerous. . . .[12]

These words closely echo the testimonies of some of the greatest thinkers of our century, including Husserl and Jaspers, Heidegger and Camus, Jung and Freud, Toynbee and Sorokin, Tillich and Ricoeur, Patocka and Kolakowski among others, all of whom expressed their fears about a deepening spiritual crisis that had attacked, and might engulf, our civilization.

The latest attempts to understand and interpret the world and ourselves, usually subsumed under the name "postmodernism," seem to be themselves the symptoms of a crisis. They have declared

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the "end of ideologies," the decline of all the "great theories," the "grand narratives," the "great metanarratives" of the age of modernity: emancipation, progress, socialism, triumphant democratization. All these are being replaced by postmodern "decomposition," pragmatism, relativism, subjectivism, and heterogeneity.[13] "The grand project has disappeared."[14] In the long run, the present doubts and the vivisection of traditional ideas and values will lay the foundation for a new paradigm. But in the meantime the situation may become critical.

The following developments may be, and have been, considered symptoms of a coming crisis:

Man and the Universe. Humankind struggled for hundreds of thousands of years to gain the certainty that the earth was at the center of the universe. The Judeo-Christian civilization brought this aspiration to its highest point and developed the strongest and most consistent belief in an anthropocentric universe. This system of thoughts, beliefs, and convictions began to erode, however, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has been shaken in its foundations by the horrendous events of the twentieth century. There are signs, and data, indicating that more and more people accept the bitter discovery that the universe was not created for them, that they are not the focus and center of the universe, that they have to struggle for survival in a dangerous world which is indifferent to the aspirations and sufferings of humanity.

The Moral Universe. The conviction that there is a kind of moral law functioning in the universe, that through a metaphysical or divine power justice is being done in this universe, has been shattered, not so much by the moving and desperate testimonies of Marquis de Sade, Nietzsche, Beckett, or Camus, but by the cruelties of the twentieth century.

The Rational Universe. The belief that the universe was built on the principle of rationality and could, therefore, be understood and controlled by human reason was, from the time of the Enlightenment, a central and indispensable element of modern European civilization. Since Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Freud, doubts about the rationality of the world, and mainly that of the human universe, have multiplied, but the real shock came in the twentieth century, with its "orgy of violence and destruction."[15] To quote Carl Jung:

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> I realize only too well that my faith in the rational organization of the world—that old dream of the millennium when peace and harmony reign—has grown pale. . .If he [modern man] turns away from the terrifying prospect of a blind world in which building and destroying successively tip the scales, and then gazes into the recesses of his own mind, he will discover a chaos and a darkness there which everyone would gladly ignore.[16]

Authentic and Meaningful Existence. To offer the vision of an authentic and meaningful existence to people is one of the primary tasks of every great culture and civilization. The question of whether there is such a thing as an authentic and meaningful existence, and if there is what it is like, has puzzled and inspired the best thinkers of all ages and has entered the mainstream of philosophical thought in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. People as different as Max Weber and Spengler, Freud and Foucault, Heidegger and Jaspers, Ricoeur and Camus describe various facets of the same phenomenon when they speak of the "loss of substance" in modern life, the "withdrawal of the sacred," the "loss of Being," the "destruction of transcendence," "tragic estrangement," and the "loss of meaning."

The Myth of Progress. Faith in history and progress, a cornerstone of modern European civilization, is still an important motive force, but the first doubts about the existence, and even more about the benefits, of progress emerged already in the eighteenth century in the writings of Kant and Voltaire, for instance. The doubts about, and the attacks on, this faith in progress multiplied in the nineteenth century and have become dominant in the last decades of the twentieth century. Tocqueville and Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Spengler and Toynbee, Durkheim and Max Weber, Freud and Jung, Marcuse and Fromm, Eliade and Ricoeur all saw modern European history as a gloomy and dangerous decline and protested against the destructive irresponsibility of a naive faith in universal progress. Eliade's notion of the "terror of history" corresponds to the late twentieth-century mood.

European civilization lived and fared well for centuries without the "modern" faith in progress. But now, after several centuries in which this faith was its basic and inalienable part and tenet, its loss could dangerously jolt and disturb the whole system. To live without it would require a difficult process of adjustment and a funda-

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mental change in our attitudes, values, and culture. If we see how much anxiety is generated by the slowing down of economic growth in our countries by a trivial 1 or 2 percent, then we may realize how deeply rooted is this creed in progress and growth and how its erosion may contribute to the generation of a cultural and spiritual crisis.

The Myth of Europe. Soon after World War II, the myth of a united Europe became one of the main motive forces of Western Europe. It became the objective of a noble and serious endeavor which filled people's lives with meaning and authenticity and gave them a moral justification. It reinforced their faith in progress and in the power of human reason and goodwill. It promised a peaceful, rational, and prosperous world.

In the last two years, and even more in the last six months, this faith has been seriously shaken. Uncertainties, doubts, and fears have emerged about the sense and feasibility of the project. Unified Europe has lost, at least partly, its attraction and its power to be a source of meaning and hope.

CONCLUSION

Adjusting paradigms to new historical and social situations and developing paradigms which may help people understand and control their changing world has long been one of the most difficult tasks for societies. It remains to be seen how people in Europe will respond in the coming years and decades to the collapse, not only of the "evil empire," but also of many of the founding beliefs of Western civilization.

ENDNOTES

[1]The concept of "paradigm" will be used in a somewhat broader sense in this paper than it is used in contemporary sociology of knowledge. A pragmatic dimension will be added to its purely cognitive and epistemological character defined, for instance, by Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 28ff. For an excellent summary of the history of the concept see Thomas Rentsch, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,* vol. 7, ed. Joachim Ritter (Basel: Schwabe, 1971–1992), 74 – 81.

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[2]Most paradigms tend to reinforce the positive and mitigate the negative elements of the world. An important exception is the paradigm of decadence which prefers and enjoys the darker tint.

[3]Potsdam, Budapest, Prague, and Gdansk were warning signals of the latent survival of societies which had been considered dead by many. They were desperate attempts at protest and self-liberation. But the silent everyday struggle for survival and human dignity was at least as important as these dramatic events.

[4]In the course of our discussions, George Schöpflin proposed some further ingenious paradigm labels within the prison metaphor: the "Paradigm of the Prison Guards," the "Paradigm of the Chaplains," and the "Paradigm of the Informers."

[5]Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1936; German original, 1809).

[6]The "Paradigm of the Missionary" was, of course, not the only paradigm helping people in the West understand and accept their world and themselves. But it was an important one and, to a lesser or greater extent, was present as a powerful component in most of the other social paradigms.

[7]See, for instance, Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Laszlo Bruszt, "Transformative Politics: Social Costs and Social Peace in East Central Europe," *EEPS* 6 (1) (Winter 1992): 55–72; Ferenc Feher and Andrew Arato, eds., *Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991); Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992); Lyman H. Legters, *Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution, 1945–1991. Documents and Analyses* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1992); Kazimierz Poznanski, ed., *Constructing Capitalism. The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (London: Westminster Press, 1992); and Adam Przeworski, et al., *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[8]There are already tendencies for one to feel "martyrized" again, but now by the West or by one's neighbors.

[9]I remember a chilly November morning in 1989 in West Berlin when I was waiting among hundreds of Japanese and American tourists at a breach in the Berlin Wall for the first visitors from East Berlin. The first family—father, mother, and almost compulsory two children—in their greenish, bluish, yellowish, brownish GDR jackets, trousers, boots, and rucksacks finally emerged from the fog. At the first station of their pilgrimage they dutifully lined up at the mobile British army canteen where they tried to drink (or pour out unobserved by their hosts) the tea with milk offered to them in plastic cups. A couple of yards away they queued up again at a Mercedes Benz van where a salesman handed out brochures of luxury cars. They then boarded city buses and were given a free ride to downtown West Berlin. When they got off, they were immediately offered hot bean soup in plastic bowls (I do not know why West Berliners thought that people in the GDR were starving). They sat down on the curb and dutifully ate the soup, reassuring their hosts that this West Berlin bean soup was much better than bean soups over the Wall had ever been. Meanwhile a most elegant Kurfürstendam crowd was wheeling around them, staring at them as though they were a strange anthropoid species. Then, after having queued up for their DM 100, they began to stroll around

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in one of the most opulent shopping districts of the Western world, with their shriveling deutsche marks in their hands. In the evening they returned home, disappearing through the breach in the Wall, frustrated and humiliated, realizing that they had lost forty years of their lives. People all over Eastern Europe are recognizing that loss, along with a loss of identity, dignity, and self-esteem.

[10]See István Rév, "The Postmortem Victory of Communism," *Dædalus* 123 (3) (Summer 1994).

[11]Attempts to replace the Soviet Union in this "ontological" and moral role with Iraq, Somalia, or Serbia have, of course, failed.

[12]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Post-Victory Blues," lecture given at the Academy of World Inquiry, Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, Washington, D.C., 25 October 1990. From among the innumerable similar statements in the last three years see the following extremely interesting pieces: John Le Carre, "The Trap Has Opened, So Let's Be Free," *International Herald Tribune,* 6 May 1993, 7 and Richard Cohen, "Waiting for New Meaning in a Post-Cold War World," *International Herald Tribune,* 27 October 1993, 7.

[13]See, for instance, Jean Baudrillard, *Selected Writings* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); Thomas Docherty, *After Theory: Postmodernism/ Postmarxism* (London: Routledge, 1990); Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism: Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992); Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990); Ann E. Kaplan, ed., *Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices* (London: Verso, 1988); Jean-François Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); and Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[14]Edgar Morin, "La pensée socialiste en ruine," *Le Monde,* 21 April 1993.

[15]Jan Patocka, *Philosophy and Selected Writings,* ed. Erazim Kohák (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1989), 127.

[16]Carl Jung, "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," in Joseph Campbell, ed., *The Portable Jung* (New York: Viking, 1971), 456.

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George Schöpflin

Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction

IN ANALYZING THE STATE OF EUROPE, it may be tempting to begin with a quote from Yeats' *Second Coming*, but that would be for effect only, no second apocalypse is on offer. I do not believe that some "rough beast, its hour come at last, slouches towards Bethlehem to be born." Nor are other literary metaphors like Godot or Wotan with his broken spear helpful. Yet, at the same time, there is little doubt that Europe is experiencing difficulties and that these difficulties affect Western Europe as much as they do Central and Eastern Europe. The question is, what is central to the dilemmas of the 1990s and what is peripheral? The regularities have to be picked out from among the fragments of the certainties of the 1980s and the seemingly hollow triumph of 1989. The diagnosis offered in this essay is tentative. It will look at the problems of postcommunism in post-Cold War Europe, which has seemingly lost its purposiveness, along with the certainties that characterized the East-West confrontation of the pre-1989 era. This essay will concentrate on the characteristics of postcommunism as they have evolved over the first three or four years of their operation.

The crisis of identity in the West does not bode well for the future efforts of Central and Eastern Europe to slough off the legacy of communism, to make the shift from being postcommunist countries to being "European" countries. Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that postcommunism is much more than a transitional stage and may well be the dominant feature of politics in the region for the foreseeable future. The determinants of what was widely

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regarded as an interim state are more than likely to be long lasting—*c'est le provisoire qui dure.*

The transition towards democracy has slowed down, and these systems have crystallized into something semipermanent. There is no suggestion that there will be no change at all, only that the shape these systems have assumed is unlikely to undergo major transformation. Postcommunism should be understood as a sui generis condition, with certain resemblances to and influences from Western European political systems, but in most other respects showing its own internal dynamic. It follows that Western European authority will almost certainly decline, whether directly, as exemplified by the Bosnian crisis, or indirectly.

The communist experience of Central and Eastern Europe constitutes something so thoroughgoing that it amounts to a new cleavage line. The *longue durée* historical frontier between Western and Central Europe was greatly reinforced by communism. The effects of that cleavage line are proving to be very far-reaching for a number of reasons, with considerable consequences for political, economic, and social attitudes, values, and practices. Most significantly, communism imposed a modernizing experience on societies that were not prepared for it.

Signs of reverting to the pattern of the interwar period are now beginning to show in Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1920s, the "lands between" the West and the Soviet Union were, by and large, pale imitations of the political order of the West—facade democracies with weak institutional systems and limited public involvement in the political process. By the 1930s, when in the West democracy was increasingly challenged by rightist radicalism, that pattern too was adopted in Central and Eastern Europe, although it tended to be pseudo-fascism rather than fully-fledged transplants of either the Italian or the German system.[1] The picking and choosing from among the Western models that was characteristic of those decades can be seen again today.

Communism was radically different. The Stalinist revolution introduced the bulk of society to modern working methods; it brought about a major and irreversible population shift from country to town, thereby largely solving the age-old peasant problem; it transformed the countryside; it created or expanded a reasonably competent technical intelligentsia; it greatly extended the scope of state

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intervention in society and brought into being a sizable population that regarded the state as its primary source of protection; and, because it sought to effect a transformation on a relatively weak resource base, it cut corners in virtually every area of social activity, especially where infrastructure and the environment were concerned.

The way in which society understands itself, identities are defined, and relationships are constructed are still significantly affected by the communist experience, and probably will continue to be for generations to come. In all these areas, especially where community, solidarity, and human interactions are concerned, behavior has been seriously affected by communist relativization, corruption, and abuse of power. The reconstruction of these spheres will not be accomplished overnight.

Part of the current difficulty of this reconstruction is sequencing: Which steps should have the highest priority and in what order ought the various steps to be taken? The interdependence between the various spheres—political, economic, legal, social, and ethical—makes sequencing all the more difficult. It is evident both from a theoretical perspective and from the actual practice of postcommunist politics that rational construction encompassing the totality of postcommunist processes is impossible. Decisions are taken on a short term, ad hoc basis with little regard for their impact on other spheres of activity, as is generally the case with politics everywhere. The unintended consequences of these decisions impose distortions which only further exacerbate existing dysfunctions. This phenomenon strengthens the proposition made earlier: the existing dispensation will last for a long time in Central and Eastern Europe.

It has been said that the democratic experiment in Central and Eastern Europe is beginning to resemble the imposition of communism: inasmuch as communism was an attempt to introduce a proletarian revolution without a working class, what is now happening is the introduction of democracy without democrats. There is an element of truth in all this, as there is in most *bons mots*. The reason is not hard to find. When communism collapsed, there was no alternative to democracy, both in the international context and in the domestic situation.

Those who delegitimated communism did so in the name of democracy. The intellectual elites who had successfully taken on the communist ideology came to the fore. But, having spent many years

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fighting the communist dragon, they had taken on some of the characteristics of dragons themselves. Their concept of democracy was homogenizing, idealized, and, despite their professions to the contrary, utopian.[2] Their vision was of a society without institutions and politics, where the responsible citizen pursued his affairs without the intermediation of bureaucracies and other forces contributing to opacity. The concept of society which these elites propounded was curiously like the one Marxists had put forward forty years ago. In their view, society need not be significantly marked by conflicts of interests, nor were there any deep cleavages which called for intermediation and aggregation.

This view, originating in the idea of "antipolitics," tended to see society—renamed "civil society"—as the fountainhead of virtue; the party had become the repository of evil. The Manichaean struggle between capitalists and an all-virtuous proletariat was replicated in a new form. The elites failed to understand that society was a far more complex organism than what they had thought, that simple, well-meaning declarations were not effective in politics, that ideas and programs would have to be sold to the public, and that institutions were necessary for the routinized exercise of power.

The second legacy of this mind-set was the importation of moral issues directly into politics, which gave postcommunist politics their very particular flavor of constant, abstract, intellectualized argument. These have little to do with the everyday realities with which society has to cope, above all the steady economic deterioration which has eroded the standard of living of those who made some gains in income and status under communism.[3]

Not that society was itself without illusions. The image of society that emerged under communism was an oddly distorted one. In general, it was a society that appeared to be more sophisticated about itself and the world in which it lived than it, in fact, was. This picture, built up from evidence supplied by communist social scientists and by how these societies behaved when Communist Party rule was relaxed (Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980–1981), did not begin to describe conditions accurately. Despite occasional warning signs, both the new elites and the Western observers tended to blindly attribute democratic qualities to the societies being born after communism.[4]

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Yet, signals pointing in the opposite direction were present, as in the highly homogenizing set of assumptions on which the program of Solidarity was based. The political inexperience of Central and Eastern European society came as something of a shock. The low voter turnouts, the readiness on the part of sizable minorities to lend an ear to demagogues (like Stanislaw Tyminski, who gained a quarter of the vote in the presidential elections in Poland in 1990 on a populist platform), the vulnerability to emotionally-charged nationalist rhetoric, were evidence that all was not well with the democratic credentials of these postcommunist societies. In hindsight, it is now clear that for many people in Central and Eastern Europe "democracy" was a code word meaning not the complex culture of procedures and values that has evolved slowly in the West, but total freedom and immediate access to Western levels of prosperity. It is probably not unfair to describe this as the "light-switch syndrome": with the flick of a switch—the holding of elections—the West was expected to insure a Swedish standard of living in the East.

The depoliticization, infantilization, and atomization that communism imposed on society could not be sloughed off overnight. Yet, the public, or at least significant sections of it, was ready to accept the easy solutions that political entrepreneurs were offering them. That both the elites and society more generally had such a low level of political literacy was perhaps not fatal, but certainly unhelpful to the success of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.[5]

THE RULE OF LAW

It is widely accepted that the introduction of a transparent, consistent, and reliable legal system is an essential precondition for the successful stabilization of both political and economic activity. There can be no stability, long-range planning, or confidence in the predictability of the public sphere without an adequate legal system. Without predictability, individual and collective decision-making will operate in a defensive fashion, often appearing irrational from the broader perspective, though perfectly intelligible when seen in the light of previous experience.

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In this respect, the situation today is contradictory. Most of the postcommunist states have begun to revamp their legislation, to introduce the laws needed to bring them into line with West European practice. However, the gap between laws passed and actual practice remains substantial; laws are flouted or ignored. This means, inevitably, that trust in the legal order is markedly lower than in Western Europe; people look for ways around the laws, not least because they believe that they are not being applied fairly. Corruption presents a separate though related problem. Where public service is not understood as an ideal, where bureaucrats are underpaid, corruption is all but automatic, and both parties in a bureaucratic transaction expect this to happen. The process becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This engenders a cycle that is extremely difficult to break, especially because no one is eager to assume the risk of believing that a particular regulation is, in fact, being applied without prejudice; people expect hidden agendas, discrimination, and conspiracies.[6]

Civil society can be born only if individuals acquire a sense of authenticity in their dealings with others, where economic and political transactions are felt to be real, reciprocally satisfactory, imbued with a moral content respected by all the parties. At present, far too many people interpret liberty in the public sphere as license, which only further undermines respect for the law.

The legacy of the communist and, for that matter, the precommunist past is unhelpful in this area. The communist system did not accept legality as an autonomous sphere; it kept it under strict political control. While in the 1970s and 1980s a certain routinization of the administration of the law took place, with a degree of depoliticization of the legal sphere, the system as a whole was characterized by its discretionary character: nine times out of ten the formal rules of the law might be followed; on the tenth, some political requirement would supervene.

This phenomenon did more than weaken respect for the law; it potentially made every transaction involving the state a matter for bargaining—currency became the power which allowed access to scarce goods. It is no wonder that under postcommunism legality exists more on paper than as a set of internalized norms. When respect for rules has been sustained by force, no inner understand-

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ing remains once that force is removed of why adherence to rules is valuable in itself.[7]

Another aspect of communism was a tendency towards overregulation. Throughout the communist period, a stream of directives, decrees, and other forms of instruction poured from the center to the lower levels of the hierarchy. This behavior derived partly from a semimagical belief in the efficacy of regulation, an attitude inherent in central planning, and from a need to correct mistakes produced by previous directives. The outcome was the devaluation of regulation and legality. At the same time, overregulation was deliberately used as a control mechanism by the center in a rather Machiavellian fashion: enterprise managers or other lower-level figures could be pulled back into line by the threat of legal proceedings in situations where they had ignored certain regulations. It was intended that they operate in a shadowy state of semilegality as a way to curb any potential autonomy vis-à-vis the party. Needless to say, this kind of control is distinctly unhelpful in an altered state of affairs.

Finally, it is important to consider the "softness" of the state, a phenomenon closely related to overregulation, but conceptually distinct. It implies that the state administration under communism lacked the will and the means to enforce the rules it issued, both politically and practically, thereby encouraging corruption, a lackadaisical approach to regulation, and disregard for the legal sphere.[8]

The postcommunist state, not merely "soft," functions unevenly, both spatially and territorially. As the new economic and political order was established, it became evident that certain regions were doing much better than others, that their adjustment to the market was proving easier, and that their local cultures were, in consequence, gaining saliency to the detriment of the state as a whole. Other regions, however, were obviously less able to cope with the challenge of the new system.[9]

This regional imbalance could have important political results, especially if an ethnic cleavage was involved, but even in ethnically homogeneous states like Poland or Hungary it would produce outcomes that the postcommunist state would be powerless to change. In Hungary, for example, Transdanubia, through its Western, principally Austrian, tourism, rose to new levels of prosperity that eastern Hungary could not begin to match. Prague is another

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instance of a locality that has benefited from very high levels of tourism to the disadvantage of, say, the Ostrava basin. In Poland, Silesia took advantage of its closeness to Germany. Slovakia, with its awkward east-west communications, discovered that the location of Bratislava at the extreme western end of the country was viewed negatively by those in eastern Slovakia, where an oppositional subculture cohered around Kosice. In the more extreme case of Croatia, both Istria and Dalmatia sought to develop political agendas without supervision from Zagreb.

THE STATE AND THE CITIZENSHIP

The second broad range of factors that characterizes postcommunism concerns the relationship between the individual and the state, the nature of citizenship. In this field communism left a distinctly contradictory legacy. On the one hand, because the communist system was regarded as illegitimate and alien, many people show highly individualistic attitudes and are opposed to collectivism. On the other hand, because they are dependent on the state, they are fearful of the consequences of unbridled individualism, free markets, and competition.

The division of postcommunist societies into three broad segments—traditional, communist, and democratic—proposed by the Hungarian social scientist Gyula Tellér is highly original and very useful in this context.[10] The traditional segment resents the forced modernization that has been imposed and, clinging to the traditional values of the village, dislikes the impact of Western culture. Traditionalists are generally vulnerable to any demagogic appeal, notably that of nationalism. The communist segment, so-called because it was brought into being by the communist revolution, accepts many of the aspects of modernity, but feels uneasy with openness and competition because it is fearful of ending up a loser. Both are unsettled and are found in the declining sectors of industry and at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. The democratic segment, prepared to live with the liberal values of tolerance, openness, markets, and competition, looks readily to the West for models of behavior both in politics and economics. Self-evidently, this last segment is the one on which a democratic system must rely. Its size varies from country to country, as does its self-confidence.

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The attitudes of these different segments to the issue of citizenship are no less various. The communist segment is generally antagonistic to any clear-cut view of rights and corresponding obligations. The democratic segment is closest to accepting a reciprocal system as the most effective way of achieving unity. And the traditionalist segment prefers collectivist, anti-individualist conceptions of citizenship, in which its fears of modernity would be minimized.[11]

It is hard to see an early acceptance of citizenship based on reciprocity given the current attitude of state bureaucrats and the suspicions of society. The culture of bureaucracy, noted above, is generally antagonistic to reciprocity and prefers paternalism. Society, especially those segments to which the installation of the new system has brought little or nothing, is suspicious of what the state has to offer. It views citizenship in terms of a crude egalitarianism that rejects the privilege of higher material conditions as a reward for success.

THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRACY

The third problem area that characterizes postcommunism is democracy. Democracy has to be established at two levels—as a set of functioning institutions and as a discourse. In neither area has any substantial advance been made, but this is not intended to imply that nothing has been done at all. The very fact that a democratic discourse exists, that it still dominates the public sphere and that the nondemocratic discourses (whether they be populist, clericalist, law and order, or other types of authoritarianism) remain relatively weak, is a significant step when measured by the yardstick of communist discourse, which sought to exclude all other sources of legitimation. But the implications of democracy are far from being readily accepted even by those who give it verbal support.

The gap between words and practice was a growing source of irritation to those who regarded themselves as losers under the new dispensation. The communist legacy, in this connection as in other areas, was unhelpful, overwhelmingly because the nexus between political power and economic welfare was not understood by significant sections of society. The ideals of democracy were interpreted in a rather abstract way; the interlinking of government policy and

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the economy—the regulation of the market, the determination of the boundary between just and unjust profit—for example, was not universally understood.

The uneven functioning of institutions, the low level of grassroots organization of political parties, and the seemingly endless and irrelevant political debates tended to bring about disenchantment and cynicism, generating anti-intellectualism and hostility to the new elites. They were increasingly seen as behaving as parasitically as the communists had done before them.

Postcommunist states have become notorious for the difficulty they have in coping with diversity. The proposition that "otherness" may have positive functions is completely alien to large sections of the elite and society. The reasons for this intolerance can be found in the absolute values propagated by communism, with its emphasis on the negative stereotype of the enemy (i.e., "class enemy"), together with the way in which the anticommunist elites have had to construct their strategies in accordance with the ground rules established by communism. The postcommunist elites were themselves unable to deal with challenges and criticism; they tended to regard the normal workings of democracy as a hostile conspiracy rather than as a fairly routinized process of give-and-take. The inability to deal with diversity is particularly acute where there are ethnic cleavages, but applies equally to nonethnic discord.[12]

The role of the West demands analysis also. By 1994, it had become generally known that the West would not bestir itself to help the new democratic systems in Central and Eastern Europe. While the West occasionally expressed verbal support for democracy, this was seldom reinforced by action. Examples abound, but two make the point. The attitude of the European Community to imports from Central and Eastern Europe was always negative. Despite the rhetoric, when it actually came to balancing out the needs of the new democracies, the West would generally favor its own interests. It may have been naive of the Central and East Europeans to expect the ideals of democracy to override short-term economic necessity, but the failure left them bemused and disillusioned.

The Bosnian crisis was a far more serious warning that the West would not involve itself militarily to defend a political community against attacks by another. The short-term consequence was to encourage those who believed that ethnic identity should prevail

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over all others in politics, who preferred violence to negotiation and compromise. This was a serious short-term blow to the prospects of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, but the long-term implications were even greater. It was a signal that the West lacked the will to support those who sought to emulate its mature democracies, who hoped that the reintegration of Europe would take place with the active participation of the West.

ETHNICITY AND NATIONHOOD

After the collapse of communism, the view that "rejoining Europe" was not only desirable but that it would be a relatively straightforward process was prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. This view proved to be mistaken; disenchantment followed, predictably enhancing the salience of ethnicity as an alternative.

There were, in addition, other explanations for the rise of ethnic politics. Nationhood needs to be viewed as functioning in two dimensions— ethnic and civic. Where the civic dimension, identification with the institutions of the state and society, is weak, ethnicity inevitably assumes a stronger role. While the civic aspect of nationhood can generally be regarded as appealing to material interests in political and economic life, ethnicity resonates in the cultural and affective sphere. Political stability in a state depends on a balance between the two.[13]

Communism largely destroyed the civic dimension; reconstructing it was bound to be slow and laborious. In the interim, ethnicity was called upon to mediate between the rulers and the ruled, something it could hardly do effectively because that was not its political function. This weakness of civic politics accounted for the overemphasis on ethnicity that characterized Central and Eastern European politics after the end of communism.

The consequences of the process were considerable. It made the acceptance of institutions and the institutional mediation of interests—the contest for power—far more difficult to bring into equilibrium; bargaining and negotiation over identities are virtually impossible. While one may readily give away material interests in the expectation of gaining something else, identity is not open to compromise. The political debates of postcommunism were characterized by polemics, emotional appeals, intolerance, and, from the

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perspective of societies beset by deep-seated existential problems, irrelevance.

Increasingly, governments tended to rely on ethnic nationhood as a means of legitimating their power. This signified that although they had achieved power through popular election, the nexus between the rulers and the ruled was regarded as too weak to carry them through the harsh problems of creating markets and facing the criticism that accompanies competitive politics. Unfortunately, making governments ethnic tended to make the states ethnic, which promoted collectivist, anti-individualist values; it made it that much more difficult to establish genuinely legitimate institutions. This circle will be hard to break.[14]

To this cluster of problems should be added the mounting nonethnic regional disparities that began to be distinguishing marks of several of the postcommunist states. These regional disparities, derived from structural features of the inherited system, were exacerbated by the transition towards democracy; some regions were clearly able to take better advantage of the new opportunities than others and the new governments lacked the skills and resources to redress the balance. These shortcomings tended to promote anxieties about national unity; they reinforced the nationalist message arguing for stronger central control, which, in turn, potentially enhanced the role of the state and weakened other social institutions.

TRANSITION TO WHAT?

It has been suggested aphoristically that a transition ought to have transitional elites. This may very well turn out to be a prediction rather than a hope. The elites who assumed power after the collapse of communism are, in many cases, disillusioned with politics. They have discovered that they have no taste for the showmanship, negotiation, and complex dealing that politics demands. The high-minded moralizing and intellectual analysis which they had looked forward to has no role in politics. The elections that have been held since 1989 tend to confirm this trend. The bulk of the Charter 77 group has left politics in the Czech lands, replaced by a tougher though not necessarily more pragmatic coterie. The elections in September 1993 in Poland produced a markedly different elite than

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the one that initially came to power. Something similar is likely to happen in Hungary after the 1994 elections.[15]

It is another question, however, whether the new elites will be more professional than those they have displaced. Until the social and political bases of pragmatism exist—a strong civic sphere—ideological politics in one form or other will probably persist. These will be colored in the first instance by ethnonationalism, but other issues—religion, anticapitalism, and moral purity—may soon also become involved. Nevertheless, the Central European countries (Poland, the Czech lands, Hungary, Slovenia) have a reasonably good chance in the long run of moving towards a social structure where the traditional segment is gradually weakened over time and a de facto alliance between the liberal and communist segments will construct a social and political base sufficient for a reasonably secure democracy.

In the interim, the postcommunist systems will continue to function in the way they have during their first three years of existence. The very high level (by Western criteria) of ideological discourse will not change, making compromise difficult. The suspicion of institutions and a corresponding trust in individuals will remain strong, with the result that citizens will tend to distrust motives, considering gains in personal power the primary reason why leaders act in a particular way. Furthermore, corruption will be endemic; the criteria for policing the new systems have not been agreed upon and the state has not the will, the power, nor the legitimacy to act effectively in this regard.

Representation will be weaker than in the West. It will, once more, be based on personalities rather than issues, ideologies rather than material interests. The political parties that have come into being will tend to be unstable, fissiparous, and quarrelsome; their strength will not be organization. Former Communist Parties, which have a better understanding both of organization and material interests will probably perform well, especially if, as in Bulgaria, they link their appeal to nationalism. The political contest will be unstable or at least appear to be so. It may well be that these systems will, in reality, be more fixed than they appear; the constant forming and reforming of governments may be more a surface symptom of instability than something that is deeper and more structural.[16]

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CONCLUSION

A particularly striking irony in the political development of the postcommunist countries is that they began their passage towards democracy by hitching their wagons to an idealized vision of the West European star at the very time when that star was beginning to appear increasingly tarnished to the West Europeans. The East European definition of democracy was, in that sense, dependent on external models rather than being derived from their own political experience, even where that experience was hardly suited to the development of democratic principles. What the postcommunists launched was a successful delegitimation of communism by reference to an ideal vision of democracy; they then sought to transform their polities according to this visionary model. This was bound to fail, but it was neither an unworthy attempt nor was it unexpected, given the intellectual traditions and utopianism of the region. The West played a role in this, by its inability and lack of will to help the Central and East Europeans in their quest for a new democratic paradigm. That too was explicable by the slow crisis that Western Europe was itself experiencing as a result of the collapse of communism.

Europe was once again far more interdependent than it had been during the communist period. Not only were Central and Eastern Europe dependent on what the West would or would not do, but the West could hardly remain immune to developments further east. While ethnic cleansing, for example, was restricted to the former Yugoslavia, the proposition that unwelcome minorities should be eliminated wholesale was certain to find imitators in the West. While ironies abounded, the future of Europe as a whole was affected by an enormous sea change. The era beginning in 1989 had to be qualitatively different from the one that began in 1914.

ENDNOTES

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[10]Gyula Tellér, "Döntés elött," *4x4 oldalas: Szabad Demokrata tajékoztató* (44) (4 November 1992).

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[16]Jane L. Curry, "Pluralism in East Central Europe: Not Will It Last But What Is It?," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26 (4) (December 1993): 446–61.

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In effect, during the four decades of Soviet domination Central Europe went through a process of adaptation rather like that familiar in penal practice. When first imprisoned, humans tend to refuse to acknowledge their new condition. Though in prison, they refuse to think, act, and respond like prisoners. Instead, they cling to the habits and attitudes of freedom. Only gradually does reality set in and with it a stage of waiting and hoping. If the prisoners are released during this stage, they often return to ordinary life stronger and wiser for their experience. If, however, the imprisonment lasts, prisoners tend to adapt to their condition, acquiring new skills, attitudes, and habits likely to enhance their chances of survival. They become jail smart, able to resist the system and to derive from it such benefits as it has to offer. What they tend to lose is the ability to function as free humans.

That is the development through which the nations of Central Europe passed in the forty years of Soviet domination. Certainly there were courageous individuals who defied the pattern, and certainly the timetable differed in various countries, but the overall development went from defiance to adaptation. In Czechoslovakia, the first phase was the time of Milada Horáková, of prison camps and executions. We refused to admit that the Communists were then in power and that their rule was likely to last. It was a time of defiance.

The mood changed drastically in the mid-1950s after the Hungarian uprising. When the West did not move while the Soviet army did, ruthlessly and effectively, we had to accept the reality. The years that followed were a time of introspection, of waiting and hoping, which culminated in the late 1960s in Alexander Dubček and his socialism with a human face.

Erazim Kohák

From "Ashes, Ashes. . .Central Europe after Forty Years"
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George Kolankiewicz

Elites in Search of a Political Formula

This legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests, is what we have elsewhere called the political formula. It answers a real need. . .so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force but on the basis of a moral principle.[1]

—*Gaetano Mosca*

IT MAY APPEAR WILLFULLY PROVOCATIVE to argue at the outset that what the postcommunist societies now require is a greater intellectual and material basis to their societies and less emphasis on normative commitment or moral imperatives. The rejection of communist pathologies in Eastern Europe was of necessity grounded in the language of values but was permeated by material need and intellectual atrophy. "Counter interpretations" of reality which could effectively challenge the status quo were nearly always couched in terms which tacitly accepted etatism and monocentric politics.[2] As such, its governing elites were well endowed with moral authority, just as their predecessors had been bereft of it, but they were short on programs and perspectives for system reform. Subsequently, the practice of power has exposed severe shortcomings in their ability to impose themselves through either the force of ideas or economic precept. Concomitantly, populations have gradually disengaged themselves from the first embrace of Western wiles and demanded less trust and faith and more reason and results. This

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has posed an enormous problem of legitimation for these new political classes.

"Designer capitalism" and "draught-board" democracy had at first appeared to possess their own built-in self-legitimatory impetus which would easily roll over the vestiges of state socialism; more recently this view has proved to be naively optimistic. The work of transforming these societies has become a race between the evaporating promise of the new espoused by those able and willing to realize this vision and the residual attraction of an unexplained "third way" or humane transformation which would care for the growing band of losers as well as the lost.

However, as this race unfolds, the starting gates, the course, and the finish line appear to have altered. All had apparently started from state socialism in crisis, were to move through economic and political restructuring involving elections and privatization, and would emerge as members of Europe and NATO. It soon became clear, however, that the means by which citizens had coped with communism influenced how they would adapt to capitalism. Elites united in tearing down communist structures were soon at unseemly odds when easy paths to political mobility were opened up and technical merit or political motivation were less important than some loosely defined dissident credential.

What had been a strength in defying a party-state became a weakness in constructing a state of parties. Furthermore, while the Visegrád formula provided a common datum line for the vanguard societies of Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks, as well as Poles, their unity was rooted more in collective *uncertainty* than in any mutual consensus over common goals. Disagreement and dissension seemed to be the hallmark of the new political class both at home and abroad. Significantly, the populations which lived on either side of the new sovereign borders were quicker to cooperate through cross-border trade and communal contacts than were their ruling elites who at their official reception with President Clinton in Prague in January 1994 were seated at separate tables.

Thus what may have appeared to be an asset in 1989 emerged as a liability in 1993. Solidarity governments which have had to leave the task of privatization to the former communists now appear in a poor light by comparison to the less mobilized Czechs who have adapted to the civil economy and the rule of law with remarkable

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ease, carrying through, it must be said, many of the ideas for which the Poles claim authorship.

The "Brazauskas" effect in Lithuania, which first signaled an apparent weakness in elites charged with breaking out of state socialism, was soon followed by the Pawlak coalition of peasants and former communists in Poland, the Zhirinovsky option in Russia, not to mention the continuing grip of reformed and unreformed communists in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the former Soviet Union.

We are assured that this does not signal a return to communism nor even a rejection of reform projects. Could it presage the end of the so-called revolutions from above, the political bankruptcy of elites, and the reappropriation of reforms by those most affected by them?

It is as if the collapse of the communist facade in Eastern Europe was replaced by the temporary awnings of market *ideology* and democratic *theory* while the work on dismantling its institutional structures and erecting a new infrastructure took place behind their cover. However, with the unveiling the emerging architecture reflected the political culture, the tools available, the materials at hand, the skill of its builders, and, not least, the abilities of citizens keen to take over their new habitat and use its amenities as they saw fit.

TRIPLE UNCERTAINTY OF TRANSFORMATION

Five years after the first noncommunist counterelite took office in Eastern Europe their political classes apparently face three major questions: Where are they going? Who are they leading? How do they justify one to the other? Put another way, they have to determine the nature of the transformation they are directing, the makeup of the societies which they had to cajole into capitalism, and how to sell an idea which produces on the one hand greater inequality and widespread poverty and on the other hand an embryonic capitalist class without the grace or good sense to temper its conspicuous consumption. All this in societies where the sense of anomie and fatalism grows daily.[3]

Where To?

That there has been much sleight of hand as well as taking things for granted on the part of the new elites in spelling out the direction

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and attendant costs of change is all too plain. When Solidarity activists complain that in 1989–1990 they did not know that they were embracing the Balcerowicz "shock therapy" which destroyed the credibility of one of the great social movements of the twentieth century, we have to ask how this happened. Likewise few could envisage that Klaus' version of market transition would have as one of its outcomes the velvet divorce of Czechs and Slovaks, something neither side sought. Hungary's eager embrace of foreign capital has found the resurgent Left poised for electoral victory. Are these, then, nothing more than the unintended consequences of elite actions uncritically guided by Western orthodoxies? Is this simply the penalty that initiating elites produced by founding elections must pay for not paying attention to their citizenry and for continuing on what appeared to be a divinely ordained path?

There exists a growing uncertainty not just of the goals and the means but also of the conditions extant in the societies undergoing the postcommunist transformation. This in turn is more than just the recognition by a section of society that they have been bounced into something they never really wanted; it is in fact part and parcel of the unraveling uncertainty which was all too easily ignored by the self-evident virtues of parliaments and privatizations.

The fact that questions are now posed at the very semantic roots of whether these are revolutions, transitions, restorations, or some less specified transformations is symptomatic of this uncertainty.

That these were not revolutions has been made all too clear for many citizens by the reemergence of the former Communist Parties in power. What lay behind the elite bargains, the roundtables, the all-too-easy demise of state power remains contested. Those on the Right claim that had they been truly revolutionary rather than conciliatory to the old regime they would not now have to fear for their dissident birthright. Those on the Left claim that though they may be the same people they now have a different, far more honorable purpose.

"Catch-up" rather than "progressive" revolutions, "negotiated" transfers of power rather than overthrown regimes, all of these elements have served to feed the imaginations of those looking for reasons for the failure of their life projects. International Monetary Fund (IMF) servitude, foreign capital manipulation of socialist property prices, *nomenklatura* entrepreneurs' networks which spread through-

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out the former Soviet bloc, and last but not least mafias linked with every major financial activity, these and more serve to explain the course of an *unjust* revolution to those who feel disinherited even from the meager legacy that was state socialism.

For obvious reasons no party has grasped the nettle and explained that the foundation of capitalism does not have as one of its genetic conditions the *just transfer* of material or political resources, however that might be envisaged. It is difficult enough to mobilize society on the promise of greater inequality let alone admit that it will be inherently unjust and will consign one-third of its citizens to social redundancy. How do you explain to workers and peasants that this time around they will not even be given the fig leaf of leading class status with political precedence for their class origins?

Given the egalitarian sensibilities of *homo sovieticus* it is not surprising that this negation of a revolutionary past (what have I got to show for fifty years of communism?) coupled with a recognition of a nonrevolutionary present (what will I have to show in ten years time?) places an impossible fetter on those striving to build capitalism on the remains of redistributive socialism.

Even the resonance in the "transition to democracy" label founders on the realization that commitment to economic well-being is not synonymous with allegiance to the tenets of representative democracy unless the latter is strongly underpinned by national sovereignty. The fate of democratic ethos parties such as Mazowiecki's Democratic Union amply demonstrate that free-floating democratic and cosmopolitan values may appeal to the vestigial intelligentsia but find other constituencies difficult to attract. To the extent that markets mean foreign market penetration and privatization implies foreign ownership, democratization may also imply loss of sovereignty, as in the case of association with the European Union (EU). Furthermore, if democracy were seen as the best guarantee of the individual against state power, then the validity of such a guarantee diminishes when ineffective state power means a breakdown in law and order, which in turn is the commonsense substitute for the much quoted but little understood rule of law. For all that, the commitment to democracy has survived in popular attitudes and values, although elites have shown less ability or willingness to harness this resource.[4]

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There is, however, one major obstacle to elite legitimation which appears insuperable. What we are witnessing in Eastern Europe are major societal transformations imposed from above. Such transformations demand a trust in elites and a depth of legitimacy binding them to society which usually only revolutionary ardor linked to charismatic leadership can deliver. The greater the uncertainty of the transformation process, the greater the trust required. However, the reverse appears to be the case with elites losing face through corruption scandals and personal veniality paradoxically allowing the reemergence of former communist elites against whom the demands of personal probity may not be so highly pitched.

This remains the case as long as these transformations are led by the elite, with the population's eyes ever turned upwards in the paternalist reflex fostered by the hierarchical party-state. But what if the real revolution is happening elsewhere?

Who With?

It follows from the above argument that a consequence of the discrediting of the democratic elites through their own behavior could be the revivification of one of the major tenets of the postcommunist reforms. It was always surprising that the slogans of "society as subject," of local and economic self-government, of empowerment and emancipation, indeed the voice of the factories, farms, and offices should have so easily been shelved and collective fate entrusted to dissident elites who had little preparation for the task at hand. In fact, for all the talk of the transition to democracy, the whole project gave powers to presidents, privatization agencies, and politicians who were at odds even with their own founding ideologies. However, as the electorate becomes increasingly dissatisfied with political parties that gain power regardless of their credentials,[5] these revolutions will be led less by elites and more by locally run reforms. This very process of grass-roots party formation with local activists unashamedly taking the spoils of office may contribute to defining the loci of future decision-making. Regionalism, whether in Moravia, Carpathia, or Silesia and reaching further still into the pores of local government, will be assisted on the one hand by those parties and individuals excluded from central office who seek to carve out a sphere of grass-roots influence and on the other hand by the parties in power who aim to either reward their

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supporters or increase their electoral base. But the transition is now reaching a group of people who at last are beginning to identify a future based on economic fact rather than political vision and as such are able to take action.

This reconstruction of middle-level and local political society, connecting microlevel interests with macrolevel policies, has often been equated with the building of civil society, the realm of autonomous association, public civility, and discursive interaction.[6] To date, however, this civil society was often conflated with the second society, that realm of activity, be it economic, political, or sociocultural, which was independent of the party-state. Opposition to communist incorporation strategies was not easy and involved day-to-day accommodations even from the most ardent dissidents.[7] Civil society was that activity which distanced the individual or group from dependence upon state inclusion and incorporation. Given the politicization of economic life within state socialism, oppositional activity was equally a blend of second economy and second society.

It is in the process of making sense of individual strategies of adaptation during regime transformation that the meaning of civil society takes on a more sociological complexion. The continued existence of a "gray economy" as well as the wide-scale political and economic networks, be they dissident or former communist, do more than indicate the survival of communist forms of dependence, reciprocity, and exchange. They point to a different interpretation of how individuals sought in their everyday lives to mobilize the social, economic, political, and cultural capital accumulated under communism and then endeavored to *convert* these forms of capital within the emerging order.[8]

How did the informal ties and connections, with the attendant semilegal activities, which permeated socialist societies serve their members in the radical restructuring of everyday life after communism?[9]

CIVIL SOCIETY AS SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital is defined as resources which can be mobilized by networks of more or less institutionalized relationships to achieve a goal. It is the relationship, the connection, not the actual resources which are exploited. Under communism little could be achieved,

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even in everyday life, without appropriately placed acquaintances. Investment strategies involved setting up and keeping in good working order through constant sociability the stock of contacts, connections, and commensalism. (It is a truism that the dependence relationships of the second economy were greater levelers under communism than any state-inspired social engineering, with shopkeeper, doctor, professor, and mechanic tied to a chain of mutual provision and interdependence.)

The absence of a cash nexus meant that money could not buy everything. (It is a shock to realize that apparently now it can.) Social capital involving a network of those with cultural, political, organizational, as well as financial assets at their disposal to exchange was a defining feature of social position under state socialism. "Amoral familism," as this was termed, putting one's family, friends, or milieu ahead of other similar units in the fight for scarce resources, may have functioned to counter the atomization of the party-state and provide an element of primitive solidarity. However, the demands of social capital formation required going outside one's own group, and this tempered egoistic individualism with moral obligation.[10] Sociological studies which ranked individuals by official pay scales or managerial or party hierarchy failed to take into account not only the horizontal ties of redistributive inequality but also the sources of cohesion and consensus in these societies. Instead they preferred to scratch around for signs of regime legitimacy.

Civil society was only civilized because this kind of exchange occurred which eased the endemic shortage of food, knowledge, and authority. It is impossible to extricate dissident movements, dissent, and opposition from the alternative networks which sustained them.

An academic who wrote underground newsletters could feed his family by writing a thesis for a party official who needed it for promotion in a hierarchy which was replete with political power but short on social prestige. That same official could give a businessman permission to open a bakery in exchange for foodstuffs. Access to flour and a clean slate with the local sanitation officials would spread the network further. In the process, both the regime and society were corrupted. Without this second society of interlocking state and private social capitals the peaceful transfer of

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power could not have occurred. There could not have been a shared discourse which recognized both the depth of the economic crisis and the collapse of regime legitimacy in the eyes of the dissident and party functionary alike.

TRANSFORMATION AS THE RATIONALIZATION AND CONVERSION OF CAPITAL

Marketization as well as democratization introduced after 1989 gradually began to eliminate the ability, indeed the need, to cultivate such extensive and demanding networks. Political lobbying, pressure groups, the gradual introduction of a civil service and the rule of law became part of the rationalization of social capital. The universalism of the market replaced the particularism of the second society. In fact, the emergence of genuine civil society removes the need for this type of reciprocity.

In a process of conversion akin to the exchange of East German deutsche marks for West German deutsche marks, those who had skills or assets which could be used to form social networks sought to replace them with new assets more applicable to the market and democratic order. This conversion cut through families, destroyed social ties and reciprocities, and was all the more brutal in its transparency. The neighbor who was a mere bookkeeper suddenly became an accountant, the brother-in-law who was a bureaucrat emerged as a property dealer, the derided shop assistant became a part owner of a supermarket. There was no social-spatial distancing to salve the sense of relative deprivation or the inability to adapt certain, once useful talents. Class was being created next door and looked you in the eye every day.

Of course, in the realm of high politics this game was played for much greater stakes, but throughout the redistributive system that was socialism everyone sought to cash in what assets they could. It was not only voucher sales, employee shares, or the more obvious features of privatization that affected the everyday processes of social mobility and restratification. Intellectuals had to write for a new market of readers and publishers; academics had to compete for research funds; and lawyers had to enforce real contracts.

There were those, such as the industrial workers in deficit enterprises or small-scale peasants threatened by foreign imports, who

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found that they had nothing to trade in. Some took early retirement. Others, such as the Solidarity union, showed that they could still use their political capital to vote out the supposed authors of their disadvantage. (The new peasant-backed government in Poland has introduced trade tariffs to protect smallholders who had been disadvantaged in the conversion process. The problem is that it raises food prices.) The attraction of the new social democrats is that they appeal to those with few assets or social capital, the "hedgehogs" rather than the "foxes."

> About two-thirds of Poles have adopted the hedgehog strategy; they have cut down on their use of electricity, hot water, and heating, renounced personal pleasures, repaired old things in lieu of buying new ones, and shopped for bargains. They seek support in the family, eat their savings, do not pay their rent or other bills, have no clear life goals, and live ever more frugally from day to day. The remaining one-third of Polish society, chiefly the young and the educated, apply the diametrically different strategy of the "fox": they look for and find better paying or additional work, they set up their own businesses or invest in shares, they raise or change their qualifications, and set for themselves real life goals.[11]

This is a polarized picture and it is likely that there is a more varied social menagerie with "tortoises" moving slowly into the new social order with all their old assets and "dogs" who are less cunning than foxes but are able to run, bark, and bite.

EVERYTHING FOR SALE?

There are still queues but they are for shares in privatized companies and banks rather than for food. Social queuing in Poland today is exactly the same as it was under communism, serviced by pensioners, nonworking wives with children, and students and lasting for several weeks. Knowledge of what will be for sale and when is passed through the grapevine.

Those on the inside do not need to stand in line. The management of the Silesian Bank, for example, made relative fortunes from their free shares on the first day of dealing. This is as clear a case of the conversion of organizational assets into economic ones as is possible to imagine. Social capital is now often tied to the knowl-

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edge of opportunities to make money from the privatization either of real estate (such as a site for a new McDonald's) or of companies.

This disposal of state and communal assets leads to new forms of solidarity. Tenants purchasing their apartments from the local authority will leave one unsold and pay the rent for this tenant in order to attract continuing local subsidy for the upkeep of the building. In Moscow housing partnerships have been organized in order to press for the ownership of the retail and commercial property within privatized apartment blocks.

This collective privatization demonstrates how the legacy of social capital eases the redistribution process in the founding of new structures of inequality. Transitional societies are seeing the emergence of new networks of obligations, communication, authority, and reciprocity. What the eventual social structural outcome of this *collective* redistribution will be is difficult to predict. A society may be being built on a form of mass "insider trading," and while the infant stock exchanges may still quote only a handful of stocks when dealing a couple of times a week, in fact the whole society is increasingly being viewed as a range of assets. Quoting Wajda's film: "everything is for sale."

In due course the rule of law will embed and sanctify property rights, credentialism and professional lobbies will limit access to lucrative occupations, and the cash nexus will diminish the role of social capital. And yet is it possible that the type of market and democracy which emerges out of this conversion process may have unique attributes? Will these property rights have collective as much as individualistic features?

One of these attributes will surely be that a system will be in place whose secret workings are, if not ab initio common knowledge, then at least not endowed with the opacity of Western financial dealings. The popular interest in the stock exchange in Poland, especially since it posted over 1000 percent growth in the bull markets of 1993, if extended to a whole population of market players in ten years will be interesting to say the least. A generation is now being schooled in the workings of the market while at the same time helping to build its institutions. How hidden will be the hand in this case, and how respected?

Can mass privatization in all its modes, affecting not only enterprises but occupations, have a qualitatively unique effect on these

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societies in terms of mobilization of nonelite politics? Can a growing economic instrumentalism compensate for the evident legitimacy deficit facing postcommunist elites and replace it with a new form of *embourgeoisement*? The privatization ethic and the spirit of capitalism comes to the rescue. It could be argued that just such an operation had to occur before the most important phase in the transformation process could take place.

FROM MORAL AUTHORITY TO MICRORATIONALITY

A major defining feature of the first wave of political elites in the new democracies is that they came to power on the basis of their moral authority, rather than their economic or political resources. Their authority rested to varying degrees upon dissident or oppositional valor synonymous with relative nonincorporation into previous party-state structures. They were not the representatives of any new form of economic power, indeed they were merely the harbingers of just such a class. This form of elite ascendancy goes against the accepted pattern of domination and legitimation.

Factual power in the Weberian sense, where obedience was accorded on the basis of the possession of marketable goods and skills, and the subordination-domination relationship reflected this, assumed goal seeking actors pursuing more or less rational interests.[12] Such interests were by definition absent since goods and services could only be marketed through the mechanism of the second economy or through social capital. Weber continues that the ensuing forms of power and privilege always feel the need to justify themselves through the elaboration of a myth of superiority to those who have lost out. The new elites in Eastern Europe have felt no such need. This process of justification is what constitutes legitimation and generally involves a moral/normative commitment to obey rather than a continuous process of rational balancing of interests. Obedience to the new elites was theirs for the asking, they did not have to elaborate any legitimizing ideology. As social orders come to be stabilized, legitimation is structured in the status order which serves to mitigate the inequalities of class. In modern Western societies such a status order was gradually introduced through the extension of social citizenship rights. These rights ameliorated the inequalities of class and provided the moral glue for stratified

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societies.[13] However, in postcommunist societies the process of legitimation is reversed.[14]

As democratization is accompanied by marketization and the privatization of capital, the political class which had come to power on the basis of its moral negation of the communist order found itself inevitably touched by economic power and privilege. The new political elites found their legitimacy, which was largely value-rational, insufficiently grounded in material interests. At best they represented the so-called "theoretical interests" of society in the creation of markets and democracy.

Because there was no middle class or easily identifiable constituency of support for the transition project, the elites had to assume that they knew what was in the public interest. In this they were given a legitimacy "on account" by society[15] and the collateral was their dissident credentials and the moral probity this signified. This promise of the future coupled with an initial rejection of the communist past was buttressed by a widespread normative commitment to the market and democracy.[16] However, the elites were insufficiently attuned to popular social consciousness and disregarding of election results, polls, and protests, not recognizing how this normative commitment was being challenged by everyday hardship. They also overlooked the "real" interests which were being created either through the attack upon past "privilege" based on state redistribution, i.e., miners, steel workers, and peasants, or the increasing influence of the private sector, which by 1993 in Poland employed over 60 percent of the population.

The extension of civil, political, and social rights, rather than underpinning the new elites, undermined their moral legitimacy. The practice of freedom of speech, movement, conscience, person, assembly, and even association and property ownership all seemed to show the worst aspects of rights without responsibilities and effectively discounted the proffer and defense of social citizenship as a basis for elite legitimacy. The withdrawal of extensive welfare provision or social rights in return for social safety nets simultaneously undercut the impact of political and civil rights.

In due course, unemployment, poverty, and poor social welfare provision began to erode the attachment to the current pattern of market reform, and social democratic third way paths filled the gap between capitalism and socialism. In addition, the macro projects of

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mass privatization, property restitution, and the like were increasingly irrelevant to those making their way through small businesses. Moral authority, dissipated through politicians' personal and parliamentary failings as well as through the travails of creating democracy, could not easily be replaced by any existing formula.

However, "repeat revolutions," characterized by a more aggressive stance towards the former communists, failed and protest was instead channeled through growing electoral support for former communists turned social democrats. They effectively argued that not all of the blame for the current problems could be assigned to the communist rulers and that they too were committed to the market, but one which brought benefits to all.

Over the last five years, the broadly understood processes of privatization and social capital conversion have made politics and elites less important to everyday life. The so-called macrosystemic rules, based on economic programs largely imported and imposed from above, now function alongside new microrationalities[17] driven by grass-roots interests.

When these newly formed interests are aggregated *upward* to parliaments and commissions through the new party structures and local politics and when microeconomies become attached to macrobudgets through the introduction of taxation and regional policies, the transitional elites will have fulfilled their role. They must now accept that society perhaps understands more fully than they the way forward.

ENDNOTES

[1]Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), 71.

[2]Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Dylematy lat osiemdziesiatych w Polsce," in Janusz Mucha, Grazyna Skapska, and Jacek Szmatka, eds., *Spoleczenstwo Polskie u Progu Przemian* (Krakow: Ossolineum, 1991), 216–17.

[3]One in four of those who committed suicide in Poland in 1993 was unemployed and middle aged. See Ewa Nowakowska, "Bez wyjscia," *Polityka,* 19 February 1994, 23.

[4]Miroslawa Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel, *Anatomia elite politycznych* (Warsaw: ISP, 1993).

[5]See Boguslaw Mazur, "Koalicja przeciwienstw," *Wprost,* 20 February 1994, 15–16.

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[6]Christopher G. Bryant, "Civil Society and Pluralism: A Conceptual Analysis," *Sisyphus* VIII (1) (1992).

[7]For an intriguing account of what opposition meant in avoiding regime inclusion see Jacek Kuron, *Spoko! Czyli Kwadratura Kola* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), 17–21.

[8]I take this concept from Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John G. Richardson, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), chap. 9.

[9]Janine R. Wedel, *The Unplanned Society: Poland During and After Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

[10]Elzbieta Tarkowska and Jacek Tarkowski, "Amoralny familizm, czyli o dezintegracji spolecnej w Polsce lat osiemdziesiatych," in Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, *Grupy i Wiezi Spoleczne w Systemie Monocentrycznym* (Warsaw: IFiS, 1990).

[11]Janusz Czapinski, "Szczescie w nieszczesciu," *Wprost,* 26 December 1993.

[12]The general theory is taken from Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., *Max Weber Economy and Society,* vol. 2 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978), 953.

[13]See Rosemary Crompton, *Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Central Debates* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 143–44.

[14]George Kolankiewicz, "The Reconstruction of Citizenship: Reverse Incorporation in Eastern Europe," in Kazimierz Z. Poznanski, ed., *Constructing Capitalism: The Reemergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

[15]For an elaboration of this argument see Ireneusz Bialecki and Bogdan W. Mach, "Orientacje spoleczno-ekonomiczne poslow na tle pogladow spoleczenstwa," in Jacek Wasilewski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, eds., *Poczatki Parlamentarnej Elity* (Warsaw: IFiS PAN, 1992), 144.

[16]George Kolankiewicz, "Poland," in Stephen Whitefield, *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1993), 107.

[17]Andrzej Rychard, *Reforms, Adaptation and Breakthrough* (Warsaw: IFiS, 1993), 216.

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When thinking about transitions to democracy we tend to assume that what is challenged is the nondemocratic regime and that with democracy a new legitimate system is established. However, in many countries the crisis of the nondemocratic regime is also intermixed with profound differences about what should actually constitute the "state." Some political activists simultaneously challenge the old nondemocratic regime and the existing territorial state itself. A "stateness" problem may be said to exist when a significant proportion of the population does not accept the boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience.

The new literature on democratic transitions did not give much thought or attention to this stateness problem, because most of it focused on transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, where the challenge of competing nationalisms within one territorial state was on the whole not a salient issue.

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan

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István Rév

The Postmortem Victory of Communism

I

"THE COLD WAR IS OVER, THE WEST WON. . .The Soviet Union. . .has collapsed. . . ." This is not a factual, retrospective historical statement. These words were spoken by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in 1984 before Gorbachev took office.[1] Moynihan was among those very few scholars, observers, and politicians who predicted the collapse of communism. He is a different species than those historians whom Paul Veyne, the famous French classical scholar, defined as a "prophet in reverse." Although Moynihan envisioned the fall of communism, imagining in 1979 that the Soviet system "could blow up," today he seems to be just a partial prophet.[2] Now, in 1994, it is not certain that the West is the part of the world that won. Without the certainty of the prophet and with the hesitation of the historian, I opt for the opposite conclusion: communism won a postmortem victory.

On December 1, 1989, *Granta* asked a number of writers how they understood the unexpected and incomprehensibly speedy events in Central and Eastern Europe (we have to keep in mind that in 1989 Central Europe was still a meaningful, cultural, and realistically utopian region). Jurek Becker, one of East Germany's best known authors, sadly repeated Moynihan's prediction, this time as a historical statement: "The West won," and continued with his own prediction, "and there's the rub."[3] Almost none of the fifteen authors who responded on Christmas Eve in 1989 was optimistic. Most of them feared the rebirth of nationalism, disintegration, and anarchy, and some buried the postcapitalist utopia with a grain of nostalgia. All of them sensed the arrival of uncertainty after the

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decades of hopeless certainty, but not one of them predicted that uncertainty would spread like an epidemic far beyond the borders of the former communist world and would occupy the hearts of those who, until now, lived with the comfort of having a certain, tangible, identifiable, familiar enemy: the evil empire, the communist world.

II

Until the collapse of communism the world had the luxury of living with two mutually exclusive utopias: communism and capitalism. For some this meant a clearly negative utopia. For the majority in the West, however, existing socialism secured the status of capitalism as a utopia in existence. For others communism remained an unfulfilled dream of mankind: "The most important thing about socialist states isn't any tangible achievements, but the fact that they give us a chance," wrote Jurek Becker pathetically.[4] For those who lived under the negative certainty and the boredom of communism, capitalism was the longed for but unreachable utopian world.[5]

For the overwhelming majority of Easterners, the cracks in the Berlin Wall were a window into the Western utopia. The world on the more fortunate side of the Wall was real, but the hope for it was not realistic. Except for a very few, nobody in the East dared hope that the Western utopia would find its way to them. The only solution was to cross the Wall somehow and leave the East behind, to go after the utopia, not to wait in vain for it.

For the majority of Westerners, the Wall was a mirror in which they were able to see just how fortunate they were to live in a world that others considered to be completely utopian.

Following the demise of the socialist states it became clear that historical teleology, linear historical movement, the basis of utopian thinking, was an illusion. For the leading Eastern and Central European dissidents it was unimaginable even in the 1970s and 1980s that after socialism Western type democratic parliamentary systems might "return" to the socialist world. Because of their Marxist education, most of them firmly believed in "historical development," that the future would bring something essentially different from the past. After socialism, not capitalism but a different postpolitical system must come. This is one of the factors that

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prevented the Eastern and Central European opposition from foreseeing what happened in and after 1989. The majority of Eastern European intellectuals wanted to give a moral, postdemocratic, antipolitical answer to the crisis of communism that would point beyond existing capitalism.

Václav Havel, in his famous and naive essay entitled "The Power of the Powerless," wrote:

> It would appear that traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the automatism of technological civilization and the industrial-consumer society. . . .In a democracy, human beings may enjoy many personal freedoms and securities that are unknown to us, but in the end they do them no good, for they too are ultimately victims of the same automatism. . . .But to cling to the notion of traditional parliamentary democracy as one's political ideal and to succumb to the illusion that this "tried and true" form is capable of guaranteeing human beings enduring dignity and an independent role in society would, in my opinion, be at the very least short-sighted. . . .I see a renewed focus of politics on real people as something far more profound than merely returning to the everyday mechanism of Western (or if you like bourgeois) democracy. . . .In other words, are not these informal, non-bureaucratic, dynamic and open communities that comprise the "parallel *polis*" a kind of rudimentary pre-figuration, a symbolic model of those more meaningful "post-democratic" political structures that might become the foundation of a better society?[6]

Postsocialist intellectuals had to learn that history can move "backward," that there can be transitions from socialism to capitalism.

Viewed from nearby, the market economy has lost its utopian character and become tough reality. It is not something that one can long for anymore, but something that is given, that is part of everyday life. The superiority of the market mechanism, which was an ultima ratio against the practice of the Planning Office, has never been taken seriously by the reform economists in Central and Eastern Europe. Rather it was used mostly metaphorically in order to persuade the Party leadership that changes were unavoidable. The reformer in the Eastern and Central European context is not an architect who has a clear positive vision of the future that he is building bit by bit, but a cautious subversive who slowly transforms the concrete surface beneath socialism into mud. The reformer loses

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enthusiasm when the market arrives and the task of the times is building something from imported materials.

For long decades the economic reformers of the communist world were experimenting, mixing planning with the market, one party rule with (limited) democratic practices. Nobody could hope to persuade the Party leadership of giving up one of the most essential elements of the system: the planning mechanism. The only way the economic reformers could smuggle a few elements of the market system into the rigid world of central planning was by promising to make the planning mechanism more effective. In the process of persuading the Party leadership, the reformers could not avoid persuading themselves as well. After a while, the majority of the economic reformers firmly believed that there was such a phenomenon as "market socialism" which combined positive elements of both the planning mechanism and the market system.

"Market socialism" formed the basis of "democratic socialism," the favorite ideological toy of the anti-Stalinist Left in the West and in the East. This nonpopulist, peculiar "third way" ideology was not only a strange method of self-deception in the 1950s and 1960s, but it seemed to offer a viable reform alternative. During the 1956 revolution in Hungary, for example, none of the major political forces aimed to restore the pre-World War II economic and political structure. There was agreement across the whole political spectrum—and this was not only a rhetorical device used to keep the Soviets quiet—that the nationalized large industrial plants had to remain collective property, more or less similar to the structure of the Yugoslav self-management model.[7] It would be ahistorical to forget that this was the time when state property played an important role in the economies of Austria, Italy, France, and Great Britain, and when the institutions of the welfare state were taking shape in the West. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and before the crisis of the welfare state in the 1970s, one could hope to mix the elements of the two antagonistic systems. Only after the defeat of the Prague Spring did it become absolutely undeniable that socialism could not be reformed from the inside, that utopia could not be born by mixing certain elements of the market and state planning.

In the recent past, people in communist Europe were in the position to point to the abundance of the Western markets when

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confronted with the shortages of the Eastern economy. The difference between the East and the West helped to delegitimize the communist ideology, socialist practices, and the ruling elites. When the Hungarian government pointed to the poverty of Romania and the lack of basic foodstuffs in Poland and the Soviet Union in order to persuade the populace that life in Hungary was still better than in the less developed or less "liberal" socialist countries, the Hungarian people pointed to Austria as an example of a nearby utopia. The market has arrived, and with it the utopia has gone.

III

For the West, until the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the border of Europe was a clear line: Europe ended where it always had, at the River Elbe. This was the historical borderline in the Middle Ages, in early modern times, and after the agreement which was allegedly reached in Yalta after World War II. The West Europeans knew where they lived, how far the familiar world stretched, and where the strange, the barbarous, the East started. The Westerners lived in a world that was envied by and unreachable for the Easterners.

After the Berlin Wall fell it was discovered that the Eastern soldiers who patrolled the Branderburger Tor guarded the identity of the West as much as they guarded the rule of the communist regimes. The strange, desperate, underdeveloped East proved to be an essential precondition of Western European common identity, of the sense of Western interdependence, cooperation, Maastricht, the European Monetary System (EMS), Franco-German solidarity, the Eureka Program, the Tempus Program, the Erasmus Program, the Channel Tunnel, and Robert Maxwell's last failed venture, *The European*. Westerners were made to realize that for the West to exist, the other, the clearly different, the East was needed. Or, as Joseph Brodsky argued in a recently published open letter to President Havel, "...neither the Communists nor the post-Communist nightmare amounts to an inconvenience, since it helped, helps and will for quite some time help the democratic world to externalize evil."[8]

The tragedy in Bosnia was a revelation for the West: it was made to understand that it was as unprepared for the political changes of

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1989 as were the countries of the East. In the face of the Eastern and Central European crisis, which is not hidden behind well-guarded walls and curtains, NATO turned out to be incompetent, impotent, and completely paralyzed. In the mirror of the Eastern horror, the West discovered that the era of comfortable certainty was over, that it could no longer count on the East German border guards, paid by Erich Honecker, to patrol the peace of the West. The River Elbe, that firm, serious, and symbolic line dividing Eastern feudalism and Western bourgeois development, communism and pluralist democracies, became a common German river that flows slowly through the territory of the European Community (EC).

As long as the Berlin Wall stood, it seemed that the division of the continent was the consequence of a historical rape: the nations of Eastern Europe, because of a combination of fate and political sins, fell under the rule of an aggressive empire. The people of the East hoped, while the people of the West entertained the idea that they would help if there were no justifiable fear of a military reaction from the Soviet Union. It was part of the democratic identity of the West that the "free world" had a moral obligation to the East. The West stood in opposition to the cruel, antidemocratic practices of the communist rulers; it denounced the hermetic closing of borders and considered the Iron Curtain symbolic of the fear of the "other." The democratic citizen of the West saw himself as an open, tolerant humanist, the defender of difference and human rights, the champion of liberty, and the potential liberator of the nations under communist rule.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West, for the first time since the end of World War II, had a real chance to help. But it came at an unfortunate hour. It would obviously be very costly to help, especially because of the recession in the West. The oppressed Easterners longed for the comforts the Westerners were fortunate enough to enjoy, and quite a few of them would have been willing to give up the privilege of being the exotic species whose task it was to build democratic institutions on top of the grave of communism. Mass immigration became a real threat for the West and apocalyptic estimates of a mass exodus from the former Soviet Union started to fill the pages of the Western newspapers. One did not have to wait long for the response: the tightening of immigration laws became the agenda of the day.

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Feudalism, absolutism, autocracy, fascism, and communism were all enemies against which democracy could define itself. If the people from the former communist countries were to be admitted to the EC and NATO, there would no longer be an "other." But it is precisely their historical difference that will enable the Eastern Europeans to give real help and provide important service to the Western democracies. The separation of Europe is more important than ever.

There are practical considerations behind the insistence on isolation. After World War II, the West could live and develop in peace. There were disturbances in the Eastern part of the continent (i.e., the workers' uprising in Berlin in 1953, unrest in Poznan, Poland and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, etc.) but NATO guarded well the peace of the West, thanks to the effective isolation of Eastern Europe. NATO was invented in and for a divided world and functioned effectively in this environment. As long as the Eastern nations could be kept out of the Atlantic Alliance, there was no serious reason to experiment with new, untried methods of peacekeeping. The Cold War proved that security is attainable through isolation.

The West is not only lacking a proper *Ostpolitik,* it is badly in need of a new, relevant, post-Cold War *Westpolitik* as well. Germany is trying to find or rediscover its role in Europe; France is unable to figure out the possible consequences of German unification; some members of the EC are suspicious; others are frightened; and Britain is divided, to say the least. If communism could look around from beneath its own ruin it would surely be satisfied; it achieved at long last the undermining of Western confidence that it had struggled for.

IV

Before 1989, Central Europe was a genuinely existing region, even if it only existed as an idea in the minds of some leading dissidents, mostly writers like Milan Kundera, Adam Michnik, George Konrád, and Václav Havel. The idea of Central Europe was a cultural, hence political, weapon against the efforts of the communist system that tried to make the countries of Central Europe—at least in the official "high culture" of politics and economy—part of the East. Historians like Jenõ Szûcs, in his essay, "The Three Historical

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Regions of Europe," made efforts to find historical justification and legitimization for the utopian idea of Central Europe.[9] The rediscovery of Wittgenstein's Vienna, Kaffka's Prague, Musil, Freud, Bartók, Karl Kraus, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, did not simply feed a self-serving nostalgia. The Viennese operetta may be the music of yesterday but it fuels the present and gives hope for the future: it suggests that the center of Europe has always been distinctively different from the East, that in spite of long decades of repression, indoctrination, and political manipulation it has succeeded in guarding its regional characteristics.

Central Europe may have existed only in the mind, on imaginary maps and in samizdat writings, but it was a real threat to those parties that had the ambition to unify and homogenize the peoples of the socialist world. The idea of Central Europe was a metaphor for resistance, a symbol of belonging to Europe, to the West, instead of being part of the East. The idea of Central Europe symbolized solidarity among the members of Solidarity, Charta 77, the Hungarian democratic opposition, and among dissidents and those other civilians who did not (want to) forget the traditional values of the *citoyen*.

Central Europe, the Atlantis of the mind, was the home of those who did not feel at home in the socialist world, and for them it became the last great adventure of life. Around 1989, Central Europe became a political program. Dissidents turned politicians, like Havel, who tried to introduce "the politics of practical morality,"[10] hoped that Central Europe could be an antidote to the growing nationalism of the region and that regional solidarity would prove to be stronger than national hatred and rivalry. Havel and all those who identified themselves as Central European, who when asked for their address always replied, "Central Europe," had to realize that Central Europe was only a brave vision for the few and was the embodiment of just another utopia for the rest of the world.

After the political changes in 1989 there was no longer any need to distinguish Central Europe from the East. The task became to distinguish between countries: to prove that Hungary was more civilized than Poland and therefore worthy of an earlier admission to the Council of Europe; that Czechoslovakia was a safer country for Western working capital than Hungary; that economic recovery was quicker in Poland than in the Czech lands and therefore Poland

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was entitled to more economic preferences than the Czech Republic; that Slovakia was nearer to the almost Western (at least on the map) Austria than was Hungary; that one is always better than the other and hence is a better partner for NATO than its neighbor. The Central European countries act as if joining the EC were a zero-sum game: one can get nearer to the West only at the expense of the others. This game, encouraged by the West, breeds dangerous nationalistic sentiments and ethnic hostility, discourages regional cooperation and solidarity, and makes it easier for the uneasy West to keep the so-called Central European countries out of the EC, as individual efforts are always less efficient than joint pressure.

For the Hungarian nationalists Central Europe means the possibility of reestablishing Hungarian hegemony in the Carpathian Basin. With the dissolution of the components of the federal states (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union), the deconstruction of the post-Versailles map has begun. The ambitious Hungarian politicians recognized that the moment had arrived for resurrecting St. Stephen's empire in the center of Europe. The so-called "Visegrád Agreement" between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary offered the chance for Hungary to play a key political role in the middle of a destabilized environment. For the newly created Slovakia, Central Europe and the Visegrád Agreement are a means of breaking out of isolation to become a member of a region, a respected real state that belongs somewhere. For the Poles, Central Europe offers a counterbalance to Germany and Russia. Central Europe has a different meaning for all the participants, but it does not exist nor can it be created. The Czechs were the first to realize the negative political effects of the Central European dreams, and they decided to follow a different path. They discovered how to turn necessity into virtue, how to take advantage of losing their middle-state status.

After the cessation of Slovakia, Václav Klaus, the Czech prime minister, remarked that an optical illusion had disappeared from the map. Now there is a "buffer state" between the Czech Republic and the Central and Eastern parts of Europe, making the Czech lands clearly part of the West. After the Slovak independence, the Czech Republic became a West European country. The Czechs understood that they had to isolate themselves from the center of

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the continent, the danger zone of Europe. In their political reading, Central Europe is a no-man's-land between the West and the East.

Not everybody can escape from this troubled part of the world. The Slovenians succeeded in the last moment: they are now nearer to Austria and Italy than to the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Slowly all the countries of the mythical Central Europe will understand that there is no other way but to try to slip into the periphery of the EC one by one. However, such moves can only be made at the expense of others. The Soviet Union, which had the ambition to individualize the nations of Central Europe and use the old technique of *divide et impera,* if it were still alive, would surely be pleased. History sadly prevented the Soviet Union from being the contemporary of its own victory.

V

The collapse of communism came as a shock to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Nobody was prepared, nobody had a ready technique for dealing with the unexpected. Faced with the unbearably easy ruining of a system that seemed to be so strong, the people had to find an answer to their own history. In Central Europe, with the exception of Poland's unique situation in the 1980s, more than 10 percent of the population on the eve of the collapse belonged to the Communist Parties. The majority had to ask themselves why they remained silent, became active or passive supporters, collaborators of a regime that eventually was so weak. In the face of the defeat of the communists, the overwhelming majority naturally wanted to prove that they had always been anticommunist, that they had never believed in the system, and that they had always resisted the rule of the communist elite.

After the fall of communism the fate of the Soviet Union became similar to that of postwar Germany. After World War II the single German state rapidly disintegrated until there were no real German citizens anymore. The nonexisting single Germany and the nonexisting German citizens could be held responsible for all the crimes of fascism. There is no Soviet Union anymore, there are no more Soviet citizens, and, once again, a nonexistent people can be held responsible for the past, for the decades of communism. If communism was the sin of the "others," the outsiders, then the natives are

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clean and innocent. A true-born Austrian, Frenchman, Norwegian, or Dutchman could not be a fascist; similarly, a true-born Hungarian, Slovak, or Serb could not be a communist. Birth decides one's place in history. If communism was the deed of the outsiders, then the decades of communism could not be part of national history. Those times can be put into brackets, erased from the pages of national history.

The consequence and natural corollary of postcommunist nationalism is a new wave of historical revisionism. Not only the history of the recent past is rewritten, but the history of the precommunist period as well. According to the new official Hungarian historical interpretation, Hungary and the allies of Hitler resisted Bolshevism *in advance* in the trenches during World War II. At the River Don the Hungarian army tried to save the blind West, which was incapable of recognizing its own historical interest. The West fought on the side of the Bolsheviks, while Hungary, the "last bastion of the West," tried to save it. Hungary acted faithfully to its historical traditions: the country has always been the savior of the West, even during the times of the Mongolian and the Ottoman invasions. The blind West, however, did not honor the martyrdom and sold Hungary and Central Europe out to the Soviets in Yalta. These historical revisions, emphasizing Hungary's wartime sacrifices, are aimed at justifying the nation's silence during the decades of communist rule.

The need to rediscover an anticommunist past is not the only explanation for the postcommunist nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, but it does play a major role. This nationalism has nothing to do with remembering, with rediscovering those elements of national history that the communists tried to erase. The fictive continuity of historical consciousness is offered as compensation for the period of communism. The new nationalism is a tool, a national and private technique for forgetting the recent past.

Perhaps with the (re) creation of the new (and old) states World War I has finally ended; perhaps the unification of Germany has made World War II truly part of the past; and perhaps communism is really dead. On the debris grow unfulfilled and yet unrealized hopes and dreams. Perhaps the idea of Europe still has meaning for a few groups on the continent, but this idea has no reality. There is no hope for an economically, politically, or culturally united Eu-

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rope. Europe is lost. Europe has lost. Communism has claimed a postmortem victory.

ENDNOTES

[1]Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Soviet Union is a 'Failed Society' in Need of Clear Policy from the U.S.," *Buffalo News,* 15 October 1984.

[2]Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Will Russia Blow Up?," *Newsweek,* 19 November 1979, 144.

[3]Jurek Becker, "The State of Europe," *Granta* 30 (Winter 1990): 133.

[4]Ibid.

[5]This might be called the "boredom factor." Stephen Spender, "The State of Europe," *Granta* 30 (Winter 1990): 169.

[6]Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Václav Havel et al., *The Power of the Powerless,* ed. John Keane (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 91–92, 95.

[7]See Miklós Szabó, "Demokratikus szocializmus vagy restauráció?," in György Litvan, ed., *1956 Yearbook* (Budapest: 1956 Institute, 1992), 93–96.

[8]"The Post-Communist Nightmare: An Exchange," *The New York Review of Books,* 17 February 1994, 28.

[9]John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London: Verso, 1988).

[10]Irena Grudzinska Gross uses this term in "The Hated Dissidents," *BUKSZ* (The Budapest Review of Books) (Summer 1993): 207.

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Andrei Marga

The Culture of Scholarship in Europe Today

THE PRODUCTION AND THE TRANSMISSION OF knowledge are essential activities in all modern societies. Any reflection on Europe today would be incomplete if its unique culture of scholarship did not figure, if the process of building professional and specialized competence, as advanced by university curricula and organization, did not reflect the very substantial differences that exist today between the several nation-states. This diversification, particularly apparent during the post-World War II decades, was partly the result of the ideological divisions that existed until 1989. They persist even now when those divisions are less paramount.

By the end of the 1960s, criticism of the traditional organization of West European universities was common. The call went out for "less rigidity," "greater openness," "freedom from authority," "participatory democracy," "autonomy within the system," and "interdisciplinarity." Many universities responded at least partially to these demands. Today, the reforms only serve to generate fresh discontent. Utilitarian criteria and egalitarian ideals have not preserved intellectual solitude. The quest for well-paying jobs has been inimical to a system that once had other values, that emphasized creativity and responsibility.

The end of "eastern socialism," the possibility of moving away from the methods of the communist dictatorships, has raised a fundamental issue: what are Central and Eastern Europe being invited to imitate in their universities?

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THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DECLINE OF THE HUMBOLDTIAN MODEL

Wilhelm von Humboldt developed the concept of the university that became the foundation for the German model. It was to remain a landmark in the evolution of universities, expressing Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment experience and sentiment: science is the result of disinterested research; culture is a harmonious combination of specialized and philosophical training; and the goal of the university is to create citizens capable of serving their nation and, at the same time, humanity as a whole.[1]

Set forth in texts concerning the founding of the Berlin University, the Humboldtian model can be reduced to the following principles: *1)* the unity of *Forschung* and *Lehre* as the basis of the university;[2] *2)* the liberty of research and education and the autonomy of the university;[3] *3)* the unity between the student's training in his speciality and in the general culture (Humboldt considered them united, nevertheless they were not to be confused[4]); *4)* the formative character of science;[5] and *5)* the organization of the university as a corporative community of professors and students.[6] These principles, embodied in the universities of Europe, were eroded by history.[7]

Altered or even contradicted by reality, the Humboldtian model of the university and of academic culture has confronted very different kinds of problems in various European university settings. Although it has not ceased to represent the ideal of the university in accord with the idea of reason, it has not been unchallenged or undefended.

Karl Jaspers, for example, argued in favor of the renaissance of the organizing principle of the university (of a *gemeinsamen Geist der Universität*) in the postwar period, hoping to avoid the dispersion of the university under the pressure of functionalist criteria.[8] Others, like Helmut Schelsky, claimed that the universities needed a new *normative Leitbild,* which could only be found in the Humboldtian model.[9] Still others, like Niklas Luhmann, were skeptical, taking into account the massive differentiation that had taken place. For him, the Humboldtian model was obsolete.[10] A fourth position, taken by Jürgen Habermas, *reconstructs* the Humboldtian idea as a new form of unity of knowledge. For Habermas, the university exists to unite research and teaching, specialization and

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training in the spirit of a general culture set against the background of the unity of the sciences.[11] This is the framework in which the university can regain its unity while defending reason, with which its very existence is connected. Along the same lines, Dieter Henrich pleads for the idea that the European universities should learn from the experience of the American universities, which joined the English collegiate tradition with the Humboldtian one in creating a "Graduate School of Arts and Sciences." The latter offers students the advantage of choosing *Studienschwerpunkte* and of working with outstanding professors.[12]

In the 1960s, the West European university models, and the Humboldtian model in particular, confronted with the expansion of knowledge, the development of new empirical techniques, and the breaking down of the "frontiers" between the sciences and other disciplines, made new provisions for postgraduate study, postdoctoral research, and lifelong in-service "refreshers."[13] These pressures continued in the 1980s and are paramount today. The increased number of students, the transformation of the great majority of Europe's universities into "mass universities," and the expansion of research institutes created new problems[14] which the well-known "conservatism" of the European university, based on the defense of the "eternal cultural values," has yet to meet.[15]

THE EASTERN TRANSITION

Immediately after World War II, when in Eastern Europe a society inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas first took shape, Karl Jaspers pointed out the incompatibility between the university as an objective defender of liberty and reason and Marxist ideology. Ernst Bloch, the newly-appointed Rector at the University of Leipzig, rejected that idea, arguing that the liberty of research would be guaranteed by Marxism.[16] Bloch was mistaken. Academic culture in "eastern socialism" bore the telltale print of a closed society. No longer autonomous, the universities of the communist states legitimized the power of the single party, the opinions of its leaders. The totalitarian state centralized all decisions in university matters, whether in respect to curriculum, professorial appointments, or student selection.

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The curriculum of each faculty would include the disciplines of Marxism-Leninism (dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism), conceived as the background for the unity of education, a guarantor of ideological correctness. The ideological courses were compulsory; students had no choice but to take them. The more empirical disciplines were also programmatically reduced or distorted by the use of ideological criteria. Teaching and research were separated. As a result, teaching was cut off from the new information that might have come from research. The regime's policy was never allowed to be an object of research. Taboo topics pervaded the social sciences, but also certain of the natural sciences, biology, for example. Ideological criteria played a decisive role in the appointment of teachers. The university was made to serve the interests of the contemporary Marxist culture. Graduates trained under "eastern socialism" could not compete in an open European market, but many who had solid professional interests and had studied in the West were in a position to remedy the situation, to some extent at least.

The academic culture of "eastern socialism" underwent changes in two directions. First, in some of the countries in the region there was a subtle shift from the "universal laws of dialectics" to a concern with the "destiny of the nation." As a result, history took its place at the center of the academic culture. Communism was strangely commingled with nationalism. History—national history, reinterpreted by the political leaders—became the unifying discipline of the academic culture. Second, in the course of time, the ideological hold was loosened under the pressure of concrete needs and Western competition. The recognition of the importance of factual, pragmatic, and purely technical approaches, but also of international interactions, had their effect. Especially after 1956, the political control became less rigid in many places, allowing for more objective analysis, more freedom of choice. However, such "liberties" did not extend as far as the questioning of Marxism-Leninism and "eastern socialism" in a very explicit way. Censorship prohibited the publication of certain research results; only those themes supporting the regime were subsidized; teaching and research were compelled to obey the instructions of the acting political powers. The result was a very fragmentary perspective of contemporary reality.

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"Real socialism," which claimed to be derived from Marxism, lost its grip on academic culture; there was a splitting up of intellectual life into an official "performance" and a private existence. The isolation of Marxism, together with the progressive loss of the spiritual aspect and, subsequently, political life, prevented the Marxists from foreseeing the collapse of the system. The non-Marxists, because of the pressures they lived under, never had the necessary resources to produce a clear diagnosis of the crisis.

A NEW DIRECTION

The overturn of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 opened the way for these countries to join the academic culture of Western Europe. This new development took place in the name of an idea that was not new: "the fundamental discovery of modernity; the open society."[17]

Since 1989, the autonomy of the university was proclaimed and state control over academic culture was considerably reduced. Curricula were liberated from ideology. The list of compulsory disciplines was significantly shortened; that of optional subjects was accordingly lengthened. The possibility of multidisciplinary training became a reality. Empirical disciplines started up again; their data no longer tampered with. Scientific research has been reintegrated into the universities. There are no longer thorny topics that may not be treated; politics has become an object of research. Teaching positions are once again competitive, awarded on the basis of professional competence. Education is orienting itself towards developing the students' capacity to solve problems. The specific difference of Eastern Europe, with its ideologized academicism, has disappeared.

The mechanisms which caused the university to turn in this new direction included the recognition of its autonomy and the need to be cleansed of its ideological orthodoxy. Also, very importantly, new recognition was given to professionalism. The old administrations of the universities have stepped down; new ones have started to recuperate the traditions of free thinking, reestablishing connections with the Western academic world. Generally speaking, the new leadership of the universities has come from those who, under

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the old regime, made themselves known through their professionalism; many had studied in Western universities.

What has happened to those who made up the old administrations, the teaching staffs of the old regime, the specialists created under "real socialism"? They fall into four groups: *1)* those with a noncompetitive professional background who constantly escaped serious evaluation of their competence through their excessive communist activism; *2)* those with a relatively competitive professional competence who actively supported the communist regime; *3)* specialists with competitive professional competence who refused to cooperate with the regime; and *4)* those with modest qualifications who had not collaborated with the regime, had not been asked to. In the universities, at least, the first group has largely left the scene, retiring under the pressure of the students' movements. The second group has remained active, despite the morally-grounded pressure from students. Claiming the political liberties proclaimed by the new regime and the political neutrality of the university, they have kept their jobs, taking advantage of the acute lack of specialists. The third group succeeded, in the first years of the transition, to give direction to the new administration of the universities, but, being small in number, they have had to find allies, curtailing their initial intransigence to those who had collaborated. The fourth group actively supported change, but, as time does not favor them, they increasingly encourage populist options.

Students realized in the first months after 1989 that there was an opportunity for them to fulfill their long suppressed professional aspirations, to get in touch with Western culture. Aware of their genuine interests in a competitive professional formation, they exercised a positive influence to cleanse the university of its ideology, to strengthen its professionalism. Their support has been invaluable in the changes that have taken place since 1989. The disappearance of the paternalistic state, which had given jobs, even if sometimes very modest ones, and the sudden increase in the number of students, even though the number of grants is insufficient, not to speak of the shortcomings of the university and the higher cost of living, have all effected a change in student behavior. Their concept of society is still taking shape; it is difficult to know what their influence will be in the future.

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Has the scientific force of the university increased in this transition phase? To some extent, yes. The scientific and, hence, the nonideological character of education and research is now again the rule. There is a greater diversification of disciplines, inspired by the Western universities, with free selection of subjects. Renewed contact with the important centers of the production of science in the West and the adjustment of the curricula according to the present state of the disciplines are, of course, important. Still, the steps taken to date have been mainly in teaching; research has been too little affected so far by the transition.

It is in the social sciences, strongly supported by programs in the West, that the most considerable mutations have occurred.[18] The diversification of disciplines, the introduction of new or previously prohibited subjects, and the resumption of contacts with Western centers of research have created larger possibilities of specialization for the young. Empirical research in the social sciences has been resumed. For the time being, the interest is largely in narrow specializations; the interest in general theory is minimal. Liberalism has great appeal for students, but the ability to understand the complexities and varieties of liberalism are limited. Liberalism seems to allow many forms of behavior, including some that contradict its fundamental principles. Against this background, devised by some of the forces that supported the communist regime, nationalism has come to the fore. It is a serious danger to the development of the social sciences and of cultural life in the countries of Eastern Europe in general.

Important changes, however, have occurred, modifying the system of the social sciences. The removal of the ideological disciplines and the introduction of new disciplines dealing with new methods of research in fields like marketing, management, ergonomics, and international relations have been crucial. While in many cases new names have simply been applied to old contents, largely because of a serious scarcity of specialists, the real difference occurred when political science, law, and sociology took the prime position which history had once held. Reflection has turned to issues of social dynamics, institutional construction, civil rights, integration of minorities, and the political system, with new attention given to the potential sources of conflict. The pro-Western direction in the social sciences has gained remarkable ground, with the overwhelming

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majority of specialists considering the West to be the prime source of experience, of reliable theoretical approach, providing methodologies and solutions worthy of study. Regional cooperation, conceived as a closed world and discredited under "real socialism," is still a neglected subject. Because of the need to reconstruct the fundamental political institutions—the constitution and the political parties, among others—the social sciences are too little preoccupied with theoretical generalization. The urgent topics of the day are all themes in the social sciences: the privatization of the economy, civil rights, market behavior. The new dangers in Eastern Europe—nationalism, populism, insufficient information, the recrudescence of communism—are only very gradually entering the sphere of interest of the social sciences.

The market economy has produced rapid changes within Eastern universities, inducing adjustments in three directions so far: the creation of business schools and schools for management; the diversification of degrees; and the increase in the role of those disciplines that have a direct impact on the economy and its administration. This has led to a diversification of university organization and curricula, with much more attention given to the local needs of the economy. This has brought about a deterioration in the level of research. The diversification of the financial resources of universities, a consequence of the passage towards privatization, has not generated allocations sufficient to the real needs of the universities. Sponsorship has become vital to their functioning. In many cases, the sponsors are members of the old *nomenklatura* who have seized the financial reins. Universities, in desperate need of subsidies, are in danger of accepting compromising financial offers. The promotion of criteria associated with the market economy in the structuring of universities has led to the elimination of nonqualified staff, but also of whole research departments dedicated to fundamental research, particularly in the humanities.

The market spirit, though widely accepted, has sometimes produced questionable results. In Hungary and the Czech Republic, for example, university reform required the consolidation of existing universities, with minimal extensions, but in other countries, like Romania, a great number of private universities have been established. Given the profound internal economic crisis and the absence of educated specialists, this solution has served principally to lower

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the quality of education. In many East European countries, the attempts to introduce tuition fees have been resisted. Given the difficult economic situation of many families, such policies only run the risk of feeding nostalgia for the past. While the "marketization" of the East European universities may be the only way to strengthen them, to make them competitive, the policy carries dangers and must be well conceived.

The university system under "eastern socialism" gave absolute priority to technical education, starting from the ideologically motivated premise that social and humanistic issues had been solved, that all depended on technical and economic development alone. For tactical reasons, "eastern socialism" divided universities into as many separate institutions as possible, resulting in isolation, for example, of medicine from psychology, economics from engineering. The first problem has become smaller, with a radical increase in the number of students attending the classical university. The second problem remains unresolved. Isolation has not been overcome.

If the humanities have registered gains, with foreign languages being widely taught and courses in the history of philosophy, logic, and art being attended by large numbers of students, there is also an increase in student interest in the social sciences. The need for philosophical criteria among students is obvious; the appeal is usually to neoromantic philosophies (Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the like). Neither the philosophical nor the religious debates develop well articulated and attractive answers to today's life problems.

In 1989, most of the specialists in Eastern Europe recognized the incapacity of "real socialism" to face the dynamics of knowledge. This was certainly one of the factors explaining their large participation in the movement that worked to change the communist regime. It has recently been said that Eastern Europe cherishes the idea of a "radiant future" summed up by the magic words free market, democracy, Europe, but that "the sense of this mutation begins to appear totally problematic."[19] Increasingly, the future is not so much perceived as being radiant, but as being filled with difficulties.

Under the circumstances, it is hard to face the populace that threatens at every point, demanding social rewards despite obviously poor professional accomplishment. The passage to mass universities

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increases the demand for teachers, which may cause the criteria for accepting new teachers to be relaxed. The absence of real competition can make solid professional qualifications almost superfluous. Perhaps only with the change of generations will it be possible to establish an educational system based on real innovation. Scientific research has not yet been structurally changed; it is largely frozen. Its reconstruction requires funds, of course, but also qualified personnel. Interdisciplinarity is a slogan; the taking over of the problems of real life is much behind what it should be. Universities do not seriously embark upon producing their own analyses of the societies and regions to which they belong. These are left largely to specialists from Western countries. The crisis in the vision of the world and society is very perceptible. Nationalism shows up against this background. It produces solutions which turn some of its authors into "national figures" whose theses cannot be questioned; they are sacrosanct, immune to criticism. They threaten the East European culture of scholarship.

THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION

The demise of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Germany created the possibility of an acceleration of the process of European unification. In the academic world, a consciousness of the historical and cultural unity of the countries which had once made up the Old World has taken shape again in the European Community, now the European Union, whether or not certain of the former communist states are admitted to that company. The aspiration towards European unification under circumstances which allow for cultural diversification is felt to be a crucial task of history.[20] This task has become the concern of universities; it is perceived as intimately related to the new culture of scholarship.

Today, this cooperation is a fact, with a network of partnership relations developing between universities, integrating more and more aspects of their academic culture. Its aims are many: ". . .to reconcile national and supranational regulations and the necessary development of local and regional initiatives, overcome administrative slowness and blockages thanks to information and communication networks, respect the best of our national traditions while assuming our new European citizenship."[21] The immediate purpose is to

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identify a European level of teaching and research, to promote it by way of partnership and, implicitly, to establish a "European dimension" for instruction and education.

The European dimension has already secured a basis in the curricula and in the academic culture of all the European countries. The mobility of students that has resulted from the compatibility of programs of study is its first concrete expression. The limitations imposed by the frame of national states in solving problems connected with the development of today's science and society required a remedy; it has been provided. "The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of a supranational dimension to policy-making of which the European Community is the world's leading example."[22] The aim is a "Europeanization of professions"[23] and the creation of a European dimension of research understood as a combination of scientific relevance and the mobilization of the best human potential.

The creation of the European dimension requires a model. The *melting pot* alternative, though efficient in certain situations, cannot be applied to Europe because of cultural diversity. This demands a solution based on mutual recognition by all partners. In spite of their being different, they are united in their common wish to join efforts to create a "new Europe." The West European universities have chosen the *network* alternative, consisting of the establishment of voluntary contacts between participating universities.[24] Against this background the concern to adjust the curricula in the universities of different countries in order to produce genuine "European" specialists becomes more and more widespread.

The process is not without its difficulties. To build a European community with democratic structures calls for the individual countries to have a civic formation capable of transcending their individual national backgrounds. It also assumes the development of a constructive attitude towards the non-European areas of the world, a positive attitude towards the mobility of individuals coming from other national cultures.[25] These difficulties are not negligible in the East or in the West.

CONCLUSION

Kant connected the university with reason, giving a high value to academic liberty and autonomy. Heidegger connected it to the

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national purpose, rejecting academic liberty as superfluous.[26] After the experience of Nazism and communism, it is clear what disastrous results can be brought about by giving up university autonomy. Today, when East European universities join the West European ones and take them as an example, it is imperative that the autonomy of the university be recognized as a matter of political pluralism. In order to defend their autonomy, universities must defend pluralism; autonomy is incompatible with political abstinence.

Before 1989, the East European universities were instruments of the state; today, they are required to adjust to conditions created by privatization. They must embrace privatization, but the way in which this process has started in certain countries, Romania, for example, threatens a serious decline in standards and achievements.

Because of austerity budgets, inevitable in the transition period, the financing of the universities remains a problem, even if the private sector is trying to become a source of major subsidies. Fundamental research, both in the social sciences and in the humanities, is insufficiently supported. While we see that populist pressures support a certain modest scale of wages, they do not encourage scientific production. What is to be done, particularly in this time when the transition in the East is coincident with an economic recession in Western Europe?

Relatively stable from the beginning of the century, the curriculum of the West European universities underwent very rapid changes during the 1960s. The reforms of the 1960s and 1970s adapted the culture of scholarship to the requirements of advanced industrial society. What came out of those reforms now requires another reform. The problem of the new reform is to adjust the culture of scholarship to the requirements of postindustrial society, to European unification. The university must concern itself with training students for certain jobs, for carrying out independent and critical research, but also for extending knowledge. Unification of these goals has remained a problem, especially in the universal passage to mass universities which concentrates attention mainly on the first of these objectives. Research has been split up, and, lacking a coherent strategy of development, rarely answers the requirements of the second goal either.

Modern society constantly puts forward demands for technical education to serve its several functions: "economy," the need for an

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education that will make possible the working of the economic system; "mobility," the selection of the better instructed part of the population, allowing them to rise; "policy," the preservation of the system of government; "innovation," the stimulation of creation; and "transmission," the retaining of the main patterns of society.[27] The weight of these demands vary, but they are always present and cannot be satisfied without consolidating the status of science within the university, relating it to industry, trade, and administration. Although some have done a great deal to realize this, many European universities, under the constant imperative of reducing their budgets, have not sufficiently developed their technical education; they keep it in a subordinate position.

The connection of higher education to contemporary life, to competitiveness and scientific productivity, calls for innovation. The culture of scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe must keep pace with and incorporate the academic culture of Western Europe, which is itself in full process of change.

ENDNOTES

[1]Herbert Scurla, *Wilhelm von Humboldt* (Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1970), 341.

[2]Helmuth Plessner, *Diesseits der Utopie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), 132–33.

[3]Scurla, *Wilhelm von Humboldt,* 334–35.

[4]Ibid., 343–44.

[5]In Humboldt's view, the university was not only a school but also a common enterprise (*Einrichtung*) of professors and students, aiming at the harmonious formation of their personalities and, by dint of research and teaching, of humanity as a whole. He had in view an "*allseitigen Ausbildung des Individuums zum harmonischen Menschen*" through "*Wissenschaft,*" understood as "*reine Idee,*" and finally through philosophy, understood as the preserver of the unity of knowledge.

[6]Scurla, *Wilhelm von Humboldt,* 251–52.

[7]Jürgen Habermas, "Die Idee der Universität—Lernprozesse," in Jürgen Habermas, *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 85.

[8]Karl Jaspers and Karl Rossemann, *Die Idee der Universität* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1961), 36.

[9]Helmut Schelsky, *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* (Hamburg: Nanos, 1963), 274. See also Helmut Schelsky, "Grundzüge einer neuen Universität," in Paul Mikat and Helmut Schelsky, *Grundzüge einer neuen Universität* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1966), 35–70.

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[10]Niklas Luhmann, "Perspektiven für Hochschulpolitik," in Niklas Luhmann, *Soziologische Erklärung* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1987), 217–18.

[11]Habermas, "Die Idee der Universität—Lernprozesse," 95.

[12]Dieter Henrich, "Die Krise der Universität in vereinigten Deutschland," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 11 (1992): 1245. See also Manfred Eigen, "Die deutsche Universität—Vielfalt der Formen, Einfalt der Reformen," in Hans Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Manfred Eigen et al., *Die Idee der Universität, Versuch einer Standortbestimmung* (Berlin: Springer, 1989).

[13]Edmund J. King, *Education and Social Change* (Oxford, London, New York: Pergamon Press, 1966), 166.

[14]See Alois Schardt and Manfred Brauneiser (Hrsg.), *Kulturpolitik in Europa. Bildungswesen und Schulreformen in Frankreich, England, Italien, Skandinavien und den Niederlanden* (München: Ehsearwirth, 1966).

[15]Ibid., 27.

[16]Ernst Bloch, "Universität, Marxismus, Philosophie," in Ernst Bloch, *Uber Karl Marx* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968), 133.

[17]Ralf Dahrendorf, R*eflexions sur la revolution en Europe 1989–1990* (Paris: Seuil, 1991), 31.

[18]See Vesna Pusic, "A New Agenda for the Social Sciences"; Fatos Tarifa, "Is There a Future for the Social Sciences in Albania?"; Atanas Gontchev, "Education and Research in the Social Sciences: Transition Dilemmas in Bulgaria"; Jiří Musil, "Education and Research in the Czech Republic: Burden of the Past and Hope for the Future"; and Rudolf Andorka, "Institutional Changes and Intellectual Trends in Hungarian Social Sciences," all contributions in *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (1) (Winter 1993).

[19]Etienne Balibar, *Les frontiers de la democratie* (Paris: La Decouverte, 1992), 208.

[20]Hans Georg Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 31.

[21]Pierre Deyon, "University Networking for Europe," *CREAction* (3) (1992): 28.

[22]Howard Newby, "Developing a Research Profile Preparing for Innovation," *CREAction* (4) (1992): 89.

[23]David Melville, "The Value of University Studies," *CREAction* (4) (1992): 51.

[24]Wolfgang Frühwald, "European Dimension of Research," *CREAction* (4) (1992): 69.

[25]Detlef Glowka, "Neue Bildungsziele für Europa?," in Marianne Krüger-Potratz (Hrsg.), *Europa 1993 und die Lehrerbildung,* Universität Münster, 1991, 49–51.

[26]Martin Heidegger, *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität: Das Rektorat (1933–1934)* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 15.

[27]P. W. Musgrave, "Constant Factors in the Demand for Technical Education, 1860–1960," in P. W. Musgrave, ed., *Sociology, History and Education* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970), 143–45.

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NOTES FROM THE PAST

Thirty years ago, *Dædalus* published an issue entitled "A New Europe?." Any number of the essays bear rereading. Given the importance of Professor Eric Weil in the activities of *Dædalus* during that period, it seemed appropriate to end this issue with some of his observations on "Philosophical and Political Thought in Europe Today." One wonders whether comparable reflections today will be alive three decades from now.

Eric Weil

Philosophical and Political Thought in Europe Today

WHAT IS GOING ON IN EUROPEAN political and philosophical thinking? The question looks as natural as natural could be. Can it be answered? Of course, it can: as the Schoolmen said, and quite rightly, from the reality of a thing you can always infer that the thing is possible; and articles, books, talks, lectures on The Present Situation are offered everywhere. But is there an objective answer, an answer whose truth can be proved in the ordinary ways of proving a point, a thesis, a theory? Where are the facts, the documents, and, above all, where is that consensus which constitutes and expresses what we are used to call truth? Maybe such an objective approach could be found; we might try to analyze books, articles, declarations, we could measure their relative importance, for example, by comparing selling figures, audio-visual appeal, student preferences for this or that teacher, this or that subject, and so on. But unfortunately all these means would

Eric Weil was a distinguished philosopher and a long-time member of the Board of Editors at Dædalus.

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not be of much help. People who are in the public eye as a rule belong to generations not educated during the period under review, books need a long time, not only before they are written and printed, but also before they start to act, and tests are particularly suspect in a field where values fundamental for those who believe in them must be proclaimed and must become, before they are proclaimed, what they ordinarily are not, that is, conscious.

It is probably true of all history which pretends to something more than chronological tables and sound calendars of state and other papers that, even ideally, it cannot attain objectivity in the meaning the term has in the so-called exact sciences; in any case, the thesis would apply to present-day "history" and, signally so, to the "history" of present thought. The argument is old, and it has very often been overstated: if there is no total objectivity in history, there is a concept and there are criteria of lack of objectivity, of falseness, of pious and other frauds; it suffices to show in any given case that relevant facts and phenomena have been left out, misrepresented, wrongly appreciated, etc. To do that is the task and content of discussion. The present author hereby admits that he wants above all to start such a discussion. Nobody knows his time, but nobody will ever know anything about it unless discussion brings out what it is and is not; in other words, unless somebody begins to propose something, although he knows quite well the limits of his, and even of all possible knowledge in this field.

A first view of the European scene will unavoidably leave the impression, at least as far as the Continent is concerned, that nothing has changed since the last war, or even since the last years before the war. Marx and Freud remain heroes and leaders, Husserl and Heidegger are being discussed everywhere, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard exert an ever growing influence. The momentum of this influence stems from prewar days, and it is far from being spent; even existentialism, whatever that term may mean, could easily be considered as nothing but an offspring of rather old families. Religious, economical, social problems—there is no lack of them and they certainly are not forgotten and repressed. But excepting the first bubbling years after hostilities had come to an end, there is an astonishing absence of things new and felt as new. It would be difficult, unless one would want to put in this line the first books of Sartre and Camus in France, to quote one single work

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which has had the decisive influence of, for instance, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus,* Heidegger's *Time and Being,* even Bergson's *Two Sources of Morals and Religion,* the work of the Vienna Circle, or, in another field, the publication of Durckheim, Pareto, Max Weber, Keynes. The old great men, living or dead, dominate the scene to such an extent that the only new, relatively new, movement, existentialism in its French form, is receding before older, sometimes very old, currents. Existentialism survives only in the field of political discussion, a field whose structures are characterized and determined by other concepts, other vectors, other problems than those of existentialism proper. No young man is really interested in knowing if his comrades are existentialists; what he wants to know is if they are Marxists or not, and if Marxists, if they are "orthodox" Communists or "deviationists" and "revisionists," if they put their trust in planning and social organizing, if they are believing and practicing Christians and, if so, if they think they can be at the same time real Christians and real "progressives" and/or real Freudians.

That is the way it looks at first. But nobody who has known Europe before 1939 will be able to suppress an uneasy feeling before such a statement. Something is changed; what is it? The best word, if any single word can be sufficient, might be *demythization.* The term has originated in the theological field, and its meaning has to be slightly modified for our purpose, since in the land of its origin it signifies the attempt to free the Christian tradition from contents which, "natural" in their time, have become inadmissible for the "scientific" thinking of our contemporaries, but whose religious significance can be maintained as opposed to their, for us, magical or mythical form. In this strict sense the concept could not possibly be applied to philosophical and political thinking. Theories do not rely on events, and when they are abandoned they grow "obsolete," "narrow," "only partially true," and so forth; but on the other hand they can lose what one may well call their mythical appeal, the place they occupy as the bottom layer of value systems, as the last presuppositions, the axioms wherefrom all other values are established or refused, all other theorems deduced, and which, quite evidently, are neither in need or capable of demonstration. The "big theories" have lost this kind of appeal. Everybody is a Marxist if somebody is a Marxist simply because he insists on the paramount

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importance of economical, social, historical factors, or does not think that preaching alone will heal or hide the ills of this world; but there are not many left whose whole life is guided by the star of transhistorical hope. And the same applies in other cases.

It would be tedious to dress a list of all the creeds, theories, value systems which have suffered this fate, this dreary fate, if you look at it through the eyes of a "true" believer. Anyhow, we shall have to mention different developments of this kind, and their meaning. Generally speaking, though, it is everywhere the same thing: ideals are not dead, they are not even forgotten, certainly not repudiated; but rare are the people who act on them. They sometimes make themselves felt in a negative manner: I can't do this, I can't admit of that, because my whole way of thinking (and in most cases, it would be better to say "my whole past") goes against it. But conversions are exceptional, and so are splits and schisms of any importance. True, there have been and always are schismatic tendencies in the Communist movements of western Europe. It concerns mainly the intellectual fringe of the Party; and it is less directed against the fundamental tenets than against their dogmatic interpretation by the authorities of the church (which authorities, by the way, don't hesitate to call one another schismatic and heretical). The phenomenon could be compared to one of these squabbles among specialists—as they happen, for example, between different denominations of psychoanalysts, anthropologists, economists—were it not that there is a very real Communist church, or some such churches, all of them gifted not only with good strong voices, but also with good strong teeth which they are not afraid of using. There is no real danger when you leave the Italian or French Party, but in other places such betrayal would be rather bad for you: the consequence is that even outside the pale when people protest they feel like heroic and slightly anxious Luthers.

There is then no deep or general yearning after martyrdom. It might be said that there never was: a martyr is somebody who suffers because suffering is the only means he has to further his party. The objection is quite pertinent, but it does not refute the thesis, it confirms it. If there are no martyrs, the reason is that there is not much persecution. The people who could persecute other people don't like to do it and are afraid that martyrs might once again sow positive convictions. They prefer to act on the assump-

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tion, very rarely belied, that opinions do not matter for them as long as they don't trouble peace and order. And they don't as a rule. There have been cases, as during and after the fighting in Algeria; but on one side the convictions, old and traditional ones, meant something only to the most traditionalistic milieux and the uprooted, while on the other hand a group of romantic youngsters was torn between an extreme form of nationalism and a revolutionary pacifism ready to fight for other nations' nationalism.

But these are exceptions, and they are less inspired by dogmatic theories than by an antidogmatic revolt, unless they originate in the small and quickly disappearing traditionalistic circles. The results are sometimes quaint: General de Gaulle is probably a believer, and the people voted for him. But they did not vote for Greatness, Independence, World Politics; they liked the man who had ended the bad business of the Algerian war, had subdued the (religiously) nationalistic army officers, and established order and sound finances. If it is a question of creeds, the situation might be compared to the conditions prevailing after the Wars of Religion: at long last people had found out that convictions had to become personal affairs so that they might be kept out of the field of politics and social life. (Those who did not understand it, like Louis XIV, had to pay for it.) The comparison, as most comparisons, is only partially correct. There have been political earthquakes in Europe after the war, but no civil strife—not even the Hungarian uprising—for reasons of conviction. The fact is that governments, and not only in western Europe, do not go in for that sort of conflict, and contemporary public opinion, perhaps the greatest force in democratic countries, is not easily scandalized, not to say that it has become unscandalizable as long as it is a matter of creeds and opinions and teachings.

So there is no great desire or much opportunity for martyrdom of the dogmatic species. The restriction is important—of the dogmatic species—for it would be easy to find people going in for heroic deeds and self-sacrifice, but rather against orthodoxy as such, whatever its contents, than in favor of a new orthodoxy (we shall have to consider this phenomenon under the heading of existentialism). If what older generations called ideas and ideals are at stake, it would be hard to discover the kind of acting and fighting faith old Marxists possessed, or old liberals, agnostics, religious sectarians. The general feeling is that something can be said for every opinion,

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and something against it: the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The point is probably best illustrated by the lip-service paid to the poor old "last values" by *all* parties. Everybody is for freedom, justice, democracy, equality, progress, order; so people quite understandably ask themselves if this touching unanimity does not empty the hallowed words of all content and meaning. They prefer to discuss concrete proposals instead of ideas. There always are ideological families, but no Salvation Armies.

But ideological families do exist. They are even very much alive, in spite of demythization; if we don't live according to our convictions, our ideas will interest us all the more, to the point of forming the center of our intellectual occupations. That is quite understandable. On the one hand, we need something to occupy our minds; on the other, what has been called here demythization remains a new development.

The statement, though, needs some rather important qualifications. The development is new. In fact, it is the result far more of European reconstruction and construction than of the war. On the contrary, immediately after the war, during that period of social trouble, misery, starvation, new frontiers, violent or simply illegal changes of government, the mythic (or if you prefer the ideological) factor was probably more prevalent than it ever had been. And even if we think only of Europe's present face, it would not be true to say that "demythization" has been absolutely victorious: there are many people in France or Italy who believe in Communism, believe in the sense that they stick to the dogma as long as dogma is being talked about and live like most other people the remainder of their time (which explains that these countries have had no more, perhaps even less, and less grave, social unrest than countries where Communism is practically nonexistent). There are people in Germany who believe in economic liberalism in exactly the same way, protesting against state intervention on principle (and as long as it works rather in the other man's interest) and forget easily that their own business would not go so well if the state did not intervene all the time in order to protect them against crises and slumps and did not, to quote only one concrete example, maintain from public means the whole of agriculture and the corresponding part of buying power. There are even people who believe in monarchy for France, neo-naziism for Germany, a renascence of fascism for Italy.

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But then new things are new only as long as the old things are alive: nobody but a historian of science would call Galilei's physics new since the old physics has disappeared. Demythization is a new trend, which means that it is neither the only one nor, statistically, the dominating one; it is simply characteristic of our time as far as it is modern.

Even circumscribed in this way the thesis does not mean that the great words have lost every kind of appeal. "Reaction" remains always a bad thing, "progress," "liberty," "justice," "rationality" are good ones. The change lies elsewhere. It consists simply in this, that not many people in Europe would follow a leader who promises them freedom or justice or whatever else without telling them in what precisely the new freedom or the greater justice would consist. Europeans have become wary; not of words, but of what the man who uses them really does mean—"really" meaning practically. What they want is not so much liberty or greatness or abstract equality; they are out for better living standards, freer access to cultural goods, more security for their families and for their old age. A good proof can be found in the recent attitudes of the two biggest international (or supranational) forces, the Communist movement and the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church insists more and more on the necessity of positive relations with other denominations, on the importance of social problems, and on the need for ways to penetrate social strata which have lost, if they ever had, every relation to the faith and its representatives. The Communists, at least the European kind (and in this context Russia is a part of Europe) proclaim more and more clearly, even emphatically, the necessity of material, in contradistinction to ideological, motivations and incentives, to the point that in Mr. Khrushchev's eyes the struggle between the two big world systems comes to a simple competition in efficiency. The victory of his system is unavoidable in his view, not because the stars or the course of History (with a capital H) have preordained that outcome, but because his way will lead to the production of more and more goods at ever lower prices in human toil and privations and will so convince all convincible people and simply outbid the people who refuse to see, not at all the absolute truth of Communism, but what is good and profitable for them and theirs.

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If this is true of movements whose very origin and fundament has always been the conviction that they possess *the* truth and which have succeeded because they were, notwithstanding facts, able to convince their adherents that they were right, if one may say so, *essentially,* if their leaders speak in this manner (the NCO's, as always, are often a bit slow), it is not surprising if other organizations have dropped their last ideological drapings. Of revolutionary syndicalism there remains nothing outside some parts of Spain, and the often small differences on points of dogma which separate every ideological party from its neighbors to the left and to the right don't play an important part in political life any more. It may be tactics if the French Socialists and Communists are not refusing a priori every kind of understanding with the defenders of denominational schools; if Italian left wing socialists are favoring a government which supports the European Common Market and NATO; if German Social-Democrats have practically renounced, perhaps not their whole Marxist credo, but at least its revolutionary implications and do not consider as impossible political collaboration with Christian Democrats; if the Holy See does not refuse all contact with unholy Moscow. All that may be tactics, as well as the recent offer by the French Communist Party of an alliance with the Socialists even if a Socialist government stuck to the Atlantic Alliance and went on working for a unified Europe. It may be tactics, but it would be quite a remarkable coincidence if no deeper changes were at work behind this identity of tactics; and it would be impossible to explain the still more important fact that these tactics are being followed by the people, which would scarcely be the case if they seemed inadmissible to them.

Considered under this angle, the situation looks as if a new kind of "Americanization" were taking place, not simply the old one of more and more efficiency, more and more productivity, better and better living standards, but another one, on an ideological, or rather anti-ideological level. Political thought is becoming increasingly realistic, governments are judged not according to their fidelity to the faith but according to their results; political parties are no more parties in the continental sense of the word but are changing into that type of indeterminate associations which Americans know under that name: rather different families than different thoughts, rather diffferent ways of going to the same end than a difference of

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ends, rather a question of temperament and tradition—what the English, with a term unfortunately dropped by our political language, called a "connection." Even political thought and thought on politics seem to follow American precedent: the same kind of scientific, statistical analysis; the same patient, painstaking, efficient group work; the same sticking to particular events and factors ("the elections of. . .," "the political geography of. . .," "political choices and income groups, religious convictions, instruction," "mass media and their influence," "decision making," and so on and so forth); the same shyness before subjects like "the State," "Society," "Authority" if they are taken quite generally (or philosophically); the same absence of new gospels and new utopias; the same down-to-earth realism.

All that is perfectly true. But, as it happens so often, the same phenomena are the result of very different forces, and their significance, for that reason, is not the same here and there. Americans, above all when they are looking at European "intellectuals" and ideological movements, are priding themselves upon their sense for realities and for really relevant issues. Europeans, as a rule, are rather ashamed if they have to come down to facts, statistics, practical questions—to the level, in other words, where compromise is a natural necessity. In fact, at least in the present writer's opinion, European realism, though hidden, perhaps because hidden, goes far deeper than the American species. Not only words and ideas, but those fundamental attitudes which seem to influence very strongly American opinion and political life are without any effect in Europe. Nowhere in Europe would the rule of law or the sacred character of the Constitution bring the people to their feet otherwise than for simple cheering; and even writers who, from deeply felt convictions, publish incendiary tracts in defense of individual rights would not be prepared to lead even a campaign of passive obedience (or disobedience), not in any case with the slightest hope of even relatively widespread support (there have been isolated cases, for example, in France during the Algerian trouble). Voluntary associations do of course exist, but the French or Italian factory and office worker does not like to pay dues (things are different in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the northern countries). Strikes are therefore rather numerous (and a nuisance) than long lasting and economically and technically formidable. On the one

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hand, it needs a lot of provocation, on the other, near desperation, to unleash a serious movement. The last big strikes in the Walloon part of Belgium and in the French coal fields found their strength in roots of a noneconomical nature and lasted because important parts of the nations and influential groups not directly involved supported the strikers morally and financially. But strictly political strikes are outdated, and the more than seven years of fighting in Algeria never permitted even the Communist Party to make an essential issue of this question and to militate in favor of "freedom for the oppressed," nor did the cry of "defense of the rights of France and of the French settlers" touch more than the settlers and part of the army. (The issue was a "moral" one for Italian and German writers far more than for political—as opposed to literary—opinion in France.) Examples could be multiplied *ad infinitum*; there has been no fight over decolonization in the European countries, none for national independence in the economical field (not even in the case of the "neutral" countries), none over public ownership of industries or obligatory health insurance. As long as things are going reasonably well people worry in their declarations but are not prepared to pay from their pockets for a "good cause," not even to vote for it as long as more "serious" problems are coming up.

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